The problem of knowledge acquisition or epistemology is on the agenda today as it reveals the bias concerning its justification. The devised theories help to comprehend the essence of knowledge acquiring and its major goal. Many philosophers argue about the ways of regress problem resolution. The recent debates in epistemology were devoted to the regress problem solution relying on infinitism and foundationalism. In that regard, Ginet rejects the Klein theory of justifies beliefs thus putting forward his theory of inferential justification. Ginet is sure that inferential justification is impossible to ramify incessantly. The debate called Is infinitism is the solution of the problem, Ginet presents the ideas that justified beliefs are not based on plausible examples and therefore they infer. To divert the idea of justified beliefs he gives a grounded argument about priority premise beliefs.
Ginet gives the examples of non-inferential justification based on experience and understanding. He is confident that those factors are sufficient to accept the belief. Hence, the prior theory proves that understanding is a diligent ground for justification that does not require inference. His simple and evidence-based example completely justifies his theory of finitism and simplifies the Klein’s theory. The assumption turns out to be rather successful as it resolves the justification regress and epistemic regress in particular.
Another strong point of his response lies in the admission of notion of availability. Due to that, justification could be supported by the personal self-awareness and responsibility. Relying on his example, he supports the idea that experience and lack of awareness give the right to believe that the premise is true. The thorough examination of his point of view shows that in fact the example does not involve any references on the inference but is framed within one justification. In comparison with Klein’s arguments, concerning the availability of knowledge, justification cannot be always subjected to reason even if it is implicit. In addition, Ginet is confident that in this particular case there must be other ways for justification such as non-inferential. Because Ginet identifies the available reasons with potential ones, he is more inclined to think of the initial justification, which is a good explanation of the regress. Therefore, it is the initial justification is based on the premise it does not mean that refers to the inference, as the reason could be provisional as well. Another advantage of Ginet’s response lies in the fact that if justification is infinite series of beliefs, it could define the initial reason of the justification.
Other questions discussed during the debates and Ginet’s response have the right to existence. Hence, Ginet presents his innovative approach to the regress problem where inference could not generate series of justified beliefs, as the actual chain of them is not justified at all. To my mind, the finite chains of the beliefs are more warrant than the infinite ones as they are based on personal experience and visual practice. Further, in case the infinite chain of beliefs has at least one wrong assumption, the whole chain could be broken.
In conclusion, the consideration of non-inferential justification is more evidence-ground and credible as it is based on responsibility and self-awareness. Therefore, the foundalist theory is more relevant for the solution of the epistemic regress. In addition, Ginet’s finite series is proved by numerous reasonable examples that are hard to reject.
Works Cited
Steup, Matthias, and Sosa, Ernest. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. US: Willey-Blackwell, 2005, p. 147.