Introduction
Chester’s work in this article centers on the fact the American use of attrition strategy in the American – Vietnam War was a failure. There are several arguments that the author uncovers to substantiate this claim. There are several aspects of his arguments that are effective. First, the operations of the US based troops were not unified in their patterns such that they could only attain the same end through a difficult experience. This was contributed by lack of territorial objectives and frontier lines which consequently led the soldiers into cynicism and frustration. Attrition only encouraged military operations that were not properly coordinated which could only end up in demand for additional US soldiers and requirements for their use. This was mainly experienced between 1965 and 1967.
Main Body
Second, the Vietnamese had a seemingly better strategy compared to the American’s attrition. This was manifested in two main ways. One is that, they had organized themselves in such a manner that their battle with the American troops were not frequent. This confused the American troops such that when the Vietnamese soldiers seized the opportunity, they could get their enemies unawares and consequently frustrate their attrition strategy.
The other way is that, while the American soldiers used attrition through missions that entail searching and destroying, their opponents could attack populated zones. However, when the American soldiers attempted countersurgency attacks, the repercussions were devastating to the environment, refugees and other non-targeted individuals. This shows how the strategy employed by the American troops did not achieve the desired end but instead caused unwanted harm resulting to more casualties. This evidence refuting the use of attrition by the American troops indicate that the strategy was ineffective and as such, it gave their enemies a leeway to capitalize on it and intensify the combat.
In defending the fact that attrition was not a strategy at all to the American troops, Chester presents other evidence that is not only superfluous, but also unconvincing. A good example is where the author points out that a greater percentage of the war reports shed more light on how the US forces were fighting and the rather genuine reports from the government of South Vietnam were dismissed. By doing this, the media journalists imagined that they were feeding the audience with relevant information.
Whereas this may point out to the fact that the journalists were trying to conceal the defeat that the American soldiers had suffered due to using an incoherent strategy (attrition), this is not brought out as the main reason for the journalists’ reporting style.
Therefore, it may not be a solid ground or evidence for the fail of attrition as a battle strategy by the American troops. The journalists may have been motivated by other reasons to present their reports in such a manner. It is evident from Chester’s argument that journalists presented such reports purposefully to please the editors who preferred such. The authorities in charge of media also gave directions that pictures and reports that indicated the defeat of American soldiers should not be disclosed.
Conclusion
In general, Chester succeeds in arguing out the fact that the use of attrition by the American troops in fighting against the Vietnamese was not a viable strategy. This is because his convincing evidence overshadows the superfluous one on this matter.