Introduction
In the book “Dereliction of Duty” H.R.McMaster provides us with a stunning examination of the reasons why the U.S became absorbed in the Vietnam War. This book is comprehensive and well-studied personal accounts of vital meetings, conflicts and resolutions of what occurred and the reasons why they occurred. In this book, the writer identifies the policies and resolutions made by key officials of President Johnson’s administration that led America to be sucked into the War.
McMaster talks about how U.S direct involvement in Vietnam War was due to the crucial role played by the civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. McMaster argues that there were several contributing factors that led the United States to direct military involvement in the Vietnam War. He uncovers who made these resolutions and their intentions and as such he challenges earlier hypotheses by historians and pretexts of the key players on what led the U.S to be directly involved in this unwinnable War. These are some of the most important topics that will be discussed throughout the paper.
Discussion
“Dereliction of Duty” is a very detailed analysis of military strategies at the formative stages of the Vietnam War. It is a detailed personal account of what happened from 1963 to 1965 the period of war. During this period, the Johnson government made a variety of disastrous resolutions that led to the commitment of the United States ground armies that led to more than 50,000 deaths in the subsequent decade.
One key factor that led to this loss as a consequence of the Vietnam War, as the writer observes, was the disagreement between the then US President Mr. Johnson, his secretary of defense, Mr. Robert McNamara, as well as the then Joint Chiefs of Staff on the war policy (P. 67). As a result of this disagreement, America’s leadership cheated its citizenry that it was good for the United States military to be directly involved with the Vietnam War.
The author points out that it was due to the foolishness and lies of President Johnson’s government actions that the country got sucked in the unwinnable war. He thus exonerates the defense secretary’s story from the blame. McMaster portrays McNamara’s version of events as bigheaded, uninformed and shallow policy puppets who believed that they understood the Vietnam War more than the U.S army and hence they disregarded the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s input nearly in all key policy resolutions on the Vietnam War. McNamara’s advisers thought that all issues could be solved via investigation and statistics. Unfortunately, their formula failed to work and led to the death of more than 50,000 U.S soldiers when they absolutely knew the war was unwinnable.
The president’s effort to obligate to a restricted war without the knowledge of the Congress as well as hiding his deeds from the Americans was extremely skeptical by all standards. Johnson’s resolutions were founded on local political criteria and hence in making some important decisions he thought that his repute as a deal-mover would permit him to rule peacefully. Johnson as a political oppressor and clever skeptical manipulator, together with the hand McNamara, was influential for the dreadfully and intentionally awful counsel he got from his key counselors in political and military arenas. The president’s deeds were totally cognizant ones, created by his narrow defining view of local political reflections.
The defense secretary’s wholehearted help and motivation to Johnson as well as his readiness to cheat about the government’s deeds are seen as recipes for the U.S direct involvement in the Vietnam War. Particularly, the responsibility of the JCS chair, Maxwell Taylor and afterward United State’s envoy to Vietnam faithfully conform to the phrase “dereliction of duty” the title of this book.
Mr. Taylor’s lack of ability to control the stumbling inter-service enmity and his failure to provide the right military-strategic advice as required in the United State law as well as his allegiance to the head of state who they truly believed as approving military forces action which could have disastrous, let the JCS to be disregarded in the policymaking process. Mr. Taylor’s team came up with tiny credit, undoubtedly seeing the outcomes of the government’s resolutions, though without satisfactory confidence to either act or quit tried to make the finest out of an extremely bad situation, leading to larger chaos in the course (p. 123).
H.R.McMaster portrays Johnson’s government as one that was much concerned with their position and as such without the ability to establish a course of action and adhere to it. In figuring out what practically occurred in regards to the Vietnam War, the writer tells us that the key players, army chief versus Johnson and McNamara all were unfaithful to each other and moving in different directions. Without question, in this story, we see how Johnson questioned the idea that the leadership was giving key positions in the military to individuals who they could influence rather than choosing the right man for the job. The consequence was indifference between the key participants who needed more than ever before to function as a team at the time of the war.
H.R.McMaster shed some light on the widespread deception on the side of president Johnson. The president was telling one story to congress, army officers another and the masses the third tale. All these stories were different and all were falsehoods. As a result of such behavior, his credibility decreased tremendously and in the end, the truth caught with him and this made the war even worse. Perhaps if Johnson would be more integral and faithful to his role as the president of America there is the likelihood that the United States would not have been absorbed that deep into the Vietnam War. In my opinion, the President believed that his deeds would function based on his knowledge on numerous political issues and his attempts to move social policies via Congress, but the Vietnam War was a different matter which needed a different approach.
The writer tells us that reason for the U.S getting into the war was a mistake of decision and abilities rather than that of values and purposes. It was Johnson’s lies within his administration that assisted plunge the U.S into this unwinnable war. McMaster observes it was the decisions and guidance on Vietnam that formulated Johnson’s administration and methodically sidetracked by the secretary of defense that plunged the country into the war.
A number of facts illustrate all that the writer is telling us. First, the forecast of the Army chiefs and Marine Corps that a win in the war is only possible if the U.S commits more than 50,000 soldiers for five years, a prediction that was disregarded by Johnson and his administration’s disagreement, especially those from McNamara that ended in a deadlock (p.341). McNamara restrained nearly all warning signs in a way of responding to Johnson’s disquiet to maintain Vietnam under control until the 1964 presidential elections were over and the great society code endorsed.
Conclusion
Without question, when you go through the book you will agree with the fact that military chief surrender to civilian manipulation in key war strategies is reasonable but both should work as a team in the time of war. I hence side with the writers in the idea that Americans were being killed in Vietnam when the Joint Chiefs were concerned with high profile wars and this amounted to dereliction of duty.
Overall, this book provides us with the fine details of the deception and manipulation that was carried out by the U.S defense secretary and President Johnson’s administration who were more engaged in the political victories in the domestic arena than Army victories in Vietnam. It can therefore be argued that the military, particularly the army chief was of no help in creating a plan or in offering military goals that could lead to a win in the Vietnam War. I hence concur with McMaster’s idea that the army is not a political instrument but it a driving force that should be employed properly to cause substantial injuries and wide-ranging damages to rival forces so as to achieve its military objectives.
Work Cited
McMaster, H. R. Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, Harper Perennial, 1998.