Nowadays, the majority of citizens continue to believe that it is namely the objectivity of Western jurisprudence as a ‘thing in itself’, which endows this legal concept with operational legitimacy. Such their impression is being reinforced even further by the fact that, in order to strengthen the conceptual validity of judicial decisions, passed down for implementation, judges often resort to such tricks as asking defendants and witnesses to swear upon the Bible, before they come up with any statements. Yet, it does not take someone with PhD in philosophy, in order to realize that the very concept of rationale-based jurisprudence is utterly fallacious, simply because there can no objectively existing truth, by definition, but only people’s irrational opinions, artificially designed to appear as ‘truth”. In this paper, I will aim at exploring this thesis even further, in order to prove that judge’s decision to treat me as cognitively healthy simply reflected his own irrational perception as to what the concept of ‘cognitive health’ stands for – thus, undermining the legal validity of this stance, in regards to my case. Let me begin from afar.
It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that 99% of currently existing, political, ideological, jurisprudential, cultural and other discourses are being solely concerned with the discussion of people’s emotionally charged definitions, in regards to these discourses’ subject matter. The best example that illustrates the validity of this suggestion is an ongoing public discussion of whether we should refer to an abortion as murder or simply a health care procedure. This discussion can have no end in sight, simply because people define their attitudes towards abortion upon the set of their religious beliefs or upon the lack of thereof.
Still, even though people may agree that the discussion of abortion’s moral implications can never produce ‘truth’, most of them would still deny the fact that if we multiply 2 by 2, there can be any other result but 4, simply because only mentally inadequate individuals would deny the soundness of this simple mathematic equation. However, the theoretical possibility alone for the truthfulness of the earlier mentioned equation to be doubted, on the part of these individuals, signifies the equation’s relativity. However, even if we do not take the opinions of mentally inadequate people into consideration, it will still appear that the validity of the 2 * 2 = 4 equation can only be recognized within the conceptual framework of Archimedean math. We can say the same about the statement “sum of the angles in a triangle is 180 degrees” – this statement will only be valid within the context of Euclidean geometry. However, within the context of non-linear geometries, this statement will cease to make any sense, whatsoever.
It is important to understand that empirical sciences are not being concerned with seeking the truth that could be proven ‘truthful’ beyond any reasonable doubt, but with creating informational models, the validity of which can only be discussed within the framework of a particular scientific or socio-political phenomenon. Up until comparatively recent times, the validity of euro-centric legal concepts was assumed as something self-evident, simply because these concepts were utilized within racially homogeneous Western societies. However, I have doubts as to the fact that the utilization of Western (White) jurisprudence in multicultural society continues to remain conceptually appropriate, simply because of the particulars of cognitive reasoning, on the part of representatives of racial minorities, differ considerably from that of Whites.
For example, in his article “Cultures of Reason”, Bruce Bower leaves no doubt as to the fact that the mentality of Asians is being metaphysically different from the mentality of people of European descent: “In a variety of reasoning tasks, East Asians take a holistic approach. They make little use of categories and formal logic and instead focus on relations among objects and the context in which they interact… Caucasians, on the other hand, adopt an ‘analytic’ perspective. They look for the traits of objects while largely ignoring their context” (2000, 57). What it means is that, if a suspected criminal was Chinese-American, the White judge could not possibly utilize his racially predetermined analytical sense of rationale, in order to reveal what had prompted the suspect to indulge in socially inappropriate behavior, in the first place. In other words, the very premise of objectivity within the system of jurisprudence continues to be increasingly undermined by the realities of post-industrial living.
As of today, the fact that euro-centric jurisprudence and law enforcement cannot possibly serve the legal needs of a multicultural society is being widely recognized. In its turn, this explains why many policymakers adopt a flexible attitude towards non-White citizens’ insistence that they should be allowed to explore their ethnic uniqueness in just about any way they see fit, even though the way these people go about celebrating diversity often balances on the edge of law. For example, during the course of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Sikh-Canadians were allowed to carry huge daggers in public, as these people’s lawyers had proven that forbidding Sikh-Canadians to carry illegal knives in public would constitute the violation of their civil rights.
