The Term “Discovery”, Its Usage and Understanding Essay

Introduction

The term “discovery” has multiple contexts and meanings and therefore it is sometimes hard to provide its appropriate conceptualization. The present paper deals with the use of this term (or the notion of discovery) in the articles, written by Kuhn, Tompkins, Pratt and Percy, who understand this term as a disclosure of certain facts, interrelations between these facts or new phenomena.

Kuhn is “The Structure of Scientific Discovery” analyzes the perception of this concept by scientific circles: “Both scientists and, until quite recently, historians have ordinarily viewed discovery as the sort of event which, though it may have preconditions and surely has consequences, is itself without internal struc­ture” (Kuhn,1987, p.2). Thus, the scholar suggests that the basic nature of discovery is viewed as an insight or spontaneous idea, which comes after the profound research of the certain area – in fact, the most prominent discoveries were made by competent scientists, who had dedicated their lives to the area of their interest. On the other hand, Kuhn suggests that in fact even the most irrational and spontaneous ideas are well-structured and are preceded by the thorough background work, often performed by several scientists. For instance, when Priestley discovered oxygen in 1774, he was first unaware of his ground-breaking finding. The discovery of X-rays occurred almost in the same way: the scientist had different intentions, when arranging and conducting his experiments, and was surprised after realizing that there were different types and structures of emanation. Thus, as Kuhn suggests, it is particularly important to learn the ability to view situations and research results from different angles, or “old situations in new ways” (Kuhn, 1987, p. 6) in order to make a discovery. It is also essential to be prepared for unpredictable results, which might lead to a new discovery (rather than pointing to the poor arrangement of the study itself).

Discovery as an addition to already existing specific knowledge

Furthermore, Kuhn argues that discovery is not necessarily an addition to already existing specific knowledge, as they might finally grow into the development of radically new areas of knowledge or to develop new practices and techniques: “Those in whose area of special competence the new phenomenon falls often see both the world and their work differently as they emerge from the extended struggle with anomaly which constitutes the discovery of that phenomenon” (Kuhn, 1987, p. 6). Thus, the newly-made discovery is regarded as a distinct part of the world, or an unexplainable phenomenon, as it hasn’t been already incorporated to the traditional science. This class of discoveries is separated from the discoveries, aimed at filling the gaps in classical areas of knowledge and therefore greatly based upon the researcher’s expectations. To my view, the discoveries of the two classes often occur simultaneously, or within the frames of the same experiment; for instance, Priestly intended to develop new techniques in order to expand his research in chemistry, but discovered oxygen beyond achieving his basic objective. Consequently, his sudden finding resulted in the repudiation of the phlogiston theory and incited the revolution in academic circles.

In Percy’s writing, discovery is presented as a organization of impressive findings into a theory and reflection upon these findings. For instance, the discovery of the Grand Canyon as a prominent and interesting natural phenomenon was associated with Garcia Lopez de Cardenas’s surprise with the place. After this discovery, the society, gradually got to know that this place existed and learned about its appearance and the most important visually perceivable characteristics. This means, a well-substantiated and discovery, followed by the spread of the corresponding information (the Grand canyon was positioned as a miracle), eliminates the necessity for each person to test the validity of the discovery and to obtain experience in this area: for instance, the majority of the world’s population are aware of the existence of the Grand Canyon and about its features, but less than half of them have ever observed it. Thus, “Seeing the canyon under approved circumstances is see­ing the symbolic complex head on. The thing is no longer the thing as it confronted the Spaniard; it is rather that which has already been formu­lated-by picture postcard, geography book, tourist folders, and the words Grand Canyon” (Percy, 1996, p.3). Although “discovery” is not a central concept in the scholar’s work, Percy explains how the information about discoveries can be shared through using symbols and metaphors, which means, language and communication in general are the most powerful means of distributing knowledge and, utilizing Kuhn’s work, creating the superstructures (or additions) upon already existing sciences and theories.

