Introduction
Virtue Theory is the speculation that true actions pursue from becoming an ethical person, and additionally by becoming an ethical person, it is automatically known what is right and wrong. When we identify what is really right or wrong, we have thrived as humans, and we have eudemonia. So, as regards to this, virtue ethics is one of the chief structures of normative ethics, and frequently called ethics. (Barnes, 1976) It contrasts deontology, which emphasizes rules and duties. A virtue is an admirable human characteristic such as courage, kindness or forgiveness that distinguishes good people from bad. Socrates sought a single virtue for human life, while Plato identified four central virtues that should be present in the ideal state. Aristotle said that a moral virtue is the middle value between two extremes. Christianity preaches virtues such as forgiveness and love to make a moral person.
Comparison of the ethics virtue theory with another ancient philosopher
If we compare the ethics virtue theory with other ancient philosopher, it transpires that for Socrates, the ultimate virtue is knowledge. With knowledge he argued, morality comes. If people had knowledge of what was good and bad, people would not sin. He said that all wrongdoing is involuntary, and that if people had knowledge of right and wrong, they would know not to sin. Plato said the soul had three parts. He said these were reason, emotion and desire. In order to become a moral person, Plato said we had to learn the three virtues to control these parts of the soul. These were wisdom, courage and self-control. With a virtue for each part of the soul, and an equal balance of each part of the soul, Plato said we would become moral people.
Wisdom would aid reason to think well, courage would override emotion, and self-control would manage desire. We see ho0w balancing the parts of the soul and having virtues would help us lead well lives in the muffin example. When faced with the option of an apple of a muffin, a good person would choose the apple, because the part of the soul that desired the muffin would be controlled by self-control, the part of the soul that was emotional would have the courage to make the decision, and to ignore the craving for the muffin, and the rational part of the soul would know that apples are better for the body than muffins, and so choose the apple. This way of thinking helps us to lead moral lives, according to Plato.
Aristotle developed a different way of thinking. He said that virtue was the middle action between two vices. So, for example, modesty would be a virtue as it comes between two extremes or vices; egotism and low self esteem. Another example would be working sensibly. The two vices of working would be overworking and laziness. The middle option would be working sensibly. This, according to Aristotle, is the correct choice of action.
He said we should act in the right way, at the right time, in the right amount towards the right persons for the correct reasons: “…To experience these emotions [fear, courage, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure] at the right times and on the right occasions and toward the right persons and for the right causes and in the right manner is the mean or the supreme good, which is characteristic of virtue.” (Bina Gupta, Jitendranath Mohanty, 2000, p193)
So if a person was upset, and another person wanted to help them, it would be correct to ask the person what was wrong because a mild amount of curiosity is between two vices, and to ask the person at the right time: when the person was able to talk about the problem without getting upset, and only talk to the appropriate people- not spread rumors about the problem. The second person should only get involved for the right reasons too- to help the upset person.
There is disagreement between philosophers and religions. Aristotle thought pride was a virtue, but Christian virtue theorists think it is a vice. Hume disliked chastity, but Christians view it as a virtue. The precise nature of each virtue is rarely discussed. Is courage in a bad cause really a virtue? Was it virtuous of the Nazi soldiers to conquer their fear in the Second World War and kill Allied troops to defend the Nazi cause? It is also debatable if honesty is a virtue, as that may mean never lying. If a psychotic murderer was chasing after your friend and you could save enough time for him to escape, and not be murdered by lying to the murderer about his whereabouts, would it not be more moral to lie? If we put virtue ethics to use in these moral situations, it seems to have dreadful consequences. Virtue ethics fails to look at these.
However it is does look at the individual, which other theories fail to do. This way we are able to use it practically without becoming unhappy or seemingly careless, as can happen with Kantian theory, when ‘duty’ overrides happiness or special relationships with friends. It also looks at down to earth situations- situations we are likely to be in, rather than he harsh moral situations of utilitarianism. (Barnes 1980) For example, instead of discussing saving passengers from a burning ship, we would look at whether it is correct to be quiet or talkative person- information we are more likely to use, that is more practical. Virtue ethics is fairly easy to understand, and applies to everyone capable of having a rational thinking personality. This means, everyone can use it practically, in their day-to-day lives, and many people do, without realizing what it is.
Aristotle evidently expects those who share the basic attitude to be rationally led by his arguments into recognizing not only the wisdom of the particular reform which he advocates, but the general potential which exists for progress in excellence, even at a fundamental level. Thus he can expect his mention of ‘sophists’ to trigger certain responses in his audience. Whoever he may have particularly in mind, his audience knows that sophists entered this fray long ago with claims to be specialist teachers of virtue and civic excellence. And however convincing the by now classic refutations of those claims by Socrates and Plato, no refutation could cancel the one unquestionable legacy of the sophistic movement: an awakening, namely, to self-awareness of immense human possibilities waiting to be tapped for good or ill through systematic education. Nothing could remove the sense once created of a gap at the centre of human life which unreflective values and practice, even at their best, would never fill from their own resources.
Furthermore, Aristotle holds that one cannot be considered in the full sense morally excellent unless one has practical wisdom too. The general ability is practical wisdom, and in defining moral virtue as a ‘prohairetic’ disposition for hitting the mean, Aristotle has so defined it that, in a person lacking practical wisdom, the qualities which would otherwise be moral virtues are not virtues strictly speaking, but potentials or prefigurations of virtues. (Burnet, 1900)
And since the soul, however complex, is a unity, not a concatenation of independently describable parts, we should perhaps be prepared eventually to find that just as practical wisdom cannot be understood without reference to the emotional part that is conditioned into character.
The morally mixed character need not be an incoherent personality, and the mixed ethical description is only too often true. Telling a child to be brave is telling him how he ought to be, and initially we say these things in simple situations where (as we give him to understand) he will do the all-round right thing if and only if he acts bravely. ‘Honest’, ‘courageous’, ‘generous’, etc. connote models, and the contraries counter models. (Kosman 1990)
Conclusion
Aristotle can conclude that the highest and best human activity is a pleasure in exactly the same sense of ‘pleasure’ as eating, drinking, and listening to music are pleasures when one enjoys them. The intensity of his argument puts it beyond doubt that in his view the conclusion is substantial. He would not concede that it rests on a turn of phrase. It is therefore not open to us not to take the doctrine seriously. If it is founded on conceptual confusion, then something important in the Ethics is founded on conceptual confusion.
References
Barnes J. 1980: “‘Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics’”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 34 490-511.
Barnes, J. 1976. Introduction to revised edition of The Ethics of Aristotle, trans. J. A.K. Thomson: Harmondsworth.
Burnet, J. 1900.The Ethics of Aristotle. London.
Kosman L. A, 1990: “‘Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle’s Ethics’”, in Rorty, 103-116.
Bina Gupta, Jitendranath Mohanty: (2000) Philosophical Questions: East and West: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc.