Anti-Corruption Strategies in Kazakhstan Research Paper

Introduction

On a global scale, the term corruption has gained prominence and is now part of the technical jargon used by both scholars and experts on governance discourse. This term has attracted the attention of scholars, human rights bodies, and international organizations, among others. The significance of his term is much more felt by those in power. Within the discourse of corruption much attention has focused on the real and workable definitions of this term. While many people have proposed various definitions of the term, all of them tend to focus on the illegal acquisitions of public assets, privileges or advantages due to by taking advantage of the powers vested in their offices. Generally, the hazards, perils and dangers of corruption are widespread.

Other than slowing down the rate of economic and democratic growth, graft creates a sense of mistrust, injustice and poverty, to mention but a few. Overall, corruption brings immense human suffering to the majority who are the victims while the few beneficiaries of corruption continue to profit. In light of the widespread effects of corruption, anti corruption initiatives have gained a lot of intensity in the recent past. Many governments have acknowledged the need to combat corruption either under external pressures or through intrinsic motivation to improve the lives of its citizens. Various anti graft bodies, programs and strategies have been developed the world over.

On the backdrop of the notion that corruption is an international issue of concern, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the success of anti corruption strategies in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a transcontinental country which lies within Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Even though Kazakhstan has a presidential system of governance, there are notable tendencies for authoritarian leadership under President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Such tendencies can be attributed to the fact that the Kazakhstani society is highly patriarchal; males have absolute authority over the females. Kazakhstan is the country to declare independence from the former Soviet Union, yet it is amongst the first of these former soviet states to ratify and accent to international anti graft standards. While its patrilineal culture cannot be blamed for the rising levels of corruption, many scholars have mentioned this as one of the catalysts. However, anti corruption activities in Kazakhstan have gradually intensified over time. Anti corruption strategies in Kazakhstan are systematic, progressively gradual and piecemeal. Currently, there are numerous strategies, programs and anti graft agencies actively involved in combating graft in Kazakhstan. As mentioned earlier, this paper aims at evaluating the anti graft strategies within Kazakhstan. As such to help meet the main aim of this paper, a number of key questions seem relevant:

• What are the key strategies for anti corruption strategies in Kazakhstan?
• How successful are anti corruption strategies in Kazakhstan?

To answer these two key questions, further sub questions have been developed. These include:

• What anti corruption agencies exists within Kazakhstan anti graft war?
• What id the roles of the Kazakhstani government in combating corruption?
• What is the prevailing legal framework?
• What is the role on international community in anti graft initiatives?

This is a research paper and as such the findings are analyzed from a scholarly perspective. As such Kazakhstan anti graft initiatives are analyzed Vis a Vis Bo Rothstein’s Big Bang Anti Corruption Theory. Rothstein stipulates that anti corruption agents fail because their approach gives enough room for corruption to mutate. Rothstein proposed a strategy that creates the big bang effect. Within Rothstein’s proposal, anti graft measures have to be simultaneous widespread and have an immediate impact as opposed to slow piecemeal and systematic strategies. Anti Corruption initiatives in Kazakhstan has failed, and when analyzed against this theory one gets the idea why this is the case.

Kazakhstan anti-corruption legislation

Corruption is a major challenge which is not only reversing the economic gains of any country but also affecting the growth and development of democratic leadership. Corruption takes many forms, with anti corruption agents coming up with varied criteria within which graft can be defined. Amidst the continuing debate, numerous legislations are being developed on a daily basis to mitigate the ever changing face of corruption. This implies that within the existing legal frameworks in a majority of countries, there exist legal Loopholes which corruption agents exploit. Exist statutes are characterized by ambiguities, errors, gaps and inconsistencies in some of its provisions. This creates the necessary environment for selfish and fraudulent officials to manipulate the law for self enrichment.

Generally, Corruption is defined as the illegal acquisition of property, advantages, privileges and benefits by state officials directly or indirectly by taking advantage of the powers vested in their offices. As a legislative measure the Republic of Kazakhstan has developed a number of anti-corruption legislations to curb corruption within and without its territorial boundaries. These legislations are meant to protect the freedoms, rights and security of its citizens emerging from all forms of corruption. It is also meant to protect the integrity of the state agencies and other stakeholders mandated to perform various functions on behalf of the state. This is by means of detecting and suppressing corruption related offences. It also categorizes the various forms of corruption and relevant penalties. This was after the realization of the fact that corruption is a major obstacle in the social, economic and even political development of the country.

