Introduction
“All animals are equal.
Man is an animal, ergo
All men are equal.”
The second statement is true. Man is the highest member of the animal kingdom. The truth of the concluding sentence is generally accepted, but that of the first is subject to a lot of argument.
When Mary Wollstonecraft published her Vindication of the Rights of Women, she was fighting for the members of her sex. We as readers do not know the reason for Thomas Taylor’s publishing his Vindication of the Rights of Brutes unless he was an animal lover. He was probably hoping that if Wollstonecraft’s views would be accepted, then his views would also merit the same approval since he used Wollstonecraft’s arguments.
Main body
It could also be that Taylor wished to downgrade Wollstonecraft’s views completely. Although the reasoning seemed to hold for the “brutes”, yet to hold that brutes had rights as women have was definitely absurd. Hence if the reasoning by which the conclusion had been reached was unsound; then it must also be unsound when applied to women. Taylor saw to it that the arguments he used were the very same arguments used by Wollstonecraft.
In defense of Wollstonecraft’s stand for women’s rights against the attack by Thomas Taylor, the article in question suggests that one might begin by saying that the case for equality between men and women cannot validly be extended to lower animals who are incapable of understanding, say, the significance of the right of suffrage. Men and women resemble each other in various ways, while humans and nonhumans differ a lot. It is understood, therefore, that since men and women are similar beings, they should enjoy similar rights; and since people and animals are different, they should not be given equal rights.
The reasoning behind the aforementioned reply to Taylor’s analogy does not go far enough, since there are many differences between the sexes and the supporters of women’s liberation know that these differences give rise to different rights. For example, many feminists hold that women have the right to an abortion on request; it does not follow that they have to support the right for men to have abortions also since a man cannot have an abortion. Taylor is put on the spot with the argument that since dogs cannot vote, it is useless to talk about their right to vote.
Singer, the philosopher, and author of the article makes it clear that the extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to another does not imply that both groups are to be treated in the same way. Neither should both groups be given exactly the same rights. This will depend on the nature of the members of the two groups. The philosopher Singer makes it clear to the reader that the basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment, it requires equal consideration.
Singer next expounds on a different reply to Taylor’s attempt to parody the case for women’s rights that is not blind to the differences between human beings, besides finding nothing absurd in the idea that the basic principle of equality applies to so-called “brutes”. Singer goes on to declare that by whatever test we choose, it simply is not true that all humans come in different shapes and sizes. They come with different moral capacities to experience pleasure and pain, different intellects, different degrees of benevolence and sensitivity to the needs of others, different abilities to communicate effectively. We realize the senselessness of demanding equality based on the actuality of all human beings.
Although humans differ as individuals, the writer states that no difference exists between races and sex. He opens the readers’ eyes when he claims that one’s color or sex cannot determine anything about a person’s intellectual or moral leanings. This he says is the reason why racism and sexism are wrong.
Going further, Singer opines that a more sophisticated opponent of equality is he who proposes that, for example, the interests of those with I.Q.’s below 100 be given less consideration than those below the mark. The reader breathes a sigh of relief to discover that there is no need to pin the case for equality on one particular outcome of scientific investigation. Singer puts us at ease when he makes it clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality, he maintains, is a moral ideal, not an assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to their needs and interests. This brings us to the assumption that the principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of alleged actual equality among humans; it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings.
Jenny Bentham, founder of the Utilitarian school of moral philosophy provides us with a formula incorporating the essential basis of moral equality into a system of ethics: “Each to count for one and none for more than one.” This translates to the following: The interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being.
A later utilitarian, Henry Sidgewick is of a similar opinion when he expressed it thus: The good of any one individual is of no more importance from the point of view of the Universe than the good of any other. An implication of this principle of equality is expressed in a simpler statement: Our concern for others and our readiness to consider their interests should not depend on what they are like or whatever abilities they may have. For example, our concern for the well-being of children growing up in America requires that they be taught how to read. Whereas, our concern for the well-being of pigs requires that we leave them in the company of other pigs in a place where there is enough food and clean space to run about freely.
Thomas Jefferson who incorporated the principle of equality among men into the Declaration of Independence led him to oppose slavery. He pointed out in a letter to a friend the notable intellectual achievements of Negroes to prove the falsity of the impression that the black race had limited intellectual capacities. When in the 1950s a call for women’s rights was raised in America, a remarkable colored feminist Sojourner truth made the same point in strong terms at a feminist convention.
We go back to Jeremy Bentham. He advances the belief and points to the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. The capacity for suffering and enjoyment or happiness is not just another characteristic like the capacity for language or higher math. He’s saying that we must consider the interests of all beings with the capacity for suffering or enjoyment. An example is given in a stone. A stone does not have any interests because it cannot suffer. There would be no meaning in saying that it was not in the interests of the stone to be kicked along on the road. Nothing we could possibly do to it could make an ay difference in its welfare.
Bentham continues to expand on the subject when he argues that if a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. If a being is incapable of suffering or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account.
