Militarization of the American Foreign Policy Research Paper

Introduction

The militarization of U.S. foreign policy is an ongoing debate among researchers, politicians, and citizens. Some of the debate participants name the invasion of Iraq, the First Gulf War, and the war in Afghanistan as evidence that U.S. foreign policy relies significantly on a so-called “creeping invasion” that is supported by policies and decisions of officials and congressional representatives. Others, however, believe that the Pentagon is the major influence on the creeping invasion. The importance of the topic is in the inevitable impact of the rising power of the military on the USA, its image in the press, perception by other state leaders, and influence on American citizens. The current approach of the USA to foreign policy is called the 3D approach: defense, diplomacy, and development. Although it does emphasize the importance of diplomacy, the first word, “defense,” characterizes the perception of the foreign policy as a tool for regulating defense depending on the military’s needs and aims. To understand the processes that affect and govern U.S. foreign policy, one needs to examine recent and past military events more closely.

The gradual growth in responsibilities and funding of the military, the seeming need for the development of defense forces due to terrorism, and the rising number of humanitarian support missions that are led by the military indicate the high level of involvement of the Department of Defense into the U.S. foreign policy.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Militarization

To understand how the militarization of the U.S. foreign policy became possible, it is necessary to see what historical events shaped it. In the 1950s, the United States was aiming to support global containment in order to stop communism from rising in other countries. The American military involvement in the Korean War was necessary to prevent any control from communist North Korea over democratic South Korea.ⁱ The war ended in 1953, but American troops are still posted on South Korea’s border with North Korea. The war in Vietnam started due to the U.S. concept of containment as well, but as it did not end in victory, American citizens expressed disappointment in the American military, and the State briefly refrained from involving in major conflicts due to “the Vietnam syndrome.”

However, this reluctance to use military power did not last long.ⁱⁱ One of the most prominent examples of military involvement in U.S. foreign policy is the Cold War. The strategy of deterrence (persuading the rival state that the costs of an attack would be too high and outweigh any benefits) was actively used during the time of the nuclear arms race between the USA and the USSR. As direct conflict could potentially result in nuclear catastrophe, both superpowers used other states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as locations for battle. In 1987, U.S. and USSR state leaders Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty that paved the path for further elimination of nuclear missiles in both states.ⁱⁱⁱ In 1991, the USSR ceased to exist, and the USA had to reconsider the role of its military power in the world.

Militarization of Policy after 9/11

If during the Cold War era the USA acknowledged the USSR’s right to develop nuclear missiles, the approach to “the war on terror,” declared after the terrorist attacks on September 11 in 2001, was different. The role of the Department of Defense in intelligence gathering and analysis grew significantly, and the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command (SOCOM) “was given the leader role to synchronize the global war on terror,” a power which was not granted the CIA, a civilian agency.^iv The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which was a part of SOCOM, participated in the shadow war against al-Qaeda operatives by finding and killing them in Afghanistan. The emphasis on the war on terror resulted in the use of the military in nation-building, stabilization, and reconstruction; the civilian side of the American government did not have resources for such rapid mobilization and was not able to provide humanitarian assistance that would be as competent as the Pentagon’s working groups were. Additionally, both the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development remained underfunded during the 1990s, and when at the beginning of the 2000s post-conflict reconstruction was necessary, Bush’s administration had to choose the Department of Defense as a more suitable (and well-funded) actor for ensuring stabilization in fragile states.^v

The Department of Defense’s role in stabilization went beyond combat zones. For example, the Pentagon developed its own security assistance programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, although traditionally these were carried out by the state “under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961”.^vi After the eruption of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense’s security assistance programs were regulated by its own authorities and funded through the Department’s budget. The development of the programs was so active that by 2011 the Department of Defense provided up to 70% of U.S. security assistance to foreign states.^vii Today the Department has responsibilities in various areas of foreign policy, such as military diplomacy, relationships with foreign security forces, economic assistance, governance advising, etc. Civilian institutions related to foreign policy are unable to provide as many resources to support the stabilization and reconstruction of the regions, which decreases their ability to influence U.S. foreign policy.

