Introduction
The moral status of nonhuman animals is one of the questions that philosophers have found to be very difficult to answer. Animals are often considered to have a lower moral status than human beings simply because they belong to a different species (Huther, 2005). The principle of assigning moral status based on species is referred to as speciesism.
Although speciesists do not support cruelty to animals, they believe that using them for beneficial activities such as experimentation is justified. However, those who oppose speciesism believe that animals and human beings should be accorded equal moral status. This paper will analyze the arguments against speciesism.
Main Issues About Speciesism
One of the main issues surrounding speciesism is the difference between humans and animals that justifies the preferential treatment of the former. According to Huther (2005), speciesism cannot be justified because it is based on the principles of unethical practices such as racism and sexism. In particular, membership in a given species is not a relevant factor for determining moral treatment.
According to Steinbock (1978), human beings are entitled to preferential treatment in the moral community because of the unique capacities that they possess. The capacities include the following. First human beings can be held responsible for their actions, whereas nonhuman animals are not accountable for their behaviors. Second, human beings can reciprocate, whereas animals’ behaviors are hardly motivated by altruistic reasons (Steinbock, 1978).
Thirdly, human beings have a desire for self-respect. Animals, on the other hand, lack the intelligence to desire and achieve self-respect. These three differences make human beings superior to animals. Thus, using animals for food or experimentation is justified, especially if it is the only way to save the human species.
Summary of Opposing Viewpoints
Singer (2009) criticizes speciesism by showing that the principle of equal value of human life is untenable. According to Singer (2009), speciesists believe that human beings should be treated equally irrespective of their physical or mental capacities. This means that normal human beings and those who are mentally retarded should enjoy equal rights.
Therefore, mentally retarded individuals are superior to nonhuman animals. Singer (2009) dismisses this claim by arguing that animals compare to human beings in several ways. For example, great apes such as gorillas have cognitive abilities that enable them to achieve high scores in human IQ tests.
Similarly, dogs and parrots can comprehend human language albeit at a low level. Undoubtedly, animals such as chimpanzees have better cognitive abilities than human beings who have severe mental disabilities (Singer, 2009). Thus, the interests of animals are as important as those of human beings.
Pluhar (1979) criticizes speciesism by arguing that the principle of thwarted potential personhood does not provide an adequate basis for assigning basic moral rights to members of a particular species. Speciesists believe that nonperson human beings should be treated as normal individuals because they lost their potential to be persons due to circumstances that were beyond their control.
However, an animal such as a dog cannot enjoy the rights that human beings possess because it has no potential to be a person. Pluhar (1979) rejects this perspective due to the difficulty in determining the level of moral weight that “should be assigned to potential personhood” (pp.83-93). Specifically, assigning full moral status to all human beings with the potential to be persons is implausible. For instance, it would grant a fertilized ovum all the moral rights enjoyed by normal persons.
Analysis of Opposing Viewpoints
Principle of equal value of human life
The main factor that should determine the moral status of human beings and animals is their ability to suffer or enjoy life. Undoubtedly, both human beings and animals can suffer if subjected to pain. In this context, the interests of nonhuman animals cannot be less significant than those of human beings (Singer, 2009).
This means that the principle of equal value of human life is ethically irrelevant since the interests of animals are also important. Specifically, animals should enjoy equal treatment irrespective of the fact that they lack advanced human capabilities such as the ability to reason or talk.
The decisions are taken by parents concerning the lives of children with severe mental disabilities also indicate that the principle of equal value of human life does not always hold. For instance, couples often opt to terminate a pregnancy if the unborn baby is expected to have a mental disability (Singer, 2009). Moreover, doctors often withdraw treatment if a premature baby has no chance of surviving. Since the principle does not always hold, it should not be used to justify the preferential treatment of human beings at the expense of animals.
Human rights activists often oppose institutionalization and physical confinement of children with severe mental disabilities because they believe that everyone’s life is important. In this context, subjecting animals to painful situations such as rearing pigs in factory farms cannot be justified because they have better cognitive abilities than the mentally retarded children.
Thwarted Potential Personhood
Assigning full moral status to potential persons at conception or gradually as an individual develops fail to support speciesism. Gradual ascription of moral status would justify unequal treatment of nonhuman animals that have no potential of being persons. This implies that the nonhuman animal should be sacrificed to save the human nonperson (Pluhar, 1979).
Moreover, human nonperson should be sacrificed to save a human person. This would be unethical since it undermines the value of human life. In particular, it contradicts speciesists’ belief that no one should be denied the right to life because of their medical or any other condition.
Another weakness of the argument is that it ignores the fact that human beings who have no potential of being persons are equal to nonhuman animals that cannot be persons (Pluhar, 1979). In this context, it is not possible to justify the claim that human nonpersons are more morally significant than animals that lack the capacity to be persons. Therefore, the interests of animals should not be ignored simply because they belong to species that are considered inferior to human beings.
Conclusion
Speciesism promotes infringement of animals’ right to life to benefit human beings in different ways such as developing new treatment methods. Speciesists believe that the interests of human beings should be prioritized because they have unique capabilities that animals cannot possess.
However, this argument fails to justify speciesism because both human beings and animals can experience pain. Moreover, it is unethical to give animals a lower moral status than mentally retarded human beings who have no potential of being persons. Therefore, animals should not be subjected to inhumane conditions because of their species.
References
Huther, M. (2005). Can speciesism be defended? A discussion of the traditional approach to the moral status of animals. Munich: Ludwig Maximilians University Munich.
Pluhar, E. (1979). Speciesism: A form of bigotry or a justified view. Harrisburg: Pennsylvania State University.
Singer, P. (2009). Speciesism and moral status. Metaphilosophy, 40(4), 567-581.
Steinbock, B. (1978). Speciesism and the Idea of Equality. Philosophy, 53(204), 247-256.