The challenge of corruption and the tendency to be corrupt has led to the deliberate manipulation of the otherwise rigid acts thus exposing the existence of the factors that create an environment conducive for corruption to triumph. To facilitate the identification of such factors the Independent Anti-Corruption Council (IAC) started the execution of an anti-fraud proficiency of legal provisions and drafts of legislative legal acts. The mandatory need to conduct the anti-corruption proficiency of legal provisions shall change the functioning of all state stakeholders. There was a call to direct attention to the prevention of fraud in state organs at the initial decision making stages. This position was drummed by the president of the Foundation for parliamentary development.

The ‘Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia’ (EFCA) in corroboration with the ‘Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland’ facilitated the creation of the Independent Anticorruption Council (IAC) drawing its membership from the non-governmental organizations and the business community. The mandate of the IAC was to advise the government through recommending measures to increased and enforce anti-fraud values in society. The IAC was also meant to lobby the civil society to partake in the monitoring of corruption and facilitate the developing of government policies to address official fraud.

The republic of Kazakhstan has also put in place the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code in its state policy against corruption. This forms an important base for fighting corruption. It states corruption related criminal offences and relevant penalties for offenders. However, the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code has been criticized and accused of falling short of the international set standards. The particular failure is on the elaborate information on the interpretation and interpretation of is provisions on bribery offences.

The ‘Law on Public Service’ purposefully brings to scope who a public servant is and tries to differentiate between administrative public officials and political public officials. The law identifies judges and deputies of parliament who are responsible for fraudulent offences committed as prescribed by in the constitution. It also states descriptive provisions on how they should be hired. This should be in an open manner and open to public scrutiny. In addition to the aforesaid code, the president initiated a ‘Law on Anticorruption Efforts’. This law also defines corruption, and corruption offences goals. It states basic principles vital in the fight against fraud in government institutions. First, every body is equal before the law and any court of law. It regulates the conduct of state authority in state agencies how they are to be publicized and legal control over them. It states the priority in the protection of the rights and legal interests of citizens and legal organizations in addition to the administration of state agencies in terms of their social political and economic management systems.

In addition, it prescribes the criminal responsibilities for both the corrupt state officials and members of the public who try to compromise them to engage in corrupt activities. To ensure the sustainability of these provisions, the Law on Anti-Corruption Efforts has a provision for whistleblowers and witness protection. They are protected by hiding their identity unless it becomes absolutely necessary to reveal their physical protection. Similarly, the’ Code of Ethics for State Officials’ states administrative offences of state officials. They are not to engage in corrupt activities or any acts that may portray their person as to be engaging in illegal transactions or incompatible with the dispensation of public duties. This creates the justification for restriction from any commercial or gainful activities with the exception of scientific, instruction and creativity. Further, state officers are restricted from any gainful gambling with other state offices. Though it is not a criminal offence, it attracts disciplinary action where if repeated in a span of one year will lead to demotion or dismissal. To complement this, state officials are required to declare their wealth within and outside the republic of Kazakhstan and file their tax returns on annual income as prescribe by law.

Review of Kazakhstan’s anti-corruption strategies

On a global scale, corruption is an issue of serious concern for the growth and development of underdeveloped countries. On the other hand, developed countries see corruption as a hindrance towards the development of economies and democratic ideals globally. As such, there have been concerted efforts in the recent past from all quarters towards combating corruption. To sufficiently end endemic graft, international anti corruption agents have emphasized intensification of anti corruption efforts at the domestic front, before collaboration with international anti corruption agents such as Interpol and the FBI. In this regard many of the countries plagued by corruption have intensified their own domestic anti corruption efforts. While there are a variety of motivations for the intensification of anti corruption efforts in developing countries, most of these countries do register improved results. For instance Kazakhstan, whose anti corruption efforts have been under the watch of the international community since the country ushered in democratic systems of government has been systematically improving steadily over the years. A survey by Transparency International, which annually compiles an index list of county’s rating on combating corruption, indicates that Kazakhstan has moved 40 places up to position 120. These improvements can be attributed to intensification of anti corruption strategies within the country.