The Imbalance between Institutions

This wide influence of the Department of Defense (DoD) did not emerge at once. Instead, the imbalance between the civilian and military institutions led to the increasing domination of the Department in U.S. foreign policy. First, it is important to consider budgeting. The defense budget in 2013 was $600 billion a year, twelve times the size of the budget provided to civilian institutions.^viii Furthermore, the Department’s workforce is much larger than that of the State Department and USAID: approximately 1.5 million active-duty forces and 770,000 civilians (28% of federal civil service) are employed at DoD, whereas 19,000 Foreign Service officers and civil servants work at the State, and USAID employs nearly 2,000 individuals. One should also remember that the DoD is present in more than 40 countries through permanently installed bases, with a total number of 660 bases.

However, it is not only the capabilities of the Department that define its influence on foreign affairs. The lack of coherence and unity in civilian agencies and institutions makes the imbalance even greater, resulting in DoD’s almost hegemonic control of foreign affairs. The Secretary of State does not have full authoritative oversight over the international funding, programs, policies, and projects that exist among civilian agencies.^ix The institutional diaspora is too broad because it includes programs that operate abroad, which cannot be controlled by the Secretary. A quick response from the Secretary to crises or opportunities in foreign institutions and programs is also impossible, and not all ambassadors are capable of coordinating the integration of projects at the mission level.^x Thus, civilian institutions are unable to compete with the DoD’s unity and organization.

Another problem that adversely influences the imbalance between these institutions is Congressional inability to “place boundaries on the military influence.”^xi The Congress members have little experience in military service (in 2013, only 22% of the Congress members had served in the military) and are afraid to speak against decisions of ranking officers because they can be perceived as not supportive of the troops. Eikenberry provides an example, indicating that when the members of Congress visited Afghanistan, they placed emphasis on photo shoots with the military and were generally passive and supportive during military briefings.^xii At the same time, during meetings with the civilian team in Kabul, these members were skeptical and sometimes confrontational. The problem was not in their skepticism toward the civilian group but the lack of it regarding military briefings and decisions.

The media’s ability to challenge the decisions and actions of the military is also impaired. Some journalists are reluctant to lose access to high-ranking officers by publishing materials that might cast a shadow on the military. Moreover, the media’s responsibility to cover daily news, innovations, celebrity life, and other news leaves little place for long, insightful research about expanding military influence. The emergence of embedded media (when journalists observe frontline combats to use them as sources for stories) has resulted in a one-perspective view of the picture, through which commanders are able to transfer the message.^xiii The excessive presentation of violence is also present in other types of media, which help normalize it. Giroux points out that violence is normalized not only in male characters but female (including underage) ones as well: in the movies Let Me In (2010), Hannah (2011), SuckerPunch (2011), “young girls are… valorized for their ability to produce high body counts”.^xiv One can also remember superhero movies such as Captain America: The First Avenger (2011), Captain America: Civil War (2016), X-Men: First Class (2011) that revolve around the presentation of war and violence with an emphasis on heroism and justice. Such normalization of violence interferes with civilians’ ability to understand that war is not always (if ever) heroic and again provides only one perspective on the issue, omitting the representation of those who have suffered from military invasions and now need humanitarian aid, successfully provided by the DoD. Thus, both Congress and the media support the imbalance between DoD and civilian agencies, although they might not be fully aware of this.

