Classical Definition of Knowledge
The traditional definition of knowledge can be found in the works of the Greek philosopher Plato. Along with Aristotle, they developed a theory of knowledge called epistemology. Plato gives what could be considered a classical or traditional definition of knowledge: justified true beliefs shown to have the limitations given by the justification condition and the true nature.
The definition given by Plato seems entirely plausible. Plato states three necessary conditions when the data and information become knowledge: belief condition, truth condition, and justification condition (Blisanui & Bratinu, 2018). It reflects both subjective and objective aspects of knowledge, forming its necessary components.
First, knowledge is a held belief, meaning it is reflected in the human psyche and is regarded as a true statement. Without it, there could be no knowledge, just random data in the universe, not defined by any concept and thus meaningless. The belief conditions distinguish between knowledge and a lie. The second part distinguishes knowledge from the truth of that belief. This means the gathered data is aligned with objective reality, distinguishing knowledge from opinion. The justification condition requires a practical way to ensure the belief is true. Taken together, they provide a plausible definition of knowledge.
Internalism vs. Externalism
Internalism and externalism are opposing philosophical views on mental representation in analytical philosophy. These teachings concern factors and conditions by which beliefs acquire the status of being epistemically justified (Hughes, 2022). Internalism proposes that these factors and conditions are internal to the subject and its perspective on the world. On the contrary, externalism disregards the subject’s worldview, instead seeking to justify knowledge through external factors outside the subject’s mind. This debate may appear somewhat reductive because, upon thorough examination, we might find that both internal cognitive processes and external factors are necessary to form a comprehensive epistemic justification.
However, the externalist approach seems the more plausible of the two. Even the best internal understanding of one’s reasoning might not provide truthful beliefs. Without testing against the objective world, the best-understood internal reasoning may not reveal its faults, leading to faulty outcomes. In this case, reliance on the methods known to provide justifiable results is the answer. The belief is justified if the thesis stands the test of objective reality during the proper procedure. It is possible to form justified beliefs based on external factors without fully understanding the internal reasoning.
Critique of Reformed Epistemology
The central thesis of Reformed epistemology is that religious belief can be rational without any appeal to evidence or argument. This thesis cannot be found plausible for several reasons. First, it is proposed that the belief in the existence of God is a properly fundamental belief, akin to the belief that the past exists or that other minds are present (Mustață, 2020). Such notions cannot be proved, so they are called “properly basic.” However, this does not make a belief in the existence of God rational because other properly basic beliefs are not arbitrary.
The properly basic beliefs are grounded in the fact that the mind had specific experiences, suggesting, for example, the existence of the external world or the reality of the past. The opposition to the Reformed epistemology points out that rational persons recognize rational beliefs. So, if the belief in the existence of God were rational, it would have been recognized across all cultures, which is not the case. It is possible to name the thesis or Reformed epistemology less than plausible.
References
Bolisani, E. & Bratianu, C. (2018). The Elusive Definition of Knowledge. Web.
Hughes, N. (2022). Epistemology without guidance. Philosophical Studies, 179 (01), 27-43. Web.
Mustață, G. (2020). Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology. Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia, 65 (11), 55-71. Web.