Introduction
Not all theories that predict or explain evidence can be given the credit of being universally accepted as deductively integrated in the formal systems. Most of the ordinary theories employ auxiliary hypothesis to come up with deductive observation and predictions. Such theories are considered as being inconsistent and inappropriate in predicting any phenomena.
Most theories prove to have syntactic consistency problems in conjoint applications. Theories employed to come up with deductive observations and conclusions should make use of available evidence in order to confirm any hypothesis or conclusion.
There are these observable evidences that are based on while deciding whether a theory is consistent or not. Hampel argues that deductive inferences gotten from theoretical premises are crucial in the theories inexplicable judgment (Hempel, 1996)
Conditions
Hempel suggests conditions which theories must fulfill in order to get more credence. The conditions include; entailment conditions, consistency conditions and consequence condition (Fetzer, 2000). According to Hampel, such theories must fulfill these conditions.
Very few theories meet these conditions as some come up with observable evidence which contradict the formulated hypothesis, some lack any evidence while some make predictions basing on the hypothesis rather than evidence.
Hempel justifies this argument by stating the formulating of hypothesis related to a particular object should be understood to be what the hypothesis are meant to assert. Theories should be consistent in their hypothesis and the objects they are trying to assert. Normally, positivists typically make theorists wind up as they deny conforming to any theoretical entities existence.
Justification
Hempel remains restrictive in the way observations are generalized. He goes ahead to confirm that there is no way claims on theories based on mere claims of predicates can be confirmed. However, Hampel still appreciates that it is not necessary to insist that most of the theories consist of imperceptible entities. Most of the theories that predict or explain evidence try to justify induction.
Hampel also takes a look at the concerns on whether evidence evaluation for any theory results to any difference as to whether the empirical evidence are provided before the creation of the theory or whether it is the theory that predict the evidence. According to Hampel, hypothesis for any theory are strengthened and supported by the data provided.
Thus the strength of any theory depends on what the hypothesis formulated assert and the type of data used. The data used serve as evidence and are based on to confirm hypothesis.
Both data and observations are based on to confirm hypothesis thus theories must meet the consistency condition as well as the other two conditions. Moreso, without any justification, it is hard to get attached to the account of the theories as accurate description of the formulated hypothesis (Fetzer, 2000).
Conclusion
The inductive and arguments of the theories should be organized in such away that they confirm to the theories and the evidence they provide. The observations of the theories may end up disconfirming the evidence provided, yet intuitively, the theoretical evidence are supposed to confirm the hypothesis stated by the theory.
If the observations of any theory disconfirm with the formulated hypothesis, then the theory is considered to be inconsistence. Thus it is not rational to give credit to any theories that are out to explain or predict evidence unless they meet the conditions stated by Carl Hempel (Alford, 2000).
References
Alford, R. (2000). The Craft of Inquiry: Theories, Methods, Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fetzer, J. (2000). Science, Explanation and Rationality: The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel. New York: Oxford University Press
Hempel, C. (1996). Philosophy of Natural Science. (Foundations of Philosophy). New York: Prentice Hall