Introduction
With the emergence of telecommunication technology, the world is experiencing a major revolution in the communication sector. Theoretically, people are able to communicate with one another regardless of the distance separating them (Zhang, 2009).
After several years of market reforms and development, China’s media had big changes in terms of communication models, management philosophy, and ownership. More importantly, however, these changes have also drastically altered the way in which the government, media, and the public interact.
This paper looks at how the Chinese state is dealing with the ever increasing adoption of new media and what the state is doing to control the way citizens communicate and receive news whether local or international.
Various situations are examined to help understand how the relationship between the Chinese state and the media has changed over the years as a result of development and reforms in the communication sector that has led to the expansion in the number, variety and ownership of media outlets (Shirk, 2011).
The Impact of New Media
To better understand the impact of new media on the Chinese state and how this has been and continues to be dealt with, different avenues of access to information will be examined to determine their effect. Specifically, Citizen News, Official Television News and Newspaper and the Internet use will be discussed.
Citizen News
In 2003, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Hu Jianto announced set of guidelines requiring that any news reporting be as close as possible to reality, close to livelihood, and close to the people. CCP further published a report that suggested a decreasing level of coverage on leaders’ activities (Hewitt, 2010).
Unanimously, Chinese media researchers agree that innovations such as Citizen News and telling people’s stories are in line with CCP’s approach to propaganda. Citizen News later received recognition as a permissible type of news reporting for local Chinese television stations.
While some communications researchers feel that Citizen News is helpful in reinforcing the credibility of television news reporting, many do not believe it. These critics assert that Citizen News is full of trivial coverage such as family disputes, neighbor’s arguments, and cases of vandalism and cheating. Furthermore, critics are convinced that content that may be regarded as newsworthy is rarely covered by Citizen News.
Despite the lack of attention to significant political news and social injustice, Citizen News programs do offer the general public a view of real life, as well as an opportunity to speak out about different issues.
Through the kind of news programs presented on Citizen News, mainstream propaganda and commercial culture are combined to create an atmosphere of caring about people’s livelihood and nurturing a harmonious society. As a result, sensors tend to be tolerant of such programs.
In a similar manner, some audiences have gradually become dissatisfied with such comparatively shallow news coverage and are disheartened by their inability to find any serious news reporting on local television (Midford, 2011).
Official Television News
Official television news is news as represented by Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) news. All television stations in China are required to broadcast CCTV news on their main channels simultaneously.
For example, cable television users in the Beijing area receive about fifty channels but more than thirty of them broadcast CCTV news from 7.00 to 7.30 pm every night. This central monopoly on national news coverage is generally well established.
During the Cultural Revolution, the only news resource for the general public was the official media. National news was primarily reported on China National Radio every night at 8.00 pm and many people were regular listeners to the program. In the year 1982, the central government declared that any important news should be released first on CCTV news at 7.00 pm before being aired on any other media.
Apparently, the rule is still being in force. (Bittner, 2008). With the growing popularity and availability of television sets, more people tend to pay close attention to CCTV news.
The results of a survey conducted in the Beijing area indicated that only 8.8 percent of the people said that they almost never watched CCTV news, 30.5 percent watched it at least three times per week, 30.7 percent watched it at least four or five times per week, and 25.7 percent watched it six to seven times per week (Shirk, 2011).
Clearly, the requirement by the state that official news first be aired on CCTV news was a means of putting measures in place to control how citizens interact with media and to ensure that traditional media remained the only popular means of receiving news both locally and internationally.
Newspaper and Internet Use
In urban areas, newspapers are seen to be one of the most popular sources of news, ranking second after television. In Beijing, for example, about 80 percent of the residents read newspapers (Shen & Breslin, 2010).
Given that reading requires literacy, those who do not read any newspapers also indicate that they do not have the time to read newspapers and they already feel sufficiently informed by electronic media such as television or radio broadcasting.
Generally, the Chinese citizens read newspapers in the late afternoon or evening. Most people spend about forty two minutes reading newspapers on a daily basis (Hsing & Lee, 2010). Considering that only a minority of Chinese readers subscribe to newspapers, most people usually get to read the newspapers at work or purchase them at a newspaper stand.
Apparently, this habit makes it possible for Chinese readers to switch very frequently between newspapers and read a greater variety of them. Average readers peruse two newspapers but some report reading as many as ten different papers per day. While most readers have a clear preference for non official papers, only 36 percent of readers choose reading official newspapers (Shen & Breslin, 2010).
As far as using the Internet is concerned, the Chinese citizens connect quite freely to the Internet within China despite being very much aware that their activities and messages may be monitored by the government (Scotton & Hachten, 2010). Some researchers inside China, however, claim that the government is very effective in ensuring that foreign information does not reach its citizens.
It is generally believed that the Chinese government is capable of blocking access to outside sites rather easily since all international traffic must pass through a small number of state controlled backbone networks. The government also has the technology in place that blocks web pages and cancels links that would lead to unacceptable sites ranging from pornography to international news (Scotton & Hachten, 2010).
