David McCullough, a famous historian and biographer, wrote this well-received and interesting book with the name “1776”. He describes the events that took place around the year 1776, which led to independence. McCullough divided the book into various sections according to the sequence of events and their importance
- Pre-Revolutionary Action.
- Dorchester Heights.
- Battle of Long Island.
- Fort Washington & Fort Lee.
- Battle of Trenton.
In the 1760s, merchants moved to Piedmont with the express purpose of setting up trade. Most of their papers have not survived. Court records suggest that at least twenty-eight merchant firms traded in Orange County between 1762 and 1766. Some were connected to large firms in Scotland, England, or colonial cities; others were independent partnerships.
In 1769, for instance, Richard Bennehan, a Virginian, and William Johnston, a Scot who was related to former governor Gabriel Johnston and to Samuel Johnston, a prominent eastern assemblyman from Edenton, opened their store about fifteen miles northeast of Hillsborough in Snow Hill, Orange County. Johnston also ran a store in Hillsborough in partnership with James Thackston. A minimum of twenty stores operated in Rowan County before 1776, and 125 taverns were licensed in that county alone.
In November, word coursed through America that Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia, had promised to liberate slaves who joined his troops and helped suppress the rebellion. Virginia’s radical congressmen railed at the “Diabolical Scheme” of “this Monster,” while the remaining reconciliationists in the province, now faced with the prospect of having their throats cut in the course of a slave insurrection inspired by their governor, turned their backs on the Crown forever. Nor were the shockwaves released by Dunmore’s act confined to Virginia. North Carolina, which had little history of assisting its neighbors, immediately dispatched 400 soldiers to Virginia to assist in its defense against the royal troops.
The king’s truculent speech opening Parliament in October reached Philadelphia. The monarch had observed that the object of the “desperate conspiracy” in America was independence. He also announced that German mercenaries would be secured to help suppress the “rebellious war.” Days later came to the word of a bill introduced by Lord North it would result in the American Prohibitory Act that would terminate commerce with all the colonies for the duration of the war. British policy “don’t look like a Reconciliation” was the response of John Hancock. It was in this environment that Thomas Paine’s Common Sense was published.
Samuel Adams fulminated privately at Wilson’s interpretation of the king’s act. “What a pity it is,” he added privately, that Wilson and his comrades were “so degenerate and servile.” They called the monarch’s address “most gracious,” when in fact, it revealed the king to be “a Man of a wicked heart.” All these events were going before that eventful period in 1776.
Dorchester Heights
Undercover of darkness on the sixth anniversary of the Boston Massacre, March 5, 1776, Washington got his new artillery atop Dorchester Heights. From that vantage point, the Continental artillerymen could sweep Boston harbor of British shipping, severing General William Howe’s lifeline to supply depots throughout Great Britain. When Howe awakened and glimpsed the sun sparkling on the gun barrels of the American cannon atop the eminence south of the city, he knew instantly that the British armed forces in Boston were in an untenable position.
Washington confidently dared him to attack. He believed that the losses the British had sustained at Bunker Hill would be as nothing compared to the carnage likely to result from an attempt to wrest this high ground from the entrenched American soldiery. Washington was convinced that during the past year, he had transformed his Continentals from civilians into soldiers; in addition, he had twelve times the number of cannon that had been available to the defenders of Bunker Hill. Howe briefly considered an attack but soon decided it was best to bargain. He proposed that in return for his safe departure from Boston, he would not raze the city. Washington faced a dilemma. He could, in all likelihood, capture the entire British army in America.
Or he could spare Boston. He chose the latter. He was fully aware that Congress was moving toward independence, which might bring foreign aid to his army, and just as alert to the reality that the ruination of Boston would only strengthen the hand of reconciliationists in other cities, especially in New York and Philadelphia, delaying the break with Great Britain indefinitely. Thus, Washington accepted Howe’s proffer and during April the last of the redcoats, who had come in the hot summer of 1768 to maintain order. What Samuel Adams had always called the “occupation” of Boston had ended.
Battle of Long Island
In the first morning of fighting on Long Island, the British nearly succeeded in surrounding the Continentals. In a disorganized retreat, the Americans broke and ran for the hills, the redoubts in the high ground of Brooklyn that had been under construction throughout the spring and summer. But their presumed security in these defensive positions was illusory, as they were very much trapped, pinioned against the East River. Washington, however, was fortunate and daring.
