Facts
In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 17 Fla. L. Weekly S 691 (Fla. Nov. 12, 1992) is a legal case that addresses the issues of anencephalic infants’ legal status, the determination of death in the case of anencephaly, and the ethical suitability of organ transplantation. In 1991, Justin Pearson and Laura Campo learned that the couple was expecting a child (Johnson et al., 2009). However, in the last trimester of pregnancy, an ultrasound revealed anencephaly in the woman’s fetus (“In re TACP,” n.d.).
Anencephaly is a fatal congenital disability characterized by “a congenital absence of a major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp” (Johnson et al., 2009, p. 123). Infants with this condition have a brain stem that ensures the presence of essential functions, including breathing and feeding. However, due to the absence of the cerebral cortex and other brain parts, they cannot hear, see, feel pain, and perceive the environment in general. As a brain stem provides limited functioning, anencephalic infants may survive several days (“In re TACP,” n.d.). Subsequently, they die from the organs’ failure as the mission brain does not support their functionality.
Although Pearson and Campo were advised to terminate the pregnancy due to their child’s medical condition being incompatible with life, the couple decided “to make something life-affirming flow from their sorrow” (Johnson et al., 2009, p. 124). In particular, they intended to donate their infant’s organs to other children to save their lives. When a girl called Teresa Ann Campo Pearson was born in 1992 at Broward General Medical Center, and her prenatal diagnosis was confirmed, the parents requested the procedure of transplantation (Johnson et al., 2009). However, they directly faced doctors’ refusal as Teresa Ann had a heartbeat and was breathing independently. In this case, the removal of her organs would be viewed as murder as legal death was not confirmed.
Meanwhile, when Pearson and Campo went to court to confirm the status of legally dead for their daughter to start a life-saving transplantation for needy patients, their request was rejected. Regardless of the case’s coverage by mass media and the general public’s support for the parents’ decision, courts continued to reject their requests and appeals. Subsequently, the infant’s condition substantially deteriorated, and she died nine days after birth. As her organs failed, leading to death, they could not be transplanted and save other infants’ lives.
Procedural History
Pearson and Campo chose Walter G. ”Skip” Campbell as their legal advocate to present their request in the Circuit Court of Broward County. After Judge Estella Moriarty rebuffed it, the parents addressed the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in West Palm Beach, aiming to overturn this ruling (Johnson et al., 2009). When this court’s three-judge panel denied the request, an appeal was filed with the Florida Supreme Court. It left the decision of lower courts unchanged. However, Florida law was examined concerning the legal status of anencephalic infants.
Issue Presented
The issue presented in this case refers to an utter lack of consensus related to the legal status and legal death in the case of infants with anencephaly. On the one hand, this medical condition is fatal, and the absence of almost all brain parts excludes an infant’s sensitivity and connection with the outside world (“In re TACP,” n.d.). On the other hand, Florida law defines death as the irreversible cessation of respiratory, brain, circulatory, or other vital functions (Johnson et al., 2009).
Although the transplantation of anencephalic infants’ organs had been performed since 1963, in all cases, legal death was confirmed as all parts of infants’ brains were dead, and they could not function. However, in In re TACP, 609 So. 2d 588, 17 Fla. L. Weekly S 691 (Fla. Nov. 12, 1992), Teresa Ann was initially breathing independently – thus, her death due to transplantation would be regarded as murder.
Holding
The court was initially responsible for deciding Teresa Ann’s legal status – in particular, her legal death was requested to be confirmed. However, the Florida Supreme Court and all lower courts did not approve it when the infant was alive. Moreover, the court did not reconsider a common law standard and the definition of death to include anencephaly as a medical condition that allowed confirmed death.
Legal Reasoning
According to Florida law, legal death that allows organ transplantation may be confirmed only when all parts of the brain, including a brain stem, stop functioning and respiratory, cognitive, and circulatory functions are ceased as well. In In re TACP, 609 So. 2d 588, 17 Fla. L. Weekly S 691 (Fla. Nov. 12, 1992), the infant was breathing independently, demonstrating the functionality of a brain stem (“In re TACP,” n.d.). In this case, she cannot be regarded as both biologically and legally dead, and transplantation was prohibited.
Rule of Law
Florida law applied to this case mirrored the approach of the Uniform Definition of Death Act (UDDA) to legal death. Issued by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to clarify the debatable aspects of the law, the act identifies death as the irreversible cessation of the brain’s functions or all respiratory and circulatory functions (Johnson et al., 2009). By it, Teresa Ann was alive during the litigation.
Concurring or Dissenting Opinions
The legal determination of death in the case of anencephalic infants remains a highly disputable and controversial issue. The supporters of the inclusion of anencephaly in the list of factors of legal death and the legalization of organ transplantation on its basis state that these decisions allow to express parents’ good intentions and save other children’s lives (Johnson et al., 2009). They underline that anencephalic infants’ condition is irreversible, and the restoration of their functions that may ensure the quality of their lives is impossible. Therefore, anencephaly-determined brain absence should be equal to brain death.
However, opposing viewpoints predominantly based on Kantian ethics presuppose an equal approach to every individual regardless of their conditions and respect for their dignity. In particular, according to it, “an individual should never be treated simply as a means to another’s ends” (Johnson et al., 2009, p. 128). In other words, people cannot decide whose lives should be saved.
Moreover, opponents believe that making an exception for anencephalic infants is a disturbing and deteriorating practice that may lead to highly negative consequences in the future. In particular, it will allow the reconsideration of the legal status of other people with physical and cognitive disabilities that impact their life spans (Johnson et al., 2009). Moreover, the change in the legal system is associated with discrimination as it divides anencephalic infants from humanity.
References
In re TACP. (n.d.). JUSTIA US Law. Web.
Johnson, S. H., Krause, J. H., Saver, R. S., & Wilson, R. F. (2009). Health law and bioethics: Cases in context. Aspen Publishers.
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