Quite a number of people believe that Chinese Internet controls can easily be evaded. As the censors work in China to limit access to the Internet sites although individuals and teams overseas are determined to frustrate such efforts. Some Chinese researchers argue that due to social pressures and technological development, it is simply impossible to hide on the Internet.
Another problem faced by censors is the lack of a clear policy regarding what is banned from the Internet. The speed of communication via this new media also makes it difficult for the Chinese government to execute any form of control on information flying around.
The presence of the Internet and mobile phones in hands of the citizens facilitates a faster transfer of information making it difficult for the government to control what eventually is available to people.
Media experts believe that official newspapers in China publish propaganda while non official papers publish what is regarded as real news. To media specialists, propaganda is based on subjective opinion aimed at guiding the reader in a certain direction and often omits important facts, while real news provides the audience with the complete story and includes negative aspects.
To stay safe, the state is forever suppressing the efforts of the non official papers that are always making attempts to push the boundaries set by the state (Yu, 2009). Official media sources are considered to be experts on the position of the state and are aimed at manipulating public opinion.
On the contrary, non official media sources are seen as reporting from the perspective of the public in a less biased way. Taking into account that media credibility requires high levels of both expertise and objectivity, official sources tend to rank lower in terms of credibility than non official ones.
Unlike newspapers, however, the Web is a less popular information source. In the year 2009, less than 30 percent of Chinese citizens had access to Internet. The number is, however, growing at a very rapid pace. In the year 2008, for example, the number of Internet users grew by 41.9 percent.
Most urban Chinese consent to the fact that their own lack of skills and access to facilities constitute to the two main reasons for not being able to surf the Web. In addition, access to the Web requires a computer, which is still costly and unreachable for the majority. As a result, the proportion of the population who use the Internet is still quite low. However, reading the news is the second most frequently used online service.
Currently, two important alternative means exist that allow citizens to go online. While some people would access the Web at work, others would do so through cyber cafes. Still others would use both alternatives depending on where one would be at a certain time.
Effects of Operating Based on CCP’s Guidelines
As the primary television propaganda machine, CCTV news has always adhered to the principle of publicizing the policies of the CCP and the government. Its reports focus on the activities of the Chinese leaders and political conferences. They are full of meaningless content and presented in an inflexible style. Rarely will information of real interest be aired through CCTV news.
According to a survey undertaken by Professor Zhou Xiaopu of Renmin University in Beijing, political news coverage accounted for 52.3 percent of the program and it mostly involved CCP leaders’ activities, propaganda campaigns, and political announcements.
International news on the other hand accounted for 7.3 percent and was always placed at the end of the program. In addition, studies have shown that, on average, events are reported on CCTV news two days after they actually had happened.
State Controlled Transparency
Controlled transparency is one of the tactics which for a very long time has been employed by the Chinese government to guarantee the continued existence of traditional Chinese media. By ensuring that citizens are mostly confined to state controlled media, the penetration of new media in the China is certainly suppressed.
Over the years, senior court officials have repeatedly emphasized the importance of greater transparency in China’s courts. As noted by the Supreme People’s Court, there is need to police the courts.
Every single court is required by the state to voluntarily release information about important cases, cease being passive in response to media coverage, and strengthen their propaganda systems so as to lead the media to report positively about the courts (Yu, 2009).
Similarly, his predecessor spoke of the importance of courts opening themselves to media supervision and balancing legal outcomes with the needs of the nation and the CCP.
In May 2009, the Supreme People’s Court issued directions to lower courts concerning implementation of the concept of justice for the people, calling on courts to respond quickly to negative reporting, in order to improve relations with the media and to voluntarily provide tips to the media with the intention of encouraging positive coverage.
These comments and rules reflect two strategies that have been used by courts in response to increased media pressure. Courts have spoken of the importance of supervision and have publicly welcomed greater coverage. At the same time, however, courts have stepped up efforts to manage information flow to the media, attempting to control access to the courts as well as the content of news reports about the courts.
Regulations adopted by the Supreme People’s Court in 1999 state that most cases should be made open to the public and the media but also include numerous vague exceptions and require reporters to obtain advance permission from the court hearing the case. Practically, the regulations give judges and courts significant discretion to deny access to the media.
Courts have also become proficient when it comes to encouraging positive media coverage. They frequently draft articles for the media or provide details about cases to journalists. Courts reward judges with praise and bonuses for obtaining positive coverage or for authoring articles that help to strengthen the courts’ public image.
Many courts also require local media to seek approval of articles from either court propaganda officials or the judges hearing a particular case prior to running a report (Reilly, 2008). Failure to seek approval can result in journalists being barred from further reporting on the court.
In 2006, the Supreme People’s Court also announced that it was creating an official press secretary and that judges were henceforth forbidden from speaking to the media without prior approval. In solidarity, local courts also implemented the same.
This has, however, not been received well by media commentary which has portrayed the system as an effort to restrict critical coverage as it stops other judges from speaking to the media. As such, the courts have been criticized as being afraid of media scrutiny.