Since the late 1990s, combating corruption has been an important issue in policy development. In efforts to root out endemic corruption from within its system Kazakhstan has over time developed its own strategies to combat the vice. As explained elsewhere in this paper, Kazakhstani’s anti corruption efforts are focused on collaborating at both the local and international levels. In this regard, the government has steadily moved in to create the necessary environment which would allow anti corruption agencies to operate with minimum interference from state law enforcement agencies. As a young democracy, Kazakhstan’s anti corruption efforts are immune perils that young democracies face; dictatorship and executive interference.

Under the leadership of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Kazakhstani government aided by its law making organ, the parliament, created several national anti corruption institutions as one of the key strategies to combat corruption. The main reason of these institutions was to mainly coordinate anti corruption activities. While this seems a noble idea, many critics however argue that this is a move to stifle anti corruption efforts since the government claims to much power through these institutions. Through ‘The Commission on Prevention of Corruption and Enforcement of the Civil Service Ethics’ CPCECS, the Kazakh government aims at strengthening anti corruption efforts with the public service by enhancing the implementation of the public service ethics.

‘The Disciplinary Councils’ works in cohorts with the CPCECS, in enforcing disciplinary measures within the public services. Furthermore, the councils ensure that the anti corruption law is implemented within the entire public sector. ‘The Coordinating Council’ as well as the ‘Security Council ‘have duplicated roles as those of ‘The Disciplinary Councils’. As explained earlier these councils work under the direct supervisions of the president. International critics claim that direct involvement of the president interferes with anti corruption activities. Kazakhstani’s anti corruption policy development is under ‘The Agency of the Fighting against Economic and Corruptive Crime’. This agency is also charged with the mandate to coordinate all inter-ministerial anti corruption efforts within the Kazakhstani government.

To avoid chaos and ensure progress in combating corruption, anti corruption activities in Kazakhstani are systematically implemented through a series of programs. The Kazakhstani government sees the programming of anti corruption activities as a vital strategy that would not only ensure progress but also minimizing corruption from within the government. In this regard the government has instituted three major 5-years anti corruption programs in the last fifteen years. The end of the year 2010 saw the successful implementation of the fourth State Anti-corruption Programmed which ran from 2006. Objectively, the purpose of this program as well as others before it is to ensure that there was improved regulatory anti corruption framework, oversee the necessary legal reforms, and to popularize the necessary anti corruption initiatives amongst the Kazakhstani public. As explained elsewhere in this paper, these programs also ambitiously target the corporation with other international anti corruption agencies.

Tied to the functions of these programs is the state’s effort to make the necessary legal reforms to aid anti corruption initiatives. The Kazakhs government has come under intense pressure, from within and without, to reform the judicial system. To facilitate this, parliament provided the necessary legal framework by passing a bill which allowed for anti corruption-friendlily changes to be made within the legal systems. Such changes affected the criminal code as well as the procedures of the criminal code and effectively reinforced the accountability of the entire Kazakhstani judicial system for crimes related to corruption. In addition, legal reforms were also targeted to make sure that there was adequate security and protection of basic human rights, freedom and liberties of all members of the public and thus enable them to voice their concerns about corruption without fear of intimidation.

The above mentioned strategies focus their attentions on anti corruption activities on the domestic front. However, Kazakhstani government has developed ambitious anti corruption strategies that also incorporate cooperation with international anti corruption agencies. The country is enjoined to numerous international anti corruption watch dogs such as the European council on anti corruption, GRECO. The purpose of such cooperation is seen by critics as the right strategy towards aligning Kazakhstani’s anti corruption initiatives with international standards such as those set by the European Union and the United Nations. Furthermore, and as mentioned elsewhere in this paper, the country has ratified numerous international anti corruption standards such as the ‘UN Convention against Corruption’. In relation to the internal legal reforms, Kazakhstani has also ensured that the reforms also provide the necessary legal infrastructure to allow for collaboration with international anti crime agencies such as the Interpol and the FBI. All these strategies are implemented alongside the 10 year anti corruption strategies, which is explained later in details.

In view of the strategies developed to fight corruption in Kazakhstani, it is imperative to state that the levels of corruption have drooped. However, corruption is still rampant. This can be attributed to notions suggested within the scholarly circles on why corruption thrives regardless of the ongoing efforts to combat it. One such notion is suggested by Bo Rothstein, and stipulates that unless there is immediate and widespread implementation of anti corruption efforts that has a big band effect, corruption will keep mutating. Therefore, for corruption to be effectively dealt with in Kazakhstan, anti corruption agents need to change their approach.

