In the book Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt analyzes and evaluates the role of the Jewish ghetto leaders (the judenrate) in the destruction of their own people. She claims that it was one of the most terrible and dramatic events in the history of the Holocaust and the Jewish nation. Thus, this position is often contested and rejected by historians who investigate psychological and social factors of this event.
In the book, Arendt criticizes Jewish leaders and military in extreme violence and hostility against Jews. These accusations are based on the evidence that most of Nazis were mentally healthy. Arendt states that Eichmann misunderstands and misinterprets Kantian categorical imperative and its practice application. By the “banality of evil”, Arendt implies the ability of human beings to justify their actions even if they lead to aggression and violence against innocent people. The evil is that resulting from human choices. Its relation to natural evil may be more or less apparent. Holocaust is perhaps the best example of this. Even though natural factors such as population pressure may help set the stage for war, actual hostilities depend on a highly organized human endeavor. But along with any possible worthy objectives (such as the attainment of freedom or the protection of a homeland) come hosts of evils–mass killing, wholesale destruction, and the personal and social problems that war leaves in its wake. Arendt states that Jewish leaders ”were inspired not by conscience but by the desire to salt some money or some connections away for the dark days to come” (Arendt 116).
According to a court-appointed worker, Eichmann tried to understand the reasons and aims of the inquiry and answered most questions readily. There is some evidence that Eichmann, depending on circumstances, would alternately profess knowledge or ignorance of the language, perhaps in order to avoid answering questions precipitously. Arendt bases her argument on the idea that: Eichmann “identifies his own will with the principle behind the law-the source from which the law sprang. In Kant’s philosophy, that source was practical reason; in Eichmann’s household use of him, it was the will of the Fiihrer” (Arendt 137). Arendt states that Eichmann did not have a choice. The struggle that historians may only sense between the reality of the Holocaust and the old words and concepts is, for them, an immediate presence. The problem is with these evil aspects of life. Occasionally someone will surrender to skepticism or nihilism, but most people assume on good evidence that life as a whole makes sense. The pattern of meaning takes shape, and these things of which we now speak contradict it (Miller and Jensen 2003). The over-all impression is not that they prevent any formulation of meaning. But the attempt to impress a pattern of meaning on every fact of life without considering it fully gives rise to partial or fallacious answers to the problem of evil. One’s enjoyment of a good apple is augmented by his having eaten a rotten one.
In sum, “the banality of evil” means simplicity of human deaths and violence justified by Nazis and their ideology. The general attitude toward the natural world which characterizes our Western civilization has essentially this religious origin. Arendt proposes readers a unique interpretation of the Jewish leadership and collaboration with Nazi Germany examining the case of Eichmann. Thus, her arguments have many limitations and incorrect argumentation. The majority of historians proves that the case of Eichmann was an exceptional one and cannot be regarded as typical behavior of Jewish leaders.
Works Cited
Arendt, H. Eichmann in Jerusalem, Penguin Classics; New Ed edition, 1994.