Another side of Discovery

On the other hand, Percy asserts that humans gradually lose the ability t make their personal discoveries and to get really amazed and surprised due to the influence of the so-called experts, who stand at the horizons of various sciences and explain them in available way, so that the listener finally looses the desire to explore the subjects described by him/herself. Clearly, the most convenient way of obtaining information or knowledge about Egyptian pyramids or the aforementioned Grand Canyon is finding a competent expert (nowadays, finding a corresponding Web-site) rather then visiting the site, as such journey is associated with the loss of time and material resources. In this sense, people’s ability to discover their own identities and personalities is also diminishing, as there is a plenty of comprehensive and comprehendible books and articles in psychology, which literally sort out human inner world and impose the order, developed by the author. Nevertheless, self-discovery is amongst the most exciting aspects of exploration; thus, those individuals who forget about this fact and rely exceptionally upon the expert opinion, are likely to ‘dissolve’ in the realm of self-imposed science. Percy’s writing, in this sense, is very edifying, as it restates the importance of reflecting upon and critically thinking about the ideas, which derive from outside sources: ”As Mounier said, the person is not something one can study and pro­vide for; he is something one struggles for. But unless he also struggles for himself, unless he knows that there is a struggle, he is going to be just what the planners think he is” (Percy, p. 16). Critical thinking prevents stereotyping, which might also lead to the disappearance of personal sovereignty and thwart self-discovery. As a rule, individuals develop their own expectations in various dimensions: interpersonal, cultural, scientific and so forth; and, in my opinion, this feature of human cognition is itself natural and sound, but sometimes people assume each object and phenomenon or the environment is predictable, thus, individual exploration is redundant with regard to the possibility of relying upon stereotypes. Nevertheless, as Percy proves, the hegemony of patterns and specimens in society makes human easily driven and dependent creature, incapable of discovering and innovating.

Pratt, in the article on linguistics and the relationship between culture and language, writes about neologisms and slang and discovers the nature of transculturalism. Although the term ‘discovery’ is neither conceptualized nor operationalized, the scholar presents her own discovery of the interdependence between history and literacy, or, more precisely, the influence historical connection between countries upon the state of literacy in these states. In her writing, the process of discovery begins with inquiry and the invention of new terms, which explain the phenomenon and allow developing a novel approach: “I use this term [ “contact zones”] to refer to social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today” (Pratt, 1999, p.2). The second stage of discovery is specific or in-depth research, which should follow the general inquiry: the scholar studies Guaman Poma’s life and his manner of writing letters. Another component of this specific research is studying modern children’s literacy, which might, according to the scholar’s hypotheses, be related to Guaman Poma’s verbal and textual expression. Furthermore, it is important to match the results of both studies and determine the degree of novelty in the findings. Pratt regards the results of her investigation as conceptually new and presents them as a discovery. Nevertheless, the algorithm, observed by Pratt, is to great extent dissimilar to the structure of discovery, described by Kuhn, as the latter tends to explain most revolutionary findings as unexpected. Nevertheless, the two scholars operate in different areas of knowledge: Kuhn’s writing is based upon natural sciences, whereas Pratt seems to work purely in the realm of humanities. Thus, Pratt provides an alternative view on discovery, and her article suggests that in arts and humanities, discoveries might even coincide with working hypotheses and thus the origin of the discovery is not necessarily a criterion of distinguishing between new findings and superstructures for already existing knowledge.

Tompkins in the article about Indians highlights the obstructions and barriers to discoveries in the field of history. The scholar holds that the main problem she has faced when attempting to draw her conclusions about the political and social relationship between Indians and New English is the validity of facts: “My problem presupposed that I couldn’t judge because I didn’t know what the facts were. All I had, or could have, was a series of different per­spectives, and so nothing that would count as an authoritative source on which moral judgments could be based” (Tompkins, 1986, p. 9). In fact, the author discusses an important aspect of discovery the other authors seem to overlook. The biases in historical facts and the absence of appropriate criteria, which would allow identifying and using only ‘truthful’ writings, are likely to make the researcher powerless against the scope of contradictory evidence. Of course, it is possible to create a matrix, which would estimate or calculate data validity, taking into consideration the author’s characteristics and the objective features of the epoch, but the information referring to moral judgments would be unclear and vague even for this matrix, as the authors’ interpretations of the same facts seem ambivalent, as for a modern reader.

To sum up, the writings by Kuhn, Pratt, Percy and Tompkins either explicitly or implicitly describe different aspects and types of discovery, which might be classified into the following categories: by the criterion of area of knowledge the discovery belongs: 1) discoveries in natural sciences; 2) discoveries in arts and humanities; 3) self-discovery; by the criterion of algorithm and structure: 1) prearranged and partially expected; 2) spontaneous. All types of discoveries have their distinctive features and barriers: discoveries in natural sciences might be complicated by low availability of appropriate equipment, the discoveries in arts and humanities might be thwarted by the lack of reliable evidence, whereas self-discovery might not occur under the pressure of stereotypes.

Works Cited

Kuhn, T. “The Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery”. In Ways of Reading: An Anthology for Writers, edited by David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky. Bedford: New York, 1987, pp. 338-349.

Tompkins, J. ““Indians”: Textualism, Morality, and the Problem of History”, 1986.

Pratt, M.-L. “Arts of the Contact Zone”. In Ways of Reading: An Anthology for Writers, 5th edition, edited by David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999

Percy, W. “Loss of the Creature”. In Ways of Reading: An Anthology for Writers, 4^th edition, edited by David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky. Boston: Bedford, 1996, pp. 511-528.