Kazakhstan 10 year anticorruption strategy

Following the legislation of anticorruption in Kazakhstan, this part endeavors to highlight the Kazakhstani 10 year anticorruption strategy. In reference to corruption in Kazakhstan, it is imperative to recapitulate on the causes of this social vice that has continued to plague the Kazakh government. The growth of corruption can be indirectly connected to the growth of economy in this former Soviet Union state. The Kazakhstani economy has experienced tremendous growth since the country ushered in democracy. Suffice to state that the growth of Kazakhstani economy is built on large oil deposits within the country. While the existence of these oil deposits has brought positive benefits to the country such as direct foreign investments, its negative side cannot be overlooked. The Kazakhstan elite, which includes high ranking government officials have vitally dominated Kazakhstan energy sector, with aim of attracting direct benefits. While the booming economy is not the cause of widespread corruption, most scholars believe that it is the absences of a strong anti corruption law which necessitates administrative malpractices in the energy sector. As such much of corruption practices in Kazakhstan are administrative. In addition, the Kazakhstan officialdom is held in high esteem and as such lives in luxury.

Suffice to say that to meet that social expectation most of the officers within Kazakhstan government lives that are far beyond their means. Since the existing anticorruption law does not allow such officers to be directly invested in the oil sector as well as receive any direct benefits, most of these officers register businesses under spouses and other relatives. This has intensified corrupt practices, especially within the oil sector.

In light of the high involvement in corruption by high ranking government officials, fighting corruption by the government seems relevant. Over the last 15 years as reported by Kairat Kozhamzharov, who heads the Financial Police (a body charged with the mandate of rooting out corruption), Kazakhstan has had three government backed programs to firth corruption. While Kozhamzharov’s led Financial Police indicates the government’s commitment to fight corruption in the recent past, reports show that there is a lot than needs to be done if corruption is to be rooted out. The failure of past anti corruption efforts can be attributed to assertions some of the anticorruption scholars that effective social changes within the social political framework needs to be gradually instituted. Furthermore, as noted by the United Nation time is of essence in any social change activities.

The theory of social gradual change seems to be the most dominant notion within Kazakhstani government anti corruption circles. Under the direction of President Nazarbayev, the Kazakhs ruling party Nur-Otan established a 10 year anticorruption strategy in 2010. The 10 year anti corruption plan foresees the collaboration of the government and the entire Kazakh society in eliminating corruption. Within the strategy, focus will be on policy issues especially on the recruitment of public officials to the civil service. The new personnel will be required to institute prohibitions, restrictions and other policy requirement to prohibit the spread of corrupt practices. Furthermore, Kozhamzharov asserts that the 10 years strategy is focused on utilizing all forms of technologies, especially media technologies to create a new anti corruption attitude within the Kazakh society. This implies that social media such as Facebook, the TV, and the internet among others, will be vital in this program. Kozhamzharov sees training through these media as well as through formal educational which includes schools curriculum as the most effective way of reeducating the people attitudes. This means that this strategy aims at involving everyone in the fight against corruption.

While the ten year program is a plausible idea, it is on the brink of failure just like the other three programs instituted previously. Research by social scientists argues that social change can only be effective through the Big Bang Effect. Within the Big Bang theory, social scientists stipulate that people are utility-maximizing. In this regard, corruption thrives because of the existence of an environment that encourages the practice. This theory seems to explain the failures of all Kazakhstani’s government efforts to fight corruption, which are build on gradual and attitude-change based strategies. In relations to social attitude change, big bang theorists argue that understanding people attitudes towards corruption is of no help.

The most important thing is instantaneous and simultaneous changes within which everything within the social political system changes and tips against corruption. This is a situation referred to as “Schelling-type tipping point”, where any effort for social changes is massive and is not limited to progressive introduction of piecemeal strategies, commonly referred to as entry point strategies. Instituting small changes, such as the Kazakhstanis 10 year program, is not enough to convince corruption agents that there is no room for corruption. As such the Kazakhstani anti corruption effort will not reach the tipping point. The risk of such progressive measures is that the system gradually slides back to corruption. This explains Kazakhstanis low rating (120/173) within the Transparency International’s Index in the years 2010.

