Introduction
The Central African Republic, located in the middle of the African continent, is one of the poorest countries in the world. Experts from various human rights organizations regularly include it in the lists of the most disadvantaged states. At the same time, large deposits of gold, uranium, hydrocarbons, minerals, and, most importantly, diamonds, which have been mined there since the beginning of the last century, are located on its territory. By the early 2010s, according to the US Geological Survey, the CAR ranked 10th among all participants in the global diamond market by the value of stones sold. One of the principal territorial problems of the Central African Republic, which borders, among other things, Sudan, Cameroon, and Chad, is the lack of direct access to the sea.
Being a colonial republic where Britain and France defended their interests, the CAR gained independence under Bokassa, the first emperor. Bokassa ruled for about ten years; during his reign, corruption in the country reached a record level, but the economic situation, conversely, deteriorated sharply, followed by a long string of coups d’état. The relative peace in the republic was established only in the 1990s. Still, in 2003, General Francois Bozize, who had previously held several ministerial posts in the country, came to power after another coup. His coming to power marked the beginning of a large-scale crisis in the 2010s. As a result, the country, rich in diamonds, could not remain without a government for a long time, and the Muslim Séléka organization encroached on its sovereignty.
In a short time, they established control over most of the country’s territories and a significant portion of the diamond deposits. In response, the Christians formed the Anti-Balaka militia, which operated simultaneously with government troops. A bloody religious conflict began in the country. The capital, Bangui, was practically deprived of electricity and water supplies, and most state institutions, including medical facilities, stopped functioning in it.
French and South African troops entered the country to conduct a special operation aimed at stabilizing the situation. Later, they transferred their powers to the UN peacekeeping mission, which was primarily composed of French peacekeepers. This work analyzes the events of 2012, in which the South African special forces fought alongside the surrendered military forces of the Central African Republic against the Séléka. The points of view are given from the perspective of the theory of special operations, their correspondence to scientific terms, and a critical analysis of the theory’s reliability in the context of modernity.
Special Operations Theory
This term refers to the use of smaller forces and combat units in military operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational goals. The primary message of the definitions is that, through tactics, trained personnel, and specialized equipment, the cumulative action significantly exceeds the capabilities of conventional armed forces. McRaven’s theory only confirms this point of view: in his opinion, a successful special operation uses small forces to defeat a larger enemy. Accuracy, speed, stealth, and tactical decisions are fundamental in achieving a qualitative advantage over a quantitative one.
There are four main principles on which this particular operation is based. Firstly, the event should pursue clear national and strategic goals, differentiated into understandable objectives. Secondly, effective command and control must have reliable and fast communication channels, as well as coordination with intelligence and the main forces. Such tactical planning must be carried out clearly and unequivocally. Finally, the troops with the best training, fully equipped for a particular operation, should be under intelligent control. Another classification in the theory of special operations is missions or reasons for mobilizing a given unit.
Non-traditional military operations, intervention in the defense of foreign states, agreements with the defending side, intelligence gathering, the fight against terrorism, and more can be significant reasons for organizing such an event. On the one hand, such tasks should be exclusively peacekeeping in nature, from the standpoint of just war theory. In reality, interpreting the situation may interfere with substituting concepts for political or non-obvious purposes. Every moment of mobilizing trained military personnel in a particular operation must be critically assessed, evaluating each side’s internal and external political motives.
The Battle of Bangui was accompanied by the intervention of a special forces unit from South Africa, as well as a parachute and medical battalion. The enemy forces outnumbered the South African troops several dozen times, but the losses were incomparable. As a result of a particular operation, 13-15 soldiers from South Africa died, and, according to various sources, from 400 to 1000 in the Séléka. Before evaluating the results of the special operation, it is necessary to address the motives for the intervention.
Battle of Bangui
This particular operation proved highly controversial for South Africa, primarily due to the region’s geographical remoteness. The agreement between Bose and Zuma remains shrouded in mystery, but it ultimately led to the demise of the South African military. The Séléka had almost 10,000 men at its disposal, a tremendous advantage compared to the 200 troops sent on a particular operation.
Given that the governance of the CAR at the national level has long been marred by blackmail, corruption, and greed, it is almost impossible to rely on diplomatic solutions. The detailed literature describing the events of that time tries to uncover the true motives that forced Jacob Zoom to send his trained military across half the continent in an unequal battle. The action is believed to have been part of a uranium deal involving the French agency Areva, one of the largest nuclear agencies in South Africa. Séléka, in turn, was formed from the Muslim population of citizens in the Central African Republic, who were persecuted during the time of Bozize.
Considering this conflict only from the point of view of theory, leaving aside the original motives and the absence of political procedures that justify such actions, this particular operation can indeed be called that way. First, a small force was dedicated to overpowering a much larger enemy through strategic, tactical, and technological advantages. Considering the parties’ losses, the participants of the special operation achieved a significant advantage, although they did not fulfill the global goal. Secondly, the intervention to protect foreign states was a fundamental aspect of the special operation. Another thing is that behind this action was an agreement between two people, not two countries, as is customary in such conflicts.
The theory of special operations primarily focuses on achieving an advantage with a significantly smaller number of combat units. Problems of a moral, humanistic nature always remain outside the theory’s context. The fictitious agreement between Zuma and Bozize carried only each chapter’s greedy, individual goals. These individuals prioritized liquid resources over the well-being of the country’s citizens and the lives of its people. In addition, Zuma violated the peace agreement signed in Gabon shortly before the battle.
The withdrawal of South African troops was one of the conditions to which the head of South Africa did not agree. Additionally, during the special operation, the South African military was lacking the necessary equipment. The country’s politics sent some of South Africa’s best military to an unlikely event and left them without proper support for many kilometers from home.
Conclusion
If, in the case of the Central African Republic, such negligence was not justified, but the norm in national politics, South Africa would be a much more progressive republic. From the perspective of the theory of special operations, it was straightforward to align the motives of this action with the list of missions, but there were still specific gaps. First, the South African military was unaware of the goal behind this action and its contribution to the country’s national interests. Secondly, the military was deprived of appropriate support and command at a high level, as if they were sent to be torn to pieces by less trained but much more numerous opponents.
Finally, the issue of just war and peacekeeping goals is highly controversial, given the historical retrospective of the Central African Republic. Muslims who suffered persecution for a long time, being citizens of the country, protested against the government by carrying out a palace coup. The need to intervene in the civil war was not dictated by the entire state’s interests but was determined by commercial goals. Therefore, even from the point of view of the theory, the Battle of Bangui is not a special operation in the broadest sense. However, it shares many similarities, such as being outnumbered, being being better prepared, and employing effective tactics. However, the lack of a proper goal and the necessary equipment makes this event doubtful.
References
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Thompson, Warren, Stephan Hofstatter, and James Oatway. The Battle of Bangui: The inside story of South Africa’s worst military scandal since apartheid. Cape Town: Penguin Random House South Africa, 2021.
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