In his article “Sikh can carry Kirpans to Olympics events in Canada”, available on the website of Global Sikh News, Amandeep Kaur state: “Sikhs will be able to carry a kirpan (Sikh article of faith), to Olympic events if they adhere to a number of conditions, the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit has announced. ISU doesn’t expect the religious item will pose an additional risk at venues” (2009). Apparently, as time goes by, more and more representatives of Canadian jurisprudence get to realize that it is utterly inappropriate to apply euro-centric legal concepts to racially and religiously diverse citizens.
The same can be said about the recent developments within American jurisprudence, which explains why many American judges adopt a lenient attitude towards non-White perpetrators of violent crime – apparently, it is being assumed that by indulging in criminal behavior, the representatives of racial minorities simply explore their cultural roots. For example, the 2007 movie “Death Sentence”, depicts an absolutely realistic situation – the son of an upstanding citizen Nick Hume was murdered at the gas station, as part of ‘initiation killing’ ritual, performed by an under-age member of an ethnic gang, with Hume being only the witness to this crime. In the court of law, this juvenile criminal’s case was dismissed on the account of Joe’s lawyer having proved to the judge that his client was forced into initiation killing by poverty and racism.
In his article “Urban Violence and Street Gangs”, James Diego Vigil provides us with the insight on how today’s progressive judges assess the actual extent of criminal culpability, on the part of accused representatives of racial minorities: “The experiences of immigrants adapting and adjusting to city life form the basis for all else that follows, including and especially the maladaptation that so often occurs among them” (2003, 232). What it means is that, had I happened to be of non-White racial background, the judge would have applied different criteria while defining the extent of my sanity, and consequently – guilt, simply because otherwise, he would be facing the accusations of racism. However, the very concept of law implies its non-discriminative subtleties. The reason why we are being required to observe law while dealing with everyday life’s challenges is that this law supposedly applies to even those who design it. Therefore, the judge’s decision to treat me as being responsible for my actions signifies the extent of his racial prejudices – the fact that I am a White person, caused the judge to automatically assume that I am being capable of adjusting my behavior to my euro-centric sense of rationale. However, even if this was the case, the legality of the judge’s decision would still be exposed as doubtful, because it is being clearly concerned with the utilization of judicial discretion, on his part. Yet, the very concept of judicial discretion implies biasness by definition, which is why I cannot agree with the verdict.
There is also another way to defend the legitimacy of my stance in regards to the inappropriateness of judicial decisions, which relates to suggestions as to the sheer relativity of the concept of scientific objectivity, expressed earlier. As it appears from Scenario 1, the judge’s decision to declare me responsible for my actions was based upon the results of psychological tests, performed on me as part of judicial procedures. Apparently, the judge had assumed that the results of these tests are perfectly objective. Yet, this could not possibly be the case, because just as any humanitarian sciences, psychiatry and psychology are ideologically motivated. In order for me to be able to substantiate the validity of this thesis, I will again need to begin from afar.
As of today, there is significant variance in how psychiatrists approach the task of evaluating the extent of an individual’s sanity/insanity. Partially, this can be explained by technical specifics of the utilization of psychiatric and psychoanalytical methodologies in every particular case. In his article “The Mentally Ill in Criminal Cases: The Constitutional Issue”, Charles D. Tarlton states: “Mental inadequacy presents peculiar legal problems. It is inherently difficult to define and detect, its time of onset is difficult to determine, and the degree of affliction at any point in time and its effect at those points in time are questions not answerable absolutely even by experts” (1963, 538). However, the fact that psychologists often have to deal with the lack of crucial information, while assessing the defendant’s cognitive abilities, is being only part of the problem. Within the context of this paper’s discussion, the real issue appears to be the lack of any universally recognized requirements in how psychologists base their approach towards assessing the extent of defendants’ perceptional adequacy. In its turn, this is the direct consequence of the fact that psychological methods of evaluating whether a particular defendant is able to stand trial reflect the particulars of their own irrational worldviews.
As of today, the majority of psychologists rely upon the utilization of psychoanalytical methodology, while assessing the full spectrum of motivations that had prompted a particular individual to commit a crime. This methodology implies one’s tendency to indulge in anti-social behavior as simply a manifestation of the fact that an individual’s subconscious drives are being suppressed. Yet, different psychoanalytical theories differ considerably in how they define the extent of subconscious urges’ primacy. For example, the Freudian school of psychoanalysis suggests that it is namely the suppression of one’s libido (sexuality), which causes him or her to consider turning into a criminal. The psychologists that subscribe to Alfred Adler’s point of view, in regards to what defines an extent of one’s criminal mindedness, believe that people’s anti-social attitudes reflect the strength of their ‘strive to power’. The theory of Erich Fromm, on the other hand, implies that it is specifically people’s ‘instinct of death’, which should be blamed for the inability of certain individuals to act like productive members of society. In its turn, this creates a situation when it is quite impossible to define a fundamental premise upon which today’s judicial psychology is based – there are as many ways of interpreting the possession of cognitive abilities, on the part of a particular defendant, as there are ‘experts’ who believe in their methodological approach to be only the valid one.
It is important to understand that the methodology of contemporary judicial psychology is the subject of what Michel Foucault used to refer to as ‘historical discourse’. According to philosophers, the actual significance of a particular political, cultural or scientific concept cannot be discussed outside of its historical context, simply because it is the existence or non-existence of historically predetermined public discourses, which reflect the degree of social, scientific and political ideas’ acuteness. In his “History of Sexuality”, Foucault states: “Discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (1978, 101). Nowadays, it is being assumed that it is in the nature of psychologists and psychiatrists to act as facilitators of scientific objectivity in the socio-political domain. However, when being thoroughly scrutinized, this assumption appears utterly fallacious – by adopting a posture of unengaged empiricists, these people simply strive to address their own psychological anxieties.
Apparently, they know perfectly well that their affiliation with a particular school of psychoanalysis serves as undeniable proof of their perceptional biases. In their article “Justifying Justice: Therapeutic Law and the Victimization Defense Strategy”, James L. Nolan et al. state: “The most important feature of the therapeutic ethos in American culture is the rise of a new priestly class of psychologists and psychiatrists who have been given the social status and cultural authority to make sense of the complex emotions emanating from the authoritative self. Replacing the priests, pastors, and rabbis of the old, religiously grounded moral order are the psychiatrists and psychologists of the therapeutic ethic” (2000, 620). The only reason I was declared cognitively adequate, is that I happened to live in a time when psychological testing, which has been applied to me, is considered scientifically appropriate. However, had I committed my crime in the early 20th century, or had I committed it in the 22nd century, for example, an entirely different psychological methodology would have been applied to me, in order to define the extent of my sanity.
What it means is that there was not even a single good reason for the judge to think of results of psychological testing, to which I was subjected, as representing truth-value. In the article from which I have just quoted, the authors come up with another valuable observation: “While it is possible that behaviors themselves have changed in some instances, the more dominant transformation has been in the cultural definitions of these behaviors. The way Americans view crime is a reflection of our cultural values, of the reigning zeitgeist. We are victims of our beliefs, just as those in the past are victims of their” (2000, 23). Just as is the case with everybody else, psychologists adjust their professional ways to correspond to their essentially irrational worldviews. Therefore, the fact that I was tested ‘cognitively positive’ simply means that the person who ran psychological tests on me believed that this is the case – nothing else. It is understood that this person’s possession of a degree in psychology did entitle his professional opinions with a certain degree of plausibility, but it did not deem them absolutely objective, which should have been the case if these opinions were even allowed to be presented to the judge.
Nevertheless, even if we assume that the results of my testing were completely objective, it would still not imply that judge had to consider them, while coming up with a decision, regarding my case. Let me explain the rationale behind this suggestion.
The very reason why the practice of defendants’ psychological testing was able to attain conceptual validity is that this practice is being highly standardized. In other words, there are many rules in regulations that are being observed by psychologists who assess the cognitive adequateness of a particular individual. In its turn, the very existence of these rules reflects psychologists’ realization of the fact that the ways of one’s mentality are subject to certain laws. The reason why ‘experts’ proclaimed me cognitively adequate is that they believe that if their scientific methodology was utilized within the context of assessing the extent of another person’s culpability, who had committed a crime under a similar set of circumstances, it would produce the same results.