Approach to anti-corruption in Kazakhstan

The analysis of anti corruption strategies mentioned previously reveals a lot about the approach to anti corruption in Kazakhstan. Clearly it is evident that all anti corruption activities are targeted at particular segments of the Kazakh society; the ruling class and the elite. All the anti corruption laws made, statutes ratified and programs implemented target high ranking government offices and key figures in the public service. Key local and international anti corruption agencies have previously closely monitored The President and his close relatives, the prime minister, members of the cabinet and key business figures, aiming to detect corrupt dealings involving these individuals. Suffice to say that the Kazakh society is highly hierarchical and that the family is derived along patrilineal heritage. Moreover, the Kazakh society is also highly hierarchical and ones social status is based on family ties. The higher the family in the social hierarchy tree, the more power and respect it attracts.

As such individuals from the elite are respected while those from the peasantry have no power vested in them. Such hierarchical nature means that social importance diminishes as an individual climbs down the social ladder. As such, power relations are a top down affair: from the higher echelon of the Kazakhs social tree, power, authority, social significance diminishes significantly to the peasant. Since power is exercised by the Kazakhstani elite, it also means that this groups of social class Kazakhstanis Control much of the business empires. As such the probability of engaging in corruption diminishes down the social hierarchy. Due to the power relations within the Kazakhstani social hierarchies, Anti corruption initiatives are top down as they mostly target the elite. They Kazakhstani peasant this becomes a mere watcher in the side stand.

Prof. He explains three main approaches to combating corruption namely the bottom up approach, which involves the mobilization and empowerment of the masses to fight graft in the public services; the mass movement approach which empowers the masses but without any institutional support, and finally the top down approach. Within this section the top down approach will be analyzed Vis a Vis the Kazakhstan scenario. It is imperative to state that the top down approach incorporates the localization of graft laws and institutions, creation of state controlled ant graft institutions and a notable level of legal reforms all aimed at combating public administrative graft.

While the top down approach is not primarily limited to any community, the Anti Corruption Resource Centre argues that this approach, prevalent in Muslim states due to their hierarchical nature, requires the creation of national anti graft institutions. The purpose of these institutions is to allow for the necessary legal, political as well as social framework to combat crime. Furthermore, such institutions allow local governments to have a firmer grip in anti corruption activities as well as creating the necessary framework for cooperation with international anti graft institutions. In Kazakhstani scenarios tends to conform to the requirements of the top down approach since the Kazakhstani government has created a number of institutions to support anti graft efforts. These institutions include ‘Financial Police’ which play a key role in the implementation of all anti graft policies, ‘Coordinating Council of Law Enforcement Agencies’ charged with ensuring effective law enforcement including the necessary anti graft legal reforms and ACCERB, and public service auditing committee with thru primary role of overseeing efficiency in public spending. There are others such as the office of the ombudsman which observes due respect to all human rights as well as the Kazakhstani ministry of finance which performs similar roles to the ACCERB.

National anti graft institutions cannot function without the necessary legal backing. In view of the top down approach anti graft laws enable the institutions to create the necessary legal structure and allow for investigation and prosecution of corruption cases within a give country. When this assertion is analyzed against the Kazakhstani case scenarios, there exist sufficient evident to pint out that Kazakhstan follows the top down approach. Kazakhstani President Nazarbaye ordered his ruling party, Nur-Otan which controls parliament to institute the necessary legal reforms which would allow for the prosecution of those implicated in graft cases. For instance, in 1998 the Kazakhstani parliament adopted laws which defined corruption and also set the national objectives and goals of fighting corruption. To supplement this law, other statutes have been adopted which stipulated penalties in particular areas which might be prone to corruption. These areas include the public administration, state procurement and the public service. These laws operate under the platform set by the 1998 law on anti graft activities.

