Protection and Provision Pacts
Contentious politics (conflict) is a foundation for forming the patterns of cooperation between elites (coalitions) that, in turn, shape parties, states, and regimes (institutions). The coalition is seen as a group of people who enjoy the benefits of the current political regime or the policy of the current leader (Waldner 34). The primary issue about the existence of a coalition is what types of coalitions may operate under the authoritarian regimes, and what influence they may have on the governments.
There are two types of coalitions – protection pacts and provision pacts. Both types exist under the authoritarian political regime. Protection pacts are characterized by the fact that they are pro-authoritarian. They become the ground for the cooperation of the upper levels of society based on the shared perception of threat seen in the ruling government. The members of these coalitions are usually among the communal leaders, economic elites, state officials, and some representatives of the middle class (Slater Ordering Power: Contentious Politics, State-Building, and Authoritarian Durability in Southeast Asia 12). What should be noted is that they possess the best leadership skills and positions in their class. The motivation for creating such pacts is to withhold the resources from the opposition endowing the stated and the regime with the strategic resources thus providing it with the three types of power – coercive, symbolic, and remunerative (Etzioni 1961). The direction of resources is from elites to the political Leviathan (See Figure 1).
As of provision pacts, they are a polarity of the protection pacts. They are created mainly to exhaust the powers of the authoritarian regime (Slater Ordering Power: Contentious Politics, State-Building, and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia 17-18). The primary difference is that the resources flow from the political Leviathan because most representatives of elites oppose it (See Figure 2).
The Impact of Domination and Fragmentation of Post-War State Building in Asia
Intra-elite relations can be characterized by three models of relations – domination, fragmentation, and militarization. Domination and fragmentation had the most significant impact on post-war state building in Asia. Domination is about the elite that dominates in the decisions regarding the future of its state. It means that if there are any local rebellions, the elite does everything possible to avoid the escalation of conflict and maintain peace. Domination is the way to describe all countries in Southeastern Asia except for Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines. They experienced anti-communist spirits and pro-Western alliances and enjoyed stable economic growth. Philippines and Thailand were a bright example of fragmentation. In this case, the elite is weak and cannot unite the masses inside the country. It leads to intra-group conflicts and unrest. The results of fragmentation in these countries were the difficulties with the economic development and social turmoil (Slater Ordering Power: Contentious Politics, State-Building, and Authoritarian Durability in Southeast Asia 27).
The Underlying Reasons for a Dominant and a Fragmented State
Contentious politics has some key elements such as mass unrest, racial riots, and rebellions. The ability to cope with them using fiscal levers is what defines the further path of the state – whether it will become a dominant or a fragmented state. Why taxation? Because taxes are a stable source of finances that can be directed to strengthening the military potential of the state. That said, a dominant state is the state of unity while a fragmented state is that living in unrest and swept by rebellions. It means that the local conflict is the worst threat to building a dominant state because it precludes the elite from uniting the masses. Moreover, it is meant that the rebellions are usually dispersed in location and are based on ethnicity. The challenge emerges because the state fails to build the same fiscal power all over the country. It is especially true for distant parts of the states that are hard to reach. In addition to it, it is easier to deal with the treats of the same ethnic or religious community because you know the mentality of this group (Slater Ordering Power: Contentious Politics, State-Building, and Authoritarian Durability in Southeast Asia 27, 83).
Categorizing Thailand and Malaysia
Thailand and Malaysia are similar because they both witnessed the periods of domestic insurgencies. What they differ in is the way they managed to turn them into state-building opportunities. That said, Malaysia is an example of a dominant state while Thailand has become a fragmented state. The motivation for such categorization is that Malaysia found a way to strengthen through the domestic insurgencies (Centeno 34). The ruling elite of Malaysia managed to conduct effective fiscal policy because it was concerned about the threats to their economic welfare coming from the lower classes (Kaufman 86-87). Thailand, on the other hand, failed to become a dominant state and ended up as a fragmented one. The primary reason for the difference is in the control and influence of minorities. It means that in the case of Malaysia, different local elites influenced the local groups, while in the case of Thailand there was only a central apparatus of power that did not have such control.
Works Cited
Centeno, Miguel Angel. “Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America.” American Journal of Sociology 102.6 (1997): 1565- 1605.
Etzioni, Amitai. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates. New York, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. Print.
Kaufman, Robert R. “Liberalization and Democratization in South America: Perspectives from the 1970s.” Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Eds. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Slater, Dan. Ordering Power: Contentious Politics, State-Building, and Authoritarian Durability in Southeast Asia. Diss. Emory University, 2005. Print.
Ordering Power: Contentious Politics, State-Building, and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Print.
Waldner, David. State Building and Late Development. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999. Print.