Introduction
For a long time, many human societies have viewed animals as sources of food, labor, and clothing. This view (partly) stems from religious influences, which define people’s perceptions of animal rights. For example, Christian teachings show that God gave man the power to control all animals (on land and in the sea). Therefore, many Christian societies know that human beings are superior to animals.
Philosophers, such as Aristotle, also supported the above-mentioned religious arguments by ranking animals in the lowest cadre of living things (Taylor 36). Although the Greek philosopher explored the differences and similarities between both species, he said animals were a “lower-stature” species (compared to human beings) because they could not reason, think, or have beliefs, as people do (Taylor 36). These ancient perceptions of animals largely explain the background of animal rights debates. They also explain how different societies treat animals today.
Relative to how people treat animals, Singera (13) says, in 2001, North American farmers raised and killed about 17 billion land animals for human consumption. Scientists in America and Europe killed another 100 million animals for experimental purposes (Singera 13). People killed about 30 million more land animals for their fur (Singera 13).
Most of these animals lived and died in morally repugnant circumstances. Such “inhuman” treatments continue unabated because many societies believe animals do not have any rights. This paper seeks to change this narrative by focusing on pets and arguing for their rights. Although it explores critics’ arguments too, it shows that, like human beings, pets are emotional creatures and not property items, as many people would like to believe. Therefore, it is immoral to mistreat them.
Arguments for Animal Rights
Pets can feel Emotion and Pain as People do
Singera (1) is widely considered as the greatest pioneer of animal rights. He said human beings do not have a special status above other animals. For him, the degree that both species experience when feeling pleasure or pain is the only difference between animals and human beings. Since both groups have a threshold of pain, Singera (1) does not understand why people do not protect animals the same way they protect their offspring. Here, Singera (1) strives to eliminate the differences between animals and human beings to advance animal rights.
Linker (9) supports this view by saying, “Once the dividing line between humans and animals disappears, it is hard to uphold any fundamental ethical distinction between them.” Steve Wise, an American Law Professor (cited in Linker 9), similarly advances the above argument by using a different justification for supporting animal rights. Instead of using shared pain and pleasure to show the similarities between people and animals, he strives to elevate animals to human status. For example, he criticizes people who view animals as property because he believes animals could reason as human beings do.
For example, he says Chimpanzees have this ability (Linker 9). He uses this argument to say their reasoning ability makes them more valuable than other types of property. Therefore, he believes animals share the same dignity as people do. Referring to Wise’s argument, Linker (12) says, “if he can demonstrate that certain higher animals possess the same intrinsic dignity that human beings do, the law within liberal democracies will be obliged to recognize that such animals are persons possessing at least some fundamental, inviolable rights.”
The above arguments show no significant differences between people and animals. In terms of shared emotion and pain, Singerb (11) says scientists infer almost all human physiological pain manifestations on other species. He particularly draws our attention to animals that are close to us – mammals and birds. He says, “Their behavioral signs include writhing, facial contortions, moaning, yelping, or other forms of calling, attempts to avoid the source of pain, appearance of fear at the prospect of its repetition, and so on” (Singerb 11).
Indeed, like how human beings behave (when they feel pain) animals show the same physiological symptoms of pain, such as dilated pupils, increased pulse rates, and increased blood pressure. To explain this commonality, Grandin (141) says both species have similar nervous systems. In line with this argument, Singerb (11) emphasizes that the nervous systems of animals evolved the same way the nervous systems of human beings did. Their ability to feel pain is part of their survival tactics because they use it to avoid injury and death.
Grandin (141) says animals also experience fear, the same way human beings do. Certainly, although fear is subjective, it causes significant stress to animals. This is why advocates of animal rights say they need environmental enrichments to prevent them from developing irregular developmental patterns, such as EEG patterns (Grandin 141). Relative to this argument, Grandin (141) says people’s nervous systems do not differ with that of higher animals. For example, scientific evidence shows that the nervous systems of chimpanzees, dogs, and cows are like that of human beings (Grandin 141).