The top down approach to anti corruption has been criticized by scholars and anti graft bodies alike for assume weaknesses. Government institutions mandated to end corruption are the same institutions which are seen as the chief agents of corruption. Furthermore, such institutions cannot act free of political interference since they essentially work agents the same government which establish and funds them. In Kazakhstan, these cases have been reported by anti graft civil authorities which accuse the state police, the executive as well as the parliament undermining the operation of such institutions. For instance, Kazakhstani media law has been amended severally by the parliament to curtail any efforts by the media to critique the government. While the Kazakhstani government claims this is in the best efforts to stifle dissent, it is evident that such the media laws stifle democracy instead. Such failures of the Kazakhstani’s also confirm Bo Rothstein assertions that only si8mulataneosu small and large scale efforts creates the necessary big bag effect which discourages corruption. The implementations of piecemeal anti graft efforts, such as the case in Kazakhstan does not generate the necessary motivations for graft agents to end corruption

International anti-corruption standards

As argued earlier, corruption in Kazakhstan seems to thrive because of a weak legal framework as well as inefficient public administration system. Procurement malpractices are also catalyzed by a thriving economy, driven by vast oil deposits. The establishment of a capitalist economy has attracted direct foreign investment. All these factors conglomerate and create the necessary conditions for corruption. Within the anticorruption circles in Kazakhstan, corruption is viewed as systematically ingrained in the culture of the ruling elite. While analyzed Vis a Vis the big bang theory these views tends to confirm the theory’s assertion that people history may falsely determine the way they behave in the present. This implies that people tend to borrow from history in determining the present behavior. As such, corruption agents are motivated to engage in corrupt malpractices by an already existing culture of corruption. This assertion tends to explain the existence of endemic corruption in Kazakhstan.

Since the 1990s the Kazakh government, buoyed by a thriving democratic environment, has undertaken gradual political as well as economic reforms, all aimed at engaging anti corruption agents at both domestic and international level. At the domestic front, the government, through the Kazakhstan parliament passed a series of statutes and laws to curtailed corrupt practices. As reported by OECD, domestic laws in Kazakhstan are compressed into a comprehensive legal document aimed at suppressing corruption in the public and private sectors. While the Kazakhstani government has done a lot to counter corruption at the domestic front, international anti corruption agents have taken notes of the effects of corruption in curtailing the growth and development the nation at large. As reported through Wikileaks cables, Mr. Kulibayev and others relatives and friend of the Kazakh president have for along time received improper payment on behalf of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. This proves corruption in Kazakhstan is deep rooted and that Bo Rothstein Big Bang theory on corruption is exemplified in Kazakhstan.

Regardless of the underlying big bang effect, the Kazakhstan government has endeavored to align its anti corruption agents along international anti corruption standards. Suffice to say that since the mid 1990s, many government in collaboration with a number of international organization such as transparency international, the United Nations and others have taken note of the negative effects of corruption on the world economy. These antic corruption agents have focused their efforts mainly on ratifying a series of international standards within which corruption will be curtailed at global level. As such a series of legal documents and agreements have been ratified to minimize the risk of corruption. Kazakhstani government under the leadership of President Nursultan Nazarbayev has accepted some of these ratifications. Specifically in June 2008, Kazakhstani government ratified ‘UN Convention against Corruption’, which was immediately followed by the ratification of all the protocol and requirements of the ‘UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’.

By ratifying these standards, Kazakhstani government accepted the liability of engaging corruption at both domestic and international fronts. According to Transparency Kazakhstan the ratification off these two broad statutes was a big and positive step towards engaging endemic corruption in Kazakhstan as other powerful anti corruption agents such as the United Nation would use the necessary legal and diplomatic backing to engage corruption in Kazakhstan. This implied that domestic law such as ‘Law on Public Service’, ’Law on the Fight against Corruption’, ‘Corruption Offences Involving Unlawful Receipt of Benefits and Advantages’ would be harmonized with these ratifications. In this regard Kazakhstani domestic anti corruption legal framework has been enhanced and enabled to corporate with these international standard in criminalizing, combating endemic financial fraudulent activities such as money laundering, the recovery of assets lost through corruption, investigation as well as prosecution corruption cases.

