The Crimean War of 1853-56 was the first major military conflict in Europe since the Napoleonic Wars and, as such, often attracted historians’ attention. Fought between Russia and a coalition of European powers together with the Ottoman Empire, the conflict demonstrated considerable advances in technology, communication, and the art of war. As the name suggests, an important part of the conflict was the campaign fought in the Crimean peninsula between the defending Russians and the expeditionary force of British, French, Ottoman, and later Sardinian troops. The most famous events of the war, such as the Charge of the Light Brigade, were associated with the siege of the Russian naval base in Sevastopol. However, this siege would have been impossible if not for the allied victory in the first major battle of the Crimean campaign. The battle of Alma, fought on 20 September 1854, opened the road to Sevastopol and proved the superiority of the allied arms and the French tactics over the cumbersome Russian military.
Before delving into the battle itself, it is necessary to briefly cover its context. In 1852-1853 a seemingly trite dispute between the Orthodox and Catholic clergy in Palestine escalated into a diplomatic conflict between Russia and France (Tate 15). Alarmed by the Russian propositions to partition the Ottoman Empire, Britain began drifting closer to the French side. After the Ottoman Empire refused the ultimatum that would give Russia the right to intervene in its internal affairs on Christians’ behalf, war broke out in October 1853. Russia engaged the Ottomans on the Danube and in the Caucasus, but with no decisive result, and was soon forced to abandon the latter theater due to Austrian intervention. Unwilling to see Russia upsetting the balance in both Europe and the Middle East, Britain and France began mobilizing and declared war on Russia in March 1854 (Tate 18). A combined French-British force arrived in Bulgaria and then, reinforced by some Ottoman troops, launched an expedition against Sevastopol, a major Russian naval base. After disembarking in Crimea on September 4, they marched toward their goal and soon encountered the Russian army waiting for them.
The Russian force, up to 40,000 string and led by Prince Menshikov, an experienced veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, occupied a good defensive position between the allies and Sevastopol. The river Alma was not particularly deep but still constituted an obstacle, and its steep left bank, which was occupied by the Russians, made it even stronger (Baumgart 128). However, the Russian commander believed that the river slopes on his left flank were nigh impassable and only left a token force at this point (Baumgart 128). The allied force, up to 61,000, would have to cross the shallow river under the Russian fire and then scale the steep hills beyond. However, the French general Saint-Arnaud, who also held overall command of the allied army, noted what he saw as Menshikov’s fatal mistake. A veteran of the colonial war in Algiers, he considered the hills on the left Russian flank perfectly accessible for his hardened troops and decided to turn the Russian flank there (Baumgart 128). As for the British commander Lord Raglan, he was charged with attacking and tying up the Russian right flank while the French did their part.
Tactically speaking, each of the three armies represented a fairly different picture. The French, especially the light infantry called Zuaves, utilized their Algerian experience and fought in loose skirmish lines to maximize the effect of their rifles while lowering their own casualties (Baumgart 129). The British, still clinging to the tactics of Wellington’s times, marched forward in lines, which could deliver devastating volleys against dense formations but were also quite vulnerable to the enemy fire (Gowing). As for the Russians, they also used the tactics that served them well in the Napoleonic Wars and mostly fought and maneuvered in battalion columns (Baumgart 68). While fearsome in bayonet charges, these columns provided an easy target for the enemy fire. The majority of the allied infantry were all armed with modern rifles with an effective range of 500-600 meters, while outdated Russian smoothbores could not fire accurately beyond 250 meters (Baumgart 68). Artillery pieces were roughly comparable in all armies and fired solid shot on the distance of up to 3-4 kilometers and canister up to 600 meters, although the accuracy decreased dramatically with range.
The battle began in the morning of September 20, with the four divisions of the French army advancing against the Russian left flank and center. As mentioned above, the Russians thought their left to be inaccessible and overlooked it, leaving only a single battalion there (Baumgart 128). The French light infantry proved this estimation wrong, climbing the steep slopes by entire battalions and even dragging field guns up (Baumgart 129). Although Menshikov understood the threat and dispatched his reserves to the left, it was too late. Although the Russian artillery fired well and inflicted casualties upon the advancing French, its canister – the only effective type of round against infantry – had roughly the same range as the French rifles (Baumgart 129). It allowed the French sharpshooters to kill the gunners quickly, and after that, the cumbersome Russian columns with their outdated smoothbores were easy to engage from the safe range. Thus, utilizing their superior tactics and weaponry, the French decimated the Russian forces that opposed them and progressed forward. This movement turned the Russians’ flank and threatened their center, which was already engaging the other half of the French army.
The British, who advanced against the Russian right flank, faced more difficulty than their French counterparts. While the Russian position there was more accessible, the Russians have erected field fortifications protecting their guns from enemy fire. As the British lines advanced, Russian guns inflicted progressively heavier casualties upon them. The fire was so intense that a British soldier who fought in the battle referred to it as a “hurricane of shot and shell” (Gowing). Despite considerable casualties, the first British line managed to assault the Russian positions and take the guns. However, the Russian infantry counterattacked almost immediately and drove them away from the artillery positions with a fierce bayonet charge. According to the eyewitness, the British “lost a great number of our men and, by overwhelming numbers… were mobbed out of the battery” (Gowing). However, the Russian overextended their counterattack and ran directly into the murderous volley fire of the second British line. After that, the British troops renewed the offensive and engaged the Russians in heavy fighting that lasted until the French pressure on its left flank and center forced the Russian army to retreat.
Seeing his left flank turned and his right flank and center pushed, Menshikov decided to retreat. The allies did not attempt to pursue the Russians – a decision that owed as much to fatigue and scorching heat as to the Russian superiority in cavalry and unknown terrain (Baumgart 130). The Russian casualties were fairly heavy in proportion to the number of troops engaged and amounted to approximately 1800 dead, 3900 wounded, and 700 missing or taken prisoner (Baumgart 131). The British lost up to 300 dead and around 2000 wounded, while the French losses were between 140 and 250 dead and 1200-1400 wounded (Baumgart 131). Put together, these figures highlight the superiority of the French tactics and especially the skirmish lines, which made the infantry less vulnerable to massed enemy fire than the Russian columns of British lines. They also demonstrate the superiority of rifles as compared to smoothbores used by most of the Russian infantry. The allied victory opened the road to Sevastopol, the siege of which would last for almost a year and constitute the most important part of the Crimean War.
As one can see, the battle of the Alma River was an important engagement that demonstrated the superiority of the French and, to a much lesser degree, British forces. Antiquated tactics and outdated smoothbore muskets of the Russian army proved no match to the French assault. The British tactics were just as cumbersome as the Russian, but the redcoats benefited from having rifles with greater effective range. The decisive factor in winning the battle was Saint-Arnaud’s tactical skills that allowed him to correctly identify the weak point of Russian defenses and turn the left Russian flank. The battle of the Alma was not only a tactical but also a strategic and psychological success, as it opened the way to Sevastopol and instilled the allied troops with a sense of superiority.
Works Cited
Baumgart, Winfried. The Crimean War: 1853-1856. 2nd ed., Bloomsbury Academic, 2020.
Gowing, Timothy. “Voice from the Ranks: A Personal Narrative of the Crimean Campaign.”The Victorian Web.
Tate, Trudi A. A Short History of the Crimean War. I. B. Tauris, 2019.