Though automatism is an incredibly rarely used form of defense, cases continue to occur in which a plea of automatism leads to what can be perceived as both wrongful or fair sentencing. Automatism refers to actions of criminal behavior that have been committed unknowingly or unconsciously by the defendant. Such actions may occur for a number of reasons such as mental conditions, sleep-related issues, and substance-induced behavior.
Essentially, automatism defines criminal acts done with lack of voluntariness, lack of culpability, or excuse. In a legal sense, the defendant was not aware of either the actions or the legality of the actions that they committed during their period of automatism. A case in 2002 saw Peter Buck absolved of a number of charges, including assault, due to the judge deciding that Buck’s behavior was of non-insane automatism provoked by the mixture of alcohol and sleeping pills (Ebrahim & Idzikowski, 2017). The prosecution was in disagreement as they believed the cause of Buck’s behavior was simply due to intoxication. Many cases of automatism employ very clear indications, such as in cases of crimes committed due to sleepwalking, while others create a more blurred line between automatism and simple criminal behavior.
As such, the following paper will examine the current parameters of automatism as a defense, issues that arise within the use of such a defense, and whether any areas within the sphere of automatism laws require further research. The audience of this paper is likely to include legal professionals such as lawyers, judges, prosecutors, as well as specialists in mental health such as behavioral scientists. It is likely that these groups have diverse backgrounds, demographic features, social, and political beliefs, but are all likely to be within the academic fields of psychiatry, psychology, and the law.
Currently, a number of criteria exist in order to properly establish whether a defendant was experiencing automatism during criminal activity. First, the person must not be at fault for the committed crime. This is reflected in cases where defendants may have fallen asleep at the wheel, diabetics who have suffered hypoglycemia during driving, and voluntary or involuntary intoxication, as well as in other specific situations.
The first exclusion dictates that individuals may not be responsible for direct consequences of what happens as they are either asleep, overly intoxicated, or otherwise incapacitated, but they are responsible for their prior actions. Second, most jurisdictions create distinctions between ‘sane’ and ‘insane automatism. Cases of ‘insane’ automatism often ascribe an action to an offender’s mental illness and will likely be given the verdict of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’. Third, and perhaps most controversial, automatism requires that the defendants lose complete control over their actions. In a case during which a lorry driver crashed due to the monotony of the highway causing a ‘driving without awareness’ which was supported by expert evidence, the court ruled that the driver’s minimal control disqualified him from pleading the automatism defense. Many committees and academics found the rule too restrictive and nonsensical.
Though the third point for exclusion from such a defense is one of the most debated concerns of automatism, the general concept of the automatism defense exposes a number of issues within such a plea. The strict legal definition of loss of total control cannot be implemented in cases in which an individual may have the capabilities to avoid a crash or some form of injury, but cannot do so simply due to the difficulty or possibility of doing so.
This means that a court decision to rule out automatism as no total loss of control occurred would punish the defendant for failing to do the impossible. One of the primary rationales of criminal law in most jurisdictions requires punishment to be a deterrent to future acts (Fehr, 2020). However, for an offender to be deterred from an act they have committed prior, it must have been voluntary. As such, cases that are unable to determine the voluntariness of a defendant cannot allow for adequate punishment.
In order to address both theoretical and practical issues that have been brought up in the field of automatism as a defense, it is essential to observe ways in which the law may seem incomplete or imperfect. For instance, its practical application provides a complete defense, it does not protect the defendant from additional crimes and administrative consequences. In fact, the use of the automatism defense often exposes the defendant to secondary accusations of criminal behavior. However, on top of understanding the defendant’s guilt or innocence concerning additional crime, criminal law experts must also analyze whether those were also committed due to automatism.
This has been observed in military law, in which the cause of automatism-induced behavior may often be a restriction from partaking in military service. Sleepwalking conflicts with Article 104a, which states that failure to disclose such a condition prior to joining the military is in conflict with military law (McKenna, 2019). This creates a situation in which a defendant may have had a sleepwalking case of automatism but disclosing their condition would still result in legal punishment despite their lack of voluntariness during the criminal behavior.
Despite the imperfections of the current use of the automatism defense, it remains to properly acknowledge the defendant’s role in any criminal cases. However, certain groups and individuals hold a contradictory view and find automatism as a totally incomplete defense. The primary argument of the opposition of automatism is constructed from the interconnectedness of the defendant’s voluntariness and consequences of crimes within criminal offenses (Gordon & Fondacaro, 2018).
Essentially, the results and actions committed by the defendant can be grouped into one set of criminal activity in relation to the defendant’s involuntary conduct. The counterpoint argues that the involuntary behavior of the defendant is not a part of the nexus of the criminal activity, thereby making it so that the defendant could not have committed the offense in a voluntary setting. As such, automatism can be perceived not as a defense but as a denial of the nexus, and by extension, a denial of the offense. However, the issue isn’t really in the existence of automatism as a defense, but the tests and criteria by which they are judged.
The opposition does not take into consideration much of the outdated terminology that is used within the automatism defense, such as the term ‘insane’ being a categorical label for individuals with learning disabilities or mental illness. Individuals with totally different conditions such as epilepsy or sleepwalking are also lumped together despite their completely different effects on a human’s behavior. Essentially, the mechanism by which automatism is granted is outdated, while the psychiatric condition itself is still subject to research.
Though automatism is a rarely implemented defense, its current use and theoretical and practical inquiries it inspires suggest the need for increased research. This would require both the analysis of criminal law experts, psychologists, and doctors in order to further develop the understanding of the extent to which automatism has an effect on human behavior. Currently, the definitions of ‘non-insane’ and ‘insane’ automatism are commonly practiced but are also reliant on prior laws that may not be entirely accurate to the current understanding of unconscious behavior. Additionally, the interpretation of automatism as a defense is varied not only in different nations but between certain jurisdictions within countries.
Contradictory viewpoints also argue against automatism as a defense entirely, while some see that it exposes technical inadequacies in policies or laws. As such, it is essential to further the ways in which automatism is depicted and employed within criminal law. Though the answer to the many issues within this field of study cannot be discovered instantly, extensive research, experimentation, and discussion is necessary to improve the current practice of automatism as a defense.
This would require organizational changes that are likely to be instigated by the introduction of new research concerning automatism into policy-making processes. The combination of more research papers on the topic of how diverse the defense of automatism really is with lobbying done through either individuals or group campaigns can begin to incite positive systematic changes.
References
Ebrahim, I. O., & Idzikowski, C. (2017). Forensic Psychiatry. CRC Press.
Fehr, C. (2020). Automatism and the Burden of Proof: An Alternative Approach.Canadian Criminal Law Review, 25(2), 115-122. Web.
Gordon, N. S., & Fondacaro, M. R. (2018). Rethinking the voluntary act requirement: Implications from neuroscience and behavioral science research. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 36(4), 426-436. Web.
McKenna, B. (2019). Automatism: A complete yet imperfect defense. Military Law Review, 227(1), 46-66. Web.