Both Kazakhstan domestic anti corruption legal framework and the international standards ratified by Kazakhstani government have a number of shortcomings. The collaboration of both the domestic and international laws creates a stronger anti corruption legal background that will assist both the local and international anti corruption agents in Kazakhstan deal with corruption more efficiently. Specifically ‘UN Convention against Corruption’ has not made it criminal to conceal assets acquired through corrupt deals. Even though concealment of such assets is considered as a grave offence and covered in part by Art. 28 and Art. 363 of ‘UN Convention against Corruption’ which also stipulates a penalty of between 15 to 20 years imprisonment, most of corruption related cases under this act are categorized as grave offense. However, ‘The Decree of the President of Kazakhstan’ passed in 2005 creates the necessary leg framework for dealing with any form of corruption cases including the concealment of assets illegal acquired. While both the domestic and international standards seem to complement each other in combating widespread corruption in Kazakhstan, when analyzed Vis a Vis Rothstein’s big bang theory it seems that no much benefits would be created since such collaboration is gradual and is not aimed at creating the big band anti corruption effect.

Organizations which help to promote anti-corruption standards in Kazakhstan

According to Bo Rothstein, many of the anti corruption agents world, in trying to combat wide spread corruption tend to focus on their anti corruption activities on understanding why people’s behavior condone corruption as well the attitudinal changes that would effectively change people perception of corruption. Rothstein further argues that such efforts would not be successful and further explains that what is more important is for the anti corruption agents to understating what people believe about anti corruption efforts as well as the perceptions that people do have on how the world works. From a policy [point of view, Rothstein’s assertion a lot of ramifications. It implies no single anti corruption agent supersedes others in combating corruption. The judicial system cannot claim to be more equipped tan the political system. Neither can the civil society, the media, the religious organizations or any anti corruption body. This is because such organizations have only influence only over their jurisdictions and that if people do not have the right kind of attitude on the efforts of such anti corruption agents, then corruption will still thrive since people will not be motivated enough to combat corruption.

In Kazakhstan anti corruption activities have attracted the attention of both the government, the political elite, the civil society as well as other international anti corruption agents. Notably all the anti corruption agents, other than the government backed Financial Police, paint a negative picture of corruptions standard in Kazakhstan. OECD Anti-Corruption Network reports that Kazakhstani Auditor-General, who heads the main auditing committee, ACCERB, is powerless as that position is subsidiary to the Kazakhstani parliament. Furthermore, there is duplication of roles between ACCERB, which also confers directly to the office of the President on matters of public budget and Ministry of Finance. As such Kazakhstani presides usually has direct influence in the manner in which public resources are allocated and spent.

This view seems to corroborate with the findings of Global Integrity, another of the international organization assisting to fight corruption in Kazakhstan. Global Integrity reports that the Kazakhstani Ombudsman Office, which is headed by and given the mandate to protect the encroachment of basic human rights and misuse of public funds by Kazakhstanis government officials, is relatively powerless as there is direct interference from the Kazakhstani executive. Such powerlessness seems to mock the Kazakhstani legislative empowerment of this office. These sentiments on the powerlessness of the office of the ombudsman are also echoed by Freedom House, an NGO concerned with rating for governments on democracy.

Freedom House assert that the Kazakhstani ombudsman office is not allowed to interfere with police work as well judiciary, some of the major government agencies accused of abetting crime in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the office is ill equipped to handle corruption investigations in the entire public sector. While the media is one of the most effective tool which can combat corruption from within the country, the media organizations in Kazakhstan operates under the highly confining Kazakhstan media law. Despite the fact that the Kazakhstani government claims to be democratic, it has not provide the same space to the media. The media law drafted by the Kazakhstani parliament is explicit in criminalizing any criticism leveled against the President through the media law. The media law was further dealt a blow in 2008 when the parliament made a number of amendments. Despite off international pressure, and instead of improving the provisions of the media law to empower the press in reporting on democratic governance , the Kazakh parliament made amendments that provide further strictly limited basic human rights such as the right to free thought, conscience and worship.

The anti corruption activities in Kazakhstani have not been without adequate financial funding. In anticipation and appreciation of anti corruption efforts in Kazakhstani, there have emerged a number of organizations whose primary responsibility is to fund anti corruption agencies within the country. Such include the European Union. In early 2010 the European union provided in excess of Euros 3.4 million to aid in the reform of the judicial as well as the legal system for a three years period ending 2013. The purpose of this generous grant was to facilitate the implementation of the best possible international practices within the Kazakhstani judicial system that would greatly enable the curtailment of all malpractices including corruption. Furthermore, the funds were intended to address Kazakhstan lawyer assertion there needs to be security clearance, for all professional legal professionals to investigate corruption without interference from state authorities such as the police.

