Introduction
It is worth noting that continental philosophy is not limited to several philosophical approaches. It seeks to consider problems in all their breadth, focusing on the humanitarian side of sciences (Koopman, 2013). The main difference of this direction from the analytical philosophy is that the first one does not reduce its discussions to formal analysis. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the ideas proposed by continental philosophy and its integral thought.
Discussion
The discussion addresses the query of whether continental philosophy considers that sensible human agency has the potential to alter the setting of people’s experience. Rorty (1997), who is the representative of hermeneutics and pragmatism, links explanation to causation. According to the scholar, social structures in which people function, as well as the background of individuals, affect the way they perceive and comprehend the world (Rorty, 1997). This philosopher believes that such scientists as Foucault reject the possibility of attributing a moral meaning to human knowledge. In order to substantiate his thought, Rorty (1997) also provides an example of the way Foucault and other liberal philosophers view the truth. They regard it as a notion isolated from power.
Moreover, Foucault believed that the language of science was neutral and could analyze political and moral institutions in an unbiased manner (Mills, 2003). However, the divergence between the views of Foucault and Rorty can be characterized as political at its core (Luxon, 2013). Both intellectuals are anti-realists. Nevertheless, Foucault’s narrative shies away from the tasks of social reformation. In his turn, Rorty (1997) is guided by the social construction of knowledge. According to this approach, in order to understand science, it is necessary to correlate it with the historical process and place science in a social context.
Interestingly, Rorty (1997) argues that it is important to have certain metaphysical ideas about the nature of people. According to him, “these heroes of humanity are the people who dissolved the problems of their day by transcending the vocabulary in which these problems were posed” (Rorty, 1997, p. 530). In particular, he suggests that society is not rallied on a philosophical basis but through a common vocabulary. In his turn, the social philosopher Lewis (2000) reiterates this position from an ontological point of view. He states that “the social world is the joint product of people’s discursive practices” (Lewis, 2000, p. 255). Therefore, he does not generalize knowledge.
Notably, the discussion held by continental philosophers is important for our professional endeavor since it has addressed the issue from different perspectives. The evolution of thought can lead to an understanding that social structures should be interpreted in terms of their causal powers (Wain, 2014). That is to say, the circumstances of human agency can be altered based on their internal constitution.
Conclusion
Thus, it can be concluded that continental philosophy debunks the worldview of analytical philosophers. Perception of the world is indicated not only in the language of humans but also in their culture. Social structures are inseparable not only from stylistics and language but also from non-philosophical categories and other means of the context. The continental approach gives grounds to assert that philosophy is not a universal knowledge and that social structures are related to causality.
Questions for In-Class Consideration
Based on the discussion and the assumptions made, the three questions for in-class consideration are as follows:
- What are the weaknesses of continental philosophy?
- Is it possible to reach an agreement on the truth as applied to different cultures?
- How are individual agents related to social structures?
References
Koopman, C. (2013). Genealogy as critique: Foucault and the problems of modernity. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Lewis, P. (2000). Realism, causality and the problem of social structure. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 30(3), 249-268.
Luxon, N. (2013). Crisis of authority: Politics, trust, and truth-telling in Freud and Foucault. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Mills, S. (2003). Michel Foucault. London, England: Routledge.
Rorty, R. M. (1997). Hermeneutics, general studies, and teaching. In S. M. Kahn (Ed.), Classic and contemporary reading in philosophy of education (pp. 522-536). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Wain, K. (2014). Between truth and freedom: Rousseau and our contemporary political and educational culture. London, England: Routledge.