The author of the article, Singer, poses the question “Do animals other than humans feel pain?” We know we can feel pain from a direct experience like when someone presses a lighted cigarette against the back of our hand. But we cannot directly experience anyone else’s pain. Pain, the author says, is a state of consciousness, a “mental event”. Behavior such as writing, screaming, and the like is not painful. Pain is something we feel, and we can only infer that others feel it from various external indications as already mentioned. Philosophers are puzzled as to whether our friend feels pain as we do. If it is justifiable to assume that other human beings feel pain as we do, is there any reason why a similar inference should be unjustifiable in the case of lower animals?
The behavioral signs of pain in lower animals, especially mammals and birds include writhing, facial contortions, moaning, yelping, the appearance of fear, etc. We know that these animals have nervous systems like our own which respond physiologically as ours do when the animal is in circumstances wherein we experience pain – the rise of blood pressure, dilated pupils, perspiration, and increased pulse rate and if stimulus continues, a fall in blood pressure. A capacity to feel pain enhances a species’ prospects of survival since it causes members of the species to avoid sources of injury.
Lord Bain, a great neurologist of our time once said: “I personally can see no reason for conceding mind to my fellowmen and denying it to animals…”The author of a book on pain writes that every particle of factual evidence supports the contention that higher mammalian vertebrates experience pain sensations at least as acute as our own. Their nervous systems are almost identical to our own and their reactions to pain are remarkably similar. One difference between men and brutes is that since animals lack the capability for language, they cannot communicate the presence or the extent of pain and wherein the body is located. Human beings can.
Singer concludes: there are no good reasons, scientific or philosophical, for denying that animals feel pain. If we do not doubt that other humans feel pain, we should not doubt that other animals do so too. Sometimes animals may suffer more because of their unlimited understanding. For instance, we are taking prisoners in wartime, we can explain to them that although they are being taken prisoner, they will otherwise not be harmed. If we capture wild animals, however, we cannot explain that we are not a threat to their lives.
Among the millions of experiments performed, only a few can be regarded as contributing to important medical research. Huge numbers of animals are used such as forestry and psychology. Many more are used for commercial purposes, to test new cosmetics, shampoos, food coloring agents, etc. All this can happen only because of our prejudice against taking seriously the suffering of a being who is not a member of our species.
There has been opposition to experimenting on animals for a long time. This opposition has made little headway since experimenters, backed by commercial firms that profit by supplying laboratory animals and equipment have convinced legislators and the public that opposition comes from uninformed fanatics who consider the interests of animals more important than the interests of human beings.
If we were to prevent the infliction of suffering on animals even only when it is quite certain that the interests of humans will not be affected, we would be forced to make radical changes in our treatment of animals that would involve our diet; the farming methods we use; experimental procedures in many fields of science; our approach to wildlife and to hunting, trapping and the wearing of furs: and areas of entertainment like circuses, rodeos, and zoos. As a result, a vast amount of suffering would be avoided.
From a different perspective, Carl Cohen explains that the reason for the aforementioned suffering is because animals have no rights since they lack the capacity for free moral judgment. They are not capable of responding to moral claims; therefore they have no rights nor can they ever have any rights. Beings that hold rights must be able to understand rules of duty that govern everything including themselves. The holders of rights recognize possible conflicts between whatever is in their own interest and what is just.
Human beings have moral capacities. They legislate themselves. They belong to communities that follow moral rules and possess rights. On the other hand, animals have no moral judgment. They are unable to legislate themselves. They also cannot belong to a truly moral community and therefore have no rights. We humans cannot violate their rights for they have no rights to violate.
We as humans give reverence to animals, even in their simplest forms; however, a vast majority of living beings do not possess rights. It cannot be inferred then that a living being, just by being alive, possesses a right to its life. It does not follow, though, that we humans can do anything we like to animals. In our treatment of animals, we have obligations just as we have obligations to our fellow humans.
Obligations arise from the commitment that has been made: physicians to their patients, teachers to their students, shepherds to their dogs, cowboys to their horses. My dog has no right to food and exercise, but I have the obligation to care for her. If my horse is dying, I am obligated to put it out of his misery by shooting it. To treat animals humanely, however, is not to treat them as humans or as holders of rights.
As regards subjecting humans to experimentation – humans may be the subjects of experiments only with their voluntary consent. Animals are such that it is impossible for them to give or withhold their consent.
Abandoning reliance on animals, some critics resort to animal sentience – their feelings of pain and distress. Since almost all experimentation on animals imposes pain, we have to desist from imposing pain on them; the ends sought may be worthy but such ends do not justify imposing agonies on animals since, by animals, the agonies are felt no less than by humans.
Animals can suffer and must not suffer needlessly. The pain suffered by dogs must be weighed no differently from the pains suffered by humans. To deny such equality is to give unjust preference to one species over another. This is “speciesism”.
When we balance the pleasures and pains resulting from the use of animals in research, we must not fail to consider the terrible pains that would have resulted, would be suffered now, and would long continue had animals not been used. Every disease eliminated, every vaccine developed, every method of pain relief devised, every surgical procedure invented, every prosthetic device implanted – in short, every modern medical therapy is due to experimentation using animals.
Conclusion
If we bear in mind the morally relevant differences between humans and animals, the calculation of long-term consequences must give overwhelming support for biomedical research using animals. Done conscientiously, peaceful co-existence between animals and humans may be achieved and hopefully, preserved.