The existence of anti corruption organizations in Kazakhstan has not helped much in alleviating corruption. This can be seen as the implications of Young’s social change theory which stipulates that piecemeal and gradual implementation of anti corruption strategies doesn’t lead to an effective outcomes since corruption agents will eventually spill over areas under control of the anti corruption force. This is further aided by Rothstein assertion, explained earlier that people attitudes about the effectiveness of anti corruption agents determines the efficacy of the fight against corruption. Rothstein assertion seems to agree with a survey which was conducted by sociologist in Kazakhstan. In this survey, it was found out that as much as 22% of Kazakhstani’s public tolerates corruption since they do not trust the efforts of government anti corruption efforts. As explained above most of the international civil societies working in Kazakhstan accuse the Kazakhstan executive of wilding too much power to the extent of its benefits from corruption

Implementation of anti corruption initiatives in Kazakhstan

As previously explained, corruption in Kazakhstan is systematic; it is deeply ingrained in the Kazakhstani social, political as well as business set ups. In this view, these systems operate in such a way that corruption is highly tolerated. As explained by Bo Rothstein such systematization accrues with time and as such it builds a culture of corruption which if not countered with a big bang, it will continue to influence generations to come. This is because future generations are brought up believing that corruption is the way the things works. With regard to effective and successful engagement of anti corruption initiatives, various approaches have been offered by professional, civil rights organizations as well as scholars. With this in mind, this section offers an overview of the present anti corruption implementation actions in Kazakhstan.

Against the backdrop of the systematic nature of graft in Kazakhstan, implementation of anti graft initiatives is also gradually progressive and systematic. As previously mentioned the president of Kazakhstan, for the last fifteen years, has been required by the law to implement five year programs aimed at creating an enabling environment for anti graft activities. Such programs are bureaucratic and systematically follow each other and are backed by the state. By the end of the year 2010, the fourth five-year plan had just been successfully implemented. The systematization of anti graft war in Kazakhstan is not limited to the five year programs. Other anti graft strategies are systematic as well. The creation of the necessary anti graft infrastructure is also systematized. The government of Kazakhstan, unlike Rothstein, sees the attainment of a corruption free state as only achievable through a series of systematic steps.

Amongst the very first step the government undertakes is the improvement of the judicial environment. This is done by drafting laws and making amendment in the existing laws. The purpose of this initial measure is to provide the necessary legal framework which will allow for the implementation of any anti graft strategy. This is usually followed by deliberate improvement to state corporations and institutions. Usually, surveys are done to find out the extent and the nature of graft within these institutions. This is attained by making further amendments in the legal frame based on the new findings. With such improvement of the judicial and law enforcements comes the development of anti graft programs. These programs are designed in such a way that not only do they allow for efficient operation of the domestic anti graft agencies but also cooperation with external bodies. The development of such programs happens alongside anti corruption popularization campaigns, mostly done through seminars and lectures. At this point the civil society is incorporated in anti graft activities. Incorporation of the international anti corruption agents is usually the last action.

Conclusion

It the fight against corruption in Kazakhstan is well on course. There are many strategies in place some at the implementation stage, and others awaiting implementation. To help in the implementation process is the International community, represented by such agencies as the FBI, transparency international, Interpol amongst others. Additionally, other international organizations such as the European Union endeavor to see the end of graft in Kazakhstan and as such provide the necessary funds. These funds are committed to improving the anti graft infrastructure including the improvement of the legal framework. While there exists a set of law in Kazakhstan, the mutation nature of corruption related crime has facilitated the need to make amendment to the existing law as well as implementation of five-year anti corruption programs.

The Kazakhstani government has committed itself to fight corruption. In this regard it has created the necessary institutions such as the Security Council, the financial police among others. Furthermore, the government has endeavored to cooperate with international bodies that fight corruption. As such the Kazakhstani government has ratified a series of international standards such as the UN convention against corruption amongst others. Regardless of all these efforts, ending of graft seem to be evading Kazakhstani anti graft agencies. This is due to, as Rothstein explains, assuming the wrong approach to anti corruption. According to Rothstein no matter the efforts put, if those efforts do not create a big bang effect, then corruption agents will not be motivated to stops corruption. In this view, the intensive anti corruption strategies would not work. Suffice to say that all anti corruption agents needs to have a different approach to combating corruption.

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