Although the media are allowed to cover cases once they have been decided, regulations strongly oppose reports that differ in opinion from the courts and in effect banning criticisms of decisions made by the court.
In 2005, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Broadcasting prohibited television and radio stations from reporting on cases while they are still pending and forbid local media from covering events outside their home jurisdiction. Repeatedly, the Supreme People’s Court officials have stated that in sensitive or high profile cases, the courts speak with a unified voice and only official spokespeople are allowed to talk to the media.
In support of all these regulations, judges argue that controls on media coverage are extremely necessary so as to prevent biased reporting. On the other hand, however, journalists complain that judges are increasingly using the rhetoric of judicial independence to prevent media oversight of the courts.
Although numerous defamation related cases have been presented before Chinese courts, a significant portion were against the media. To the media, it appears that defamation litigation is being used as a new form of control to ensure that media practitioners are forced to toe the line.
According to Shirk (2011), there are four trends that can help to explain the impact of defamation litigation on the Chinese media. First, both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that the media often lose the majority of cases brought against them.
The vagueness of Chinese defamation law is blamed for facilitating decisions against the media and for allowing the courts to find the media liable for even very small errors. Second, defamation litigation is now a significant means of retaliation by targets of public opinion supervision.
This is well reinforced by making sure that numerous cases are brought by officials or state or CCP entities in response to critical coverage (McCargo, 2003).
Individuals and corporations have been made to bring suit in response to critical reports that are designed both to retaliate against the media and to block further reporting. Courts and judges themselves have brought a small number of defamation cases in response to critical coverage.
Despite the different perceptions of media credibility, it is important to note that most Chinese citizens widely accept the need for propaganda for the collective benefit. The widespread acceptance of the propaganda has drawn together people with divergent and possibly incompatible positions on media control but willing to accept it for the sake of ensuring social stability.
Similarly, it would be wrong to conclude that official media sources do not serve an important function in Chinese society (Thorburn, Jenkins & Seawell, 2004). Although it is common knowledge that official news organs aim to manipulate public opinion, they are useful for learning the goals and policies of the government.
The cost of obtaining official news is also comparatively low for individuals given that they have access to such information sources at the workplace. Furthermore, ordinary citizens will also prefer such sources when they have incentives to seek out information about the position of the government.
The utility of official sources does not, however, imply that they are perceived as being credible. Nevertheless, the credibility issue is of great concern to the officials spreading propaganda, who are worried about their credibility to guide public opinion thorough the media.
Chinese political leaders continue to regard the news media as a necessary instrument to hold China together and to push forward reform policies. Chinese communication researchers have, therefore, been hesitant to report public opinion data that suggests the low credibility of official media sources (Mansell & Raboy, 2011).
Although official media still give non official media a sense of direction for news reporting, non official media still prevails in terms of the ability to influence public opinion. This notwithstanding, non official media outlets are always regarded as troublemakers by the Chinese officials rather than as useful tools to guide public opinion.
Officials have become particularly concerned about the role of the non official media in challenging the official line of the state and serving as catalysts of public opinion crises (Reilly, 2008).
However, it is the perceived disassociation from the government that lends credibility to the nonofficial media, improving their ability to influence public opinion. Ironically, media challenges to state control can boost the ability of the state to manipulate public opinion as long as the state retains some control over news content and can deter media outlets from deviating too strongly from the official line.
Citizens’ Views on Restrictions Placed on News Content
Studies by Waldman (2011) indicated that public perceptions of media outlets matter a great deal to the Chinese government and especially when a person’s beliefs strongly diverge from the official line of the state.
As pointed out earlier, despite their lower levels of credibility, official sources still remain useful to individuals who need to know the official position of the government regarding different national issues. It may appear that this is an approach taken by the government to see to it that control systems put in place function effectively.
Conclusion
State control of Chinese media is nothing of a secret. Despite the commercialization of media in China, journalists and editors claim that all news media are owned by the state and have not brought any form of independence. There is nothing like fully commercialized or private media in China.
As a way of ensuring that traditional Chinese media is not swallowed by the new media the Chinese government has had to make radical decisions that have made it possible to keep the activities of the private media under check.
Through discussions presented in this paper, one can clearly notice that to a great extent, the Chinese government has been able to ensure that traditional media remained relevant to its people in the presence of stiff competition in an environment filled with incredible new technology (Waldman, 2011).
Even though China’s courts are not unique in restricting media coverage and that many Western countries impose significant limitations on coverage of pending cases, such restrictions may be quite damaging in China, given the very limited history of transparency in the legal system and the numerous problems that continue to undermine the authority and the ability of the courts (Gascoyne-Cecil, 1912).
Efforts to restrict media coverage are just one example of the general attempt by the China to create a system of controlled transparency. Like other state actors, China’s courts claim that they are open to scrutiny and are thus deserving of the public trust, while at the same time they are restricting and manipulating the information available to the public.
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