The author of the article Another Intelligence Twist looks at the action of the Bush administration against North Korea based on the intelligence report of the CIA regarding its alleged uranium enrichment program. The action led to the suspension of oil to North Korea, which had been put in place so that she could freeze her program for producing plutonium. Because of this action, North Korea restarted the program and produced adequate plutonium for some nuclear weapons and in October 2006, a test for one of its nuclear weapons was done. On the other hand, the Bush administration had earlier on attacked Iraq based on intelligence that suggested Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.
The weapons were never found and the country came under attack for attacking Iraq without a legitimate reason. Moreover, the attacks by the United State in Iraq have led to the loss of lives of civilians, soldiers from the United States, and its ally countries that sent their troops in support of the action. The war has also been costly for the United States. The author explains how intelligence was used to attack the two countries resulting in a disaster. There is a call on the change on the part of the United States on how to respond to CIA intelligence concerning other countries in the future. It must take time to get all the facts right before taking any kind of action, as its failure to do so in these two cases has brought no good.
The viewpoint of the author is that the United States has taken action against states that it considers rogue resulting in negative outcomes in the past. This has been caused by acting upon intelligence that is not conclusive and thus taking action that would otherwise have been uncalled for had all the facts been put on the table before the attacks. The attacks have yielded negative outcomes.
The key question in this piece is whether the United States was justified in its action against North Korea based on the intelligence from the CIA. The other question is whether the United States will succeed in making North Korea reveal its position on the 20 centrifuges it acquired.
The assumptions are that the action against North Korea was wrong because it led to a disastrous outcome just like in the invasion of Iraq. North Korea feels that it has been wronged by the fuel suspension and so in retaliation, it restarts the nuclear program (Another Intelligence Twist, 2007, para. 2). This means that North Korea reacts like this because it feels that it has been treated unfairly. On the other hand, the United States reacts to the situation by suspending the fuel because the North might be preparing nuclear weapons, and having these kinds of weapons is a security threat. Therefore, North Korea has to be stopped from carrying out its nuclear program.
There is evidence to support the author’s assumptions. For instance, administration officials said that maybe the North really “never constructed large Uranium plant” following the opinion of external experts (Another Intelligence Twist, 2007, para. 3). On the other hand, some intelligence albeit “mid confidence” suggests that the uranium program exists and continues to work but the progress made is unknown (Klesser, 2007, para. 2). Therefore, the administration should be concerned with finding out the progress that has been made on the program and takes action thereafter.
The concepts in the piece are intelligence, which refers to information that is secret and usually relevant. Therefore, the intelligence on the uranium enrichment program was very important and warranted an action as the chemical can be used to produce nuclear weapons that can lead to catastrophic results once in the wrong hands because such weapons can be used to cause mass destructions or intimidate other countries.
The author makes the inference that the administration was at fault with its action against North Korea because it had the opposite effects. Instead of stopping North Korea from continuing with its nuclear program, the suspension of fuel to the North acted as a catalyst for its uranium enrichment program and they came out in the open with the program. Eventually, North Korea was able to develop adequate plutonium and in 2006, they launched their first nuclear weapon test (Another Intelligence Twist, 2007, para. 2) amidst protests from other countries. However, the administration should press on in its quest to find out the truth concerning the use of the 20 centrifuges and equipment for building a large-scale enrichment facility that North Korea bought from Pakistan. This will ensure that the country takes an action from a point of knowledge rather than speculation. This means that by avoiding flawed information the administration will be in a position to ensure that North Korea is denuclearized, as was the original intent. Moreover, any action to the contrary will only result in further disastrous consequences as already shown by the North Korea and Iraq situations.
Reference List
Another Intelligence Twist. (2007). Web.
Klesser, G. (2007). New Doubts on Nuclear Efforts by North Korea. Web.