The genome project also supports the same finding by showing that people’s gene make-up is like a mouse’s gene makeup (Grandin 141). Relative to this fact, Grandin (141) says mammals have more than 30% of their genes designed to serve nervous system functions. These similarities explain why some animals adopt human-like behaviors, such as self-medication. For example, studies have shown that rats self-medicate when they suffer from arthritis (Grandin 141). Besides these behavioral similarities, animals are as social as human beings are (Grandin 142).
Although some people may not support these facts, scientific evidence suggests that most animals perceive pain the same way human beings do. Governments have used this evidence to protect animal rights in many parts of the world. For example, three separate government committees (on animal welfare), in the UK, affirm that most animals feel pain (Singerb 13). However, Grandin (140) says we need more research to explain the extent that these animals experience the pain.
Animals are not Property
Taylor (36) says until the early 1900s, many people saw animals as worthless creatures. In fact, many societies could not accord a “property status” to them because of spite (Taylor 36). Therefore, the law permitted people to steal and kill animals without any consequences. The abolition approach has strived to change people’s perception of animals (as property).
It says that focusing on animal welfare distracts people from eliminating property rights on animal ownership (Grandin 140). Instead, the theory proposes a moral and legal paradigm shift, which strives to differentiate animals from other types of property (Grandin 140). To do so, the abolitionist approach encourages people to perceive animals as sentient creatures (having subjective awareness).
Proponents of this view say they do not need human-like rationalities to receive better treatment from people (Grandin 140). Therefore, since they are creatures that experience pain, they should belong to the moral community. This view differs with the animal rights view, which (only) supports the better treatment of human-like animals, such as apes, because their DNA make-up is more like human beings than other animals. As such, they say all animals are the same (Grandin 140). They also oppose treating animals as human property (merely) because they do not fit our conventional perceptions of property (Taylor 36).
Grandin (140) takes a more practical approach in elaborating the above point by comparing an animal and a screwdriver. He says that although many societies perceive them as property, they are different. To elaborate this point, he uses the US legal system and culture by highlighting how the law allows American citizens to sell, profit, and “eat” their property (among other utilities) (Grandin 140). Although property holders could do the above things, the law restricts them from committing the same acts on animals (the same restrictions do not apply to other properties).
For example, law enforcement officials could arrest a person for using a screwdriver to puncture a cow’s eye. However, they would not penalize the offender for using a hammer to deform a screwdriver. Based on this understanding, the status of animals has slowly changed, in America, because the law now recognizes animal rights. For example, all 50 states have introduced anti-cruelty laws that protect animals from mistreatment (Grimm 3). These laws allow judges to impose fines of up to $125,000, or a jail term of ten years on offenders (Grimm 4).
Similarly, many existing legislations support animal rights (such as the Federal Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act, which requires rescue services to save animals, as they would rescue a human being) (Grimm 3). This trend has equally seen many judges treat dogs as people (some judges even allow dogs to have lawyers).
Consequently, some animals have received damages from the judges (Grimm 3). Other types of “property” do not receive the same status. Using the above examples, Grandin (140) supports the views of animal rights advocates who say animals need rights because they feel pain (a goat can feel pain, but a screwdriver cannot).
It is Immoral to Mistreat Animals
Although many researchers have used different criteria to explain the differences between man and animals, few have bothered to explain man’s higher reasoning that allows them to act ethically. Indeed, unlike many animals, human beings can understand the differences between right and wrong. Based on this higher level of reasoning, people can understand that it is wrong to mistreat animals because they do not have rights.
This argument stems from the immoral and heinous acts that some people do to animals and people alike. Here, it is irrelevant to distinguish between animals and human beings because inflicting pain on another animal is wrong (human beings are animals too). People who do so diminish the moral authority that human beings have on other species.
The utilitarian view condemns how people treat and use animals. This theory says people should evaluate the net use of animals (to human beings) and adopt strategies that lead to the overall net satisfaction of animal and human interests (Singerb 14). Relative to this view, the utilitarian view urges people to “act in such a way as to maximize the expected satisfaction of interests in the world, equally considered” (Singerb 14).
When we apply this theory to animal treatment, it encourages people to imagine themselves in conditions that the animals live and, afterwards, take the best course of action. Using a welfare approach, the theory argues that all people should treat animals in a “humane” way and avoid inflicting unnecessary pain on them. In line with this argument, Singera (1) says it is important for people to take animal rights seriously because species-bias (the justification that most people use to mistreat animals) is like racism and other social practices that many societies dislike.