Modern Warfare as Means for Militarization

Ramos argues in her article that during Obama’s presidency, U.S. foreign policy began to from militarized to diplomatic.^xv The United States actively sought tools for aiding Arab nations that would support their freedom without involving the military. For example, the military would only be engaged if no diplomatic negotiations were able to regulate the activities of such countries as North Korea and Iran.^xvi Although it might be true that the administration under Obama actively strived after the demilitarization of the foreign policy, Glenny and Kavanagh point out that new methods of warfare were used to prevent Iran from creating its own nuclear arsenal, such as viruses.^xvii

Both the USA and Israel developed a specific set of viruses that could impair Iran’s nuclear development program by disrupting physical infrastructure, for example.^xviii The penetration of the military agencies into the online space does not only lead to data/intelligence gathering from the country’s citizens, but it also helps track down terrorists who engage in cybercrime to raise money.^xix The emergence of Stuxnet, a virus that was designed to disrupt the functioning mechanisms of pumps at uranium enrichment facilities in Iran, was a historic moment because it was the first use of cyber warfare officially acknowledged by the USA and Israel. The Obama administration leaked the information about the virus to The New York Times, which again proves that there was little demilitarization of foreign policy during that time.

The proof of the escalating militarization of U.S. foreign policy in the 2010s is the use of drones for targeted killing programs that was (and is) actively supported both by the Obama and Trump administrations. Although the public was concerned with this program, the Obama administration increased its influence, adding all military-age males in combat zones to the group of potential or active combatants. “Signature strikes” are aimed at high-value terrorists. Such strikes killed Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen who was a critic of the war on terror and helped recruit Al-Qaeda members in Yemen.^xx Al-Awlaki’s 16-year-old son was killed by drones ten days later. In 2017, al-Awlaki’s 8-year-old daughter was killed in a U.S. commando attack, this time ordered by Trump.^xxi Although the use of drones might appear as a good alternative to sending real American combatants to war zones, they replace diplomacy with quick, targeted killing that has the potential to worsen diplomatic ties between the USA and other countries rather than improve them, as not only terrorists but civilians die during these attacks.^xxii If the targeted killing program is not altered, the militarization of U.S. foreign policy will not de-escalate.

Conclusion

The militarization of U.S. foreign policy began in the middle of the 20th century; it has not been reversed significantly ever since. The growing imbalance between the DoD and the State, the emergence of new types of warfare, and the military presence of the USA have only increased the complexity of the problem. The Pentagon’s control over foreign policy continues to grow in the 21^st century.

Bibliography

Adams, Gordon, and Shoon Murray. Mission Creep: the Militarization of US Foreign Policy? Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2014.

Cox, Michael, and Doug Stokes. US Foreign Policy. Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2012.

Eikenberry, Karl W. “The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy.” American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 35, no. 1 (2013): 1-8.

Giroux, Henry. “The Post-9/11 Militarization of Higher Education and the Popular Culture of Depravity: Threats to the Future of American Democracy.” Revista Internacional de Sociología de la Educación 1, no. 1 (2012): 27-53.

Glenny, Misha, and Camino Kavanagh. “800 Titles but No Policy—Thoughts on Cyber Warfare.” American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 34, no. 1 (2012): 287-294.

Ramos, Michelle A. “A Shift in Diplomacy: The Arming and Disarming of Foreign Policy.” Strategic Informer: Student Publication of the Strategic Intelligence Society 1, no. 2 (2015): 10-15.

Wright, Ann. “Killer Drones and the Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy.”The Foreign Service Journal. Web.

Foonotes

1. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2012), 130.
2. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy, 131.
3. Ibid., 133.
4. Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, Mission Creep: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?, 10.
5. Ibid., 11.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 12.
8. Ibid., 23.
9. Ibid., 27.
10. Ibid., 28.
11. Karl W. Eikenberry, “The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy,” 5.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 6.
14. Henry Giroux, “The Post-9/11 Militarization of Higher Education and the Popular Culture of Depravity: Threats to the Future of American Democracy,” Revista Internacional de Sociología de la Educación 1, no. 1 (2012): 39.
15. Michelle A. Ramos, “A Shift in Diplomacy: The Arming and Disarming of Foreign Policy,” 12.
16. Ibid.,13.
17. Misha Glenny and Camino Kavanagh, “800 Titles but No Policy—Thoughts on Cyber Warfare,” American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 34, no. 1 (2012): 288.
18. Glenny and Camino Kavanagh, “800 Titles but No Policy,” 288.
19. Ibid., 291.
20. Ann Wright, “Killer Drones.”
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.