The events in the Middle East in the middle of the 20th century showed a moment of crisis that changed the social structure of Iran and led to the Islamization of the country, which resulted in the rejection of Western values and anti-Christian sentiments. In his book All the Shah’s Men, Stephen Kinzer describes the background of the Coup and quotes the words of an elderly Iranian woman: “all your trouble started in 1953” (ix). A series of events catalyzed the revolutionary mood in the country. According to Kinzer, the dominant view among Iranians is that the United States was responsible for stopping the democratic development of the eastern country, resulting in dictatorship and consequent anti-Western sentiment (x). In his book, the author mentions specific turning points in the course of events leading to the 1953 Coup.
Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh led the country from 1951 to 1953. Before that, he was an influential member of Parliament and promoted the nationalization of the oil industry, where the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was the leading one (Kinzer 49). Today, this corporation is known as British Petroleum, one of the largest companies in its industry (Kinzer 195). Mossadegh’s decision to nationalize the oil industry in Iran provoked an indignant reaction from the UK, where the actions of the eastern leader were regarded as a violation of the corporation’s legal rights. Unable to solve the issue through legal support, the West imposed a trade and economic blockade, which significantly reduced the trade in Iranian oil. This was one of the reasons the 1953 Coup took place.
The severance of diplomatic relations with Great Britain intensified the dispute between Iran and the West. However, the US, which had a significant impact on the Coup, was not immediately involved in the conflict. The change of administration of the White House in 1952, when Dwight Eisenhower came to power, was a crucial factor (Kinzer 4). Along with Winston Churchill, then British Prime Minister, the US government decided to put a stop to Iran’s attempts to secede from the Western world (Kinzer 2). A joint operation to destabilize the region was the decisive factor in causing the Coup.
As part of the campaign against the Prime Minister, foreign intelligence agencies paid for slanderous articles in local media and rallies in major cities. According to former CIA foreign propaganda specialist Richard Cottam, up to 4/5 of all newspapers in Tehran worked for the special service and published articles written in Washington (Kinzer 6). In the media, Mossadegh was presented as a politician with anti-Islamic views, “as a Communist collaborator and as a fanatic” (Kinzer 6). The UK and the United States talked much about the potential threat of the fall of Iran, bordering the Soviet republics to the north, into the hands of the USSR. Calls for a socialist revolution were one of the reasons why the 1953 Coup was organized.
Finally, the involvement of Islamic clerics was another significant premise of the Coup. According to Kinzer, the US and British intelligence agencies developed specific strategies to engage with members of religious communities, often using intimidation techniques (37). As a result, Mossadegh’s movement was halted, and the supposedly anti-Islamic background of his policies became the catalyst. In the second half of the 20th century, the face of Iran changed significantly. Despite a temporary improvement in the situation after the 1953 Coup, the coming to power of Islamic leaders brought with it colossal social transformations (Kinzer 202). As a result, after the 1979 revolution, massive religious censorship entered the lives of Iranians.
One of Kinzer’s counterfactual arguments concerns the potential outcomes for Iran in the case of joining the USSR. The author writes: “only a Soviet takeover followed by a war between the superpowers would have been worse” (Kinzer 215). This argument is counterfactual since the proposed scenario did not materialize. Despite the Cold War and the political confrontation between the US and the USSR, the leaders of both superpowers withstood pressure from each other and did not succumb to provocations. The position of the author is subjective and is not related to real events. This personal assessment may be rational, but, in the context of history, the subjunctive mood is unacceptable. Moreover, it is possible that Iran’s accession to the USSR would have improved life in the region, and the Soviet government could have found common ground with Western leaders. As a result, the argument presented cannot be considered true.
Another counterfactual argument relates to the description of Reza Shah’s position. As Kinzer describes the ruler, “if he had not alienated himself from almost every segment of Iranian society, … he might have been able to resist” (45). Such an assumption is abstract and has nothing to do with reality. Reza Shah showed aloofness from what was happening and was not ready to confront the Western threat. In addition, his self-centeredness and greed were deterrents hindering the democratic development of Iranian society. Corruption, the lack of advanced political skills, and other barriers prevented Reza Shah from keeping his people safe, which, in turn, resulted in the events of the Coup. Thus, Kinzer’s argument is an assumption based on the possible development of events but not on the real situation that took place in the country.
Work Cited
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. John Wiley & Sons, 2003.