Introduction
Articles âWhy Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bombâ and âThe Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Useâ explore possible models which can be used to determine the foundation for the creation, storage, and use of nuclear weapons. The first article, written by Sagan, investigates three approaches to discussing nuclear proliferation and proves that each of these models could be used to point out particular reasons for countriesâ decision making. On the other hand, the second article by Tannenwald focuses on one model and argues for its superiority in explaining the reasons for not using nuclear weapons. Both authors present a strong case for using the norms model for analyzing countriesâ nuclear armaments, although Tannenwaldâs arguments fail to account for other models while Saganâs thesis incorporates a more collaborative approach.
Summary, Examples, Critique
In his article, Sagan introduces three models of reasoning that help determine why countries make certain decisions related to nuclear weapons. These approaches include the security model based on the realist view, the domestic politics model, and the norms model (Sagan 56). The first approach argues that countries decide to create nuclear weapons because of their national security concerns (Sagan 57). Here, the model claims that continuous proliferation occurs due to nations wanting to have a strategic advantage over their rivals. The author gives such examples as the USâ first incident of rapid development based on the concern of losing its technological advantage and the USSRâs decision to create nuclear weapons to restore the balance of power (Sagan 58). The second model is founded on a belief that a countryâs domestic reasons are more significant in promoting weaponsâ development (Sagan 63). Finally, the last model argues that the worldâs idea of nuclear weapons influences countries’ decisions to either produce more bombs or engage in disarmament treaties (Sagan 73).
The author argues that while the security model is often regarded to be the most viable due to its wide range of suitable examples, its depth of analysis is insufficient to review every situation. For this purpose, other models should be utilized. Moreover, the norms model, often overlooked for its focus on ânuclear symbolism,â is highlighted as a valuable method of analyzing nuclear decision-making as it offers a point of view that is different from the realist-based arguments (Sagan 73). The authorâs examples are numerous as he supplies each type of model with multiple cases. The analysis of models does not attempt to deter readers from using them but encourages future research to consider a more prominent focus on the norms. The article does not appear to possess any substantial flaws as it presents a solid case for showing all models as incomplete on their own but useful in collaboration. However, the author does not produce any definite conclusions which may be considered the articleâs weakness.
The article by Tannenwald takes a different approach, focusing on the norms model to analyze some conflicts of the US and explain the concept of taboos present in the discussion of nuclear weaponsâ use. Here, the realist view is regarded as an incomplete and often incorrect basis for analysis because it fails to explain the lack of nuclear weapons’ usage after 1945 (Tannenwald 433). The author states that the normative element should be considered in the discussion of non-use of nuclear weapons. This model implies that the worldâs views of nuclear weapons changed over the years and shifted from treating them as usual armaments to the last possible option (Tannenwald 437). Tannenwald notes that a nuclear taboo established in the world after some historical events prohibits counties from engaging nuclear weapons in conflicts and frames this type of weaponry as immoral.
In this case, the power of a taboo can influence countries because norms and regulations exist in every culture and nation and are hard to challenge (Tannenwald 440). The article investigates multiple armed conflicts that involved the US, including the bombing of Japan the Korean War, and others. Across these events, the role of nuclear weapons changes from being a way of stopping conflicts and preventing losses to an idea that is not even considered. The author provides a plethora of examples to support the concept of taboos and prove that materialism cannot explain the change in nuclear weaponsâ development rates. However, she fails to regard other theories, which may weaken her argument and make it one-dimensional.
Comparison
Both articles construct a case for using the norms model to analyze countriesâ nuclear weapon development processes. However, the first research takes into consideration the benefits of other approaches and agrees that none of the models are perfect to use separately from each other. The article by Tannenwald, on the other hand, emphasizes the usefulness of the normative basis and fails to acknowledge its limitations, revealing the flaw of the second research. Moreover, both reports present many examples to support their arguments. Sagan examines countriesâ relationship during and after conflicts, and Tannenwald investigates the USâ decisions in conflicts. The arguments for using norms and taboos seem reliable although the nature of both ideas in highly theoretical and hard to prove.
Conclusion
The described articles by Sagan and Tannenwald investigate the importance of norms and taboos in countriesâ relationship with nuclear weapons. Both researchers construct a strong case for using this model for analysis and present many examples to support their position. However, Sagan fails to provide the audience with an affirmative and reliable conclusion, while Tannenwald dismisses the importance of other approaches neglecting them in favor of one model.
Works Cited
Sagan, Scott D. âWhy Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb.â International Security, vol. 21, no. 3, 1997, pp. 54-86.
Tannenwald, Nina. âThe Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use.â International Organization, vol. 53, no. 3, 1999, pp. 433-468.