When Howe paused before delivering the knockout punch, Washington took advantage of deteriorating weather. A dense fog rolled in and shrouded the river, reducing visibility to bare inches to extricate his snared men. Nevertheless, it soon appeared that disaster had only been postponed, not averted. Washington brought the men he had rescued from Long Island to Manhattan Island and posted half his force at the lower end of the island and the remainder in Harlem Heights, several miles to the north.
Congress was rattled by what had occurred. Some expressed concern that these near-disasters would strengthen the hand of those who favored reconciliation. Waiting impatiently for word from Silas Deane, who reached France on his mission in quest of foreign assistance just prior to the Battle of New York, some frightened congressmen even expressed a readiness to accept an alliance with Louis XVI on any terms that the French monarch dictated.
Washington made stupendous blunders during the Battle of New York, but the most egregious error to defend these islands against an adversary that possessed the world’s finest navy and an army of regulars that outnumbered the American citizen-soldiers was imposed on him by Congress.
However, Washington had not balked at Congress’ wishes. He believed his new-modeled army of patriots who fought for liberty could stand up to regulars who had no stake in the outcome of the Anglo-American quarrel. Soon enough, however, Washington’s callow soldiers and equally inexperienced officers proved a bitter disappointment. Yet, they were not entirely to blame. Washington made an incredible mistake at the very outset of the contest when he divided his army in the face of a superior foe.
He posted half his men on Manhattan Island and the remainder in and around Brooklyn Heights on the western end of Long Island. After barely surviving that blunder, he repeated it on Manhattan. By the narrowest of margins, he survived that misstep as well, but he foolishly remained on Manhattan long after Congress had authorized his flight to the greater safety of New Jersey or the mainland above New York. Good fortune alone appears to have saved him from himself. Late in September, like Washington, at last, was attempting to get his army off Manhattan Island, the British moved to cut off his every exit and almost brought it off. They were slowed by poor maps and inadequate knowledge of the terrain, and Washington’s Continentals barely made their escape.
Fort Washington & Fort Lee
Washington crossed into New Jersey, hoping to protect that state and shield Philadelphia. Although no one knew it at the time, the low point of the war before 1780—both for the American cause and for General Washington—was about to be reached. In mid-November, the British seized Fort Washington. The Americans lost 3,000 men killed, wounded, and captured. Washington had adequate warning of the peril but was frozen by indecision. A few days later, Fort Lee, directly across the river, fell with the loss of irreplaceable supplies and arms, especially artillery. Both losses were inexcusable, as it should have been readily apparent that neither installation could be held. For the moment, all that was left to Washington was to run for his life, which he did, with the implacable earl of Cornwallis in relentless pursuit.
Washington stayed one step ahead of his foe, sometimes exiting a glum New Jersey village while red-coated advance parties entered the other side. Ultimately, Washington got his men across the Delaware River at Trenton. There, with the wide, fast-flowing river between the pursuer and the pursued, the Continentals enjoyed a sunbeam of safety. Shortly, in fact, when the rains of late autumn increased, turning America’s primitive roads into gluey mud, the British called off the chase until spring. They went into winter quarters, posting detachments of their regulars and the Hessian mercenaries throughout New Jersey and New York.
Battle of Trenton
It was in this pernicious atmosphere that Washington struck back, attacking the Hessian cantonment at Trenton on Christmas night. It was an act of desperation. Even Washington conceded that nothing “but a necessity, dire necessity” could justify the risks he ran. He was seeking to save himself and his army, for the one-year period of enlistment that had commenced during the siege of Boston was about to expire. No one knew better than Washington that men could not be recruited to an army that was perpetually on the run or that habitually faced defeat. If he was to have an army in 1777, he needed a victory. Yet Washington did not act recklessly.
Intelligence gathered from local German-Americans led him to believe that the Hessians, distracted by their exuberant Christmas revelry, might be vulnerable to a surprise attack. Still, his operation would place him in great peril. In taking the army across Delaware, he risked the possibility that his Continentals might be discovered with their backs to the river and with no hope of escape.
Works Cited
McCullough David “1776” Simon & Schuster 2005.