He also believes that most people who oppose animal rights do so because they rely on invariable animal defects, like their lack of language skills, or advanced cognitive skills, to mistreat animals (Singerb 14). On the other side, the same people do not perceive mentally incapacitated human beings (who cannot talk or profess the same advanced cognitive skills as other people do) as animals. Based on this analysis, Francione (3) says species-bias is the only justification that most people use to exploit animals. However, this reasoning is unjust.
Arguments Against
Many people have used the utilitarian view to support animal rights. However, this view has significant weaknesses that undermine its applicability to animal rights. For example, proponents of these rights say animals have feelings, the way human beings do (Singerb 14). However, Nordin (2) questions the criterion that such people use to measure these feelings (no one has ever been a dog or a cat).
Stated differently, people have used physiological variations in a dog’s behavior to advance the view that they experience pain or emotion, but how do people know how much pain it is feeling? For example, is it correct to assume that a whimpering dog experiences the same pain as a human baby crying? Similarly, it is difficult to draw the same inferences about a dog’s pain to a whale, frog, or another animal. Therefore, many critics question whether animals could express the same emotions as grief, melancholy, and a deep interest in life, as human beings do.
Machan (1) is among groups of researchers who do not understand why animals should have the same rights as people do. Particularly, they say it is a mistake for the government to entrench animal rights in law. For example, they believe that those people who support animal rights should persuade other people to join their cause, as opposed to forcing them to do so, legally (Machan 1).
Stated differently, Machan (2) says if advocates of animal rights do not support killing animals for their fur, they should persuade people to stop buying coats, or other animal products, and not ban the use of the animal product. Again, this argument stems from the belief that no animal enjoys the same basic rights as people do. As shown above, Machan (3) believes that all people should start perceiving this matter as an ethical issue, as opposed to a legal issue. He says people can empathize with the pain that other people feel, but animals cannot.
Therefore, he opposes the views of animal rights advocates, such as Singerb (14). He argues that if animals could empathize with the pain of other animals, people should hold them to the same accountability standards as human beings do (Machan 3). For example, animals should punish other animals for killing and maiming their kind.
Since this suggestion is impractical, Machan (3) says animal advocates have misguided views. However, he defines this issue as a philosophical one (category mistake) because advocates of animal rights strive to impose their hopes and dreams on animals, using human perceptions about life. Overall, although these arguments largely describe the views of many animal right critics, they do not legitimize the inhumane treatment of animals.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The abolitionist and utilitarian views are sympathetic to animal causes. They differ from classical animal welfare views, which do not have a high regard for the creatures, or their rights. Nonetheless, this paper shows that all animals should have the same rights as human beings do because they experience, pain, fear, and emotions. Similarly, animals are not like other types of property because they are human-like. Based on these arguments alone, it is immoral to mistreat animals and cause unnecessary pain to them.
Proponents of animal rights advance the above views. However, their thoughts are not theories of animal rights; instead, they are moral judgments of human actions on animals. Such ideas come from the consequences of what we perceive as right or wrong. For example, if a person violated the right of a person, or an animal, because it produced more good than bad, the law should not punish him. Based on the findings of this research, the “good” includes giving animals the same rights as people do.
Works Cited
Francione, Gary. Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative Normative Guidance. September. 2003. PDF file.
Grandin, Temple. Animals Are Not Things: A View on Animal Welfare Based on Neurological, Complexity. 2014. PDF file.
Grimm, David. Should Pets Have the Same Legal Rights as People? 2014.
Linker, Damon. No, Animals Don’t Have Rights. 2014.
Machan, Tibor. Animals Do Not Have Rights. 2014.
Nordin, Ingemar. Animals Don’t Have Rights: A Philosophical Study. 2001. PDF file.
Singera, Peter. In Defense of Animals, Malded, Ma: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. Print.
Singerb, Peter. Animal Liberation, New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002. Print.
Taylor, Angus. Animals and Ethics, New York, NY: Broadview Press, 2009. Print.