However, as we are well aware, the very concept of law implies it being the subject to exemptions, simply because the principal uncertainty of micro-realm is also being projected upon the physical realm of macro-objects. Physicists know that it is principally impossible to define the exact location of an elementary particle at a particular point in time – one particle can simultaneously emanate itself in a number of different locations at the same time, which explains the phenomenon of so-called wave-particle duality. What it means is that, if we put a glass of water in the microwave for a minute, we cannot be 100% sure that this water will boil, instead of being turned into a chunk of ice, for example. Given the fact that the material objects on macro-realm consist of elementary particles, no physical, chemical, political or legal law can be assumed fully objective. As M. S. Bartlett had put it in his article “Chance or Chaos?”: “The difficulty of studying the behavior of actual systems in multidimensional phase space is complicated further by the unobservability of all the relevant variables” (1990, 325). The only universe’s fundamental law – there are exemptions to every law.
Let us imagine a hypothetical situation – there is a machine in the room, which has red and blue bulb lamps on its top and only one button to press on its operational panel. A particular scientist is being entrusted with the task of defining the principle of how this machine works. He enters the room, approaches the machine and begins pressing the button. Every time he does it – only the red lamp flashes. So, he continues with pressing the button, only to realize that the machine continues to react in the same way – only the red lamp keeps on flashing. After having pressed this button fifty times, our scientist writes down: “the principle of this machine functioning is: upon button being pressed, the red light flashes”. However, there is absolutely no rational reason to believe that it would only be red lamp flashing if the button continues to be pressed a hundred or a thousand times. What if the principle of the machine’s functioning is being concerned with the algorithm that makes the blue lamp flash every millionth time upon the button being pressed?
Now, let me explain how this theoretical excurse relates to my case. During the course of being examined by psychologists, I was asked to look at seemingly meaningless images of smudged geometrical figures and to describe my cognitive and emotional reactions to these images. After having analyzed my reactions, psychologists came to the conclusion that I am being fully capable of rationalizing surrounding reality, which means that I was aware of the possible consequences of my criminal act. Yet, what if the examination of my cognitive abilities did not last long enough, in order for the results of this examination to be considered objective? If this was the case, it would mean that, despite being an insane person, I would still end up being tried as sane.
It goes without saying that the probability of me being actually insane is rather slim. However, the realization of this fact should not provide the judge with good enough reason to brush this possibility out of hand. And, once he cannot deny this possibility altogether, then he cannot accept my sanity as a proven fact, simply because the very concept of Western jurisprudence is firmly based upon the presumption of the defendant’s innocence. In their article “Compounding Evidence from Multiple DNA-Tests”, Sam C. Saunders et al. state: “The American system of jurisprudence requires the jury to hold the defendant innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If jurors are confused about the degree of incrimination of certain pieces of evidence, then doubt (reasonable or not) will ensure” (1999, 39). Even if there is a slight chance for presented evidence against the defendant (in my case it was evident as to my sanity) not to be entirely objective, this evidence cannot be allowed into the courtroom, in the first place.
The outcome of the 1995 trial of O.J. Simpson, during the course of which the defendant was acquitted of all charges, illustrates the validity of the earlier suggestion perfectly well. The reason why O.J. Simpson was able to walk out of the courtroom a free man, is because judges had realized that, even though the chance for DNA samples (found on victim’s clothes) not matching that of the defendant was not proportionally plausible (1 to 500.000.000), it did not provide them with a good enough reason to consider Simpson guilty, beyond any reasonable doubt. In his article “Collecting, Testing and Convincing: Forensic DNA Experts in the Courts”, Saul Halfon makes a perfectly good point while stating: “A look at the OJ Simpson case highlights the possibility that new domains will be opened to scrutiny when lawyers are armed with sufficient resources. In particular, concerns over sample collection and handling received broad play in the Simpson case… The Simpson defense team left nothing unquestioned” (1998, 822). The very fact that O.J. Simpson was acquitted (on the account of a hypothetical possibility for his blood being actually not his) creates a legal precedent for my case to be handled in a similar manner. It is understood that I do not have a team of highly paid lawyers working on my behalf, but if the judge does not recognize the sheer relativity of the evidence as to my sanity, presented by some anonymous ‘experts’, I would be able to prove with ease that this judge is being professionally inadequate.
The conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
- Judge’s decision that euro-centric standards for defining the extent of one’s insanity apply to me reveals his racist attitudes, simply because he had assumed that my racial affiliation automatically implies my inborn ability to assess the surrounding reality in terms of logic – his referral to the results of psychological expertise, performed on me, was simply meant to serve the purpose of legally substantiating something of which he was perfectly aware, even before I was subjected to psychiatric testing. In its turns, this sheds doubts onto the trial’s very legality and onto the judge’s ability to act as a facilitator of abstract justice.
- The judge has failed to take into account the relativist subtleties of ‘experts’’ decision to declare me mentally fit to stand trial. His very insistence that psychologists’ opinions, in regards to my cognitive abilities, should be thought of as representing truth-value, reflects the sheer extent of the judge’s perceptional ignorance. Apparently, it never occurred to the judge that psychologists’ ability to indulge in sophistically sounding but utterly meaningless rhetoric does not necessarily signify the objectivity of their professional opinions. On the contrary – as realities of America’s multicultural living indicate, the greater the number of psychologists in particular organization’s staff, the worse this organization performs.
If anything, it is namely psychiatry and psychology, which are being affected by currently dominant political discourse more than any other scientific discipline. For example, in 2009, the officials from American Psychological Association have openly proclaimed that homosexualism can no longer be discussed in terms of pathology, even though that as recently as 10 years ago, the officials from the same Association used to suggest something entirely opposite. In his article, “APA Revises ‘Gay Gene’ Theory”, available on the website of American Family News Network, Charlie Butts states: “The attempt to prove that homosexuality is determined biologically has been dealt a knockout punch. An American Psychological Association publication includes an admission that there’s no homosexual ‘gene’ – meaning it’s not likely that homosexuals are born that way… That contrasts with the APA’s statement in 1998: ‘There is considerable recent evidence to suggest that biology, including genetic or inborn hormonal factors, play a significant role in a person’s sexuality” (2009). In all probability, once tree-hugging neo-Liberals are being ousted from governmental offices, the officials from American Psychological Association will again ‘update’ their opinion, regarding the subject matter. Therefore, the very fact that the judge had decided to solely rely upon psychologists’ point of view while proclaiming me being fit to stand trial, signifies the sheer extent of his professional inadequacy.
- The judge had to remain utterly ignorant as to the technical aspects of me being subjected to a psychological evaluation, which is why he accepted the results of this evaluation as being absolutely objective. By doing it, he once again had proved himself as someone who does not fit his job. Therefore, it is not only that I do not agree with the verdict of me being declared mentally healthy, but I also do not agree with this particular judge being allowed to handle my case, in the first place.
Works Cited
Bartlett, M. S. “Chance or Chaos?”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 153.3 (1990): 321-347. Print.
Bower, Bruce “Cultures of Reason”. Science News 157.4 (2000): 56-58. Print.
Butts, Charlie “APA Revises ‘Gay Gene’ Theory”. 2009. American Family News Network. Web.
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality. New York: Pantheon, 1978. Print.
Halfon, Saul “Collecting, Testing and Convincing: Forensic DNA Experts in the Courts”. Social Studies of Science 28.5/6 (1998): 801-828. Print.
Kaur, Amandeep “Sikh can Carry Kirpans to Olympics Events in Canada”. 2009. Global Sikh News. Web.
Nolan, James et al. “Justifying Justice: Therapeutic Law and the Victimization Defense”. Strategy Sociological Forum 15.4 (2000): 617-646. Print.
Saunders, Sam et al. “Compounding Evidence from Multiple DNA-Tests”. Mathematics Magazine 72.1 (1999): 39-43. Print.
Tarlton, Charles “The Mentally Ill in Criminal Cases: The Constitutional Issue”. The Western Political Quarterly 16.3 (1963): 525-540. Print.
Vigil, Diego “Urban Violence and Street Gangs”. James Annual Review of Anthropology, 32.5 (2003): 225-242. Print.