One of the main features of the technical and technological development of modern world armed forces is the process of digitalization – the saturation of troops at all levels, and above all headquarters of various levels, with intelligent devices, including means of communication, control, navigation. On the one hand, this allows headquarters to expand their capabilities, optimizing the use of troops significantly. On the other hand, it substantially increases the vulnerability of the armed forces to cyberattacks and other ways to disable command and control and communications equipment.
There are problems of attribution to states of conduct related to cross-border harm using information and communication technologies. One effective means of overcoming these complexities, many scholars believe, is to recognize the existence of an obligation of due diligence imposed on states by general international law that extends to interstate relations in cyberspace (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2017). Theoretical approaches to cyberspace deterrence have evolved in close conjunction with their practical use by countries to secure their interests in this domain. The extension of the concept of deterrence to cyberspace has been conditioned by its popularity, primarily in nuclear weapon states, where it has become one of the foundations of strategic thinking (Schneider, 2019). It has also been facilitated by the increasing use of information and communications technology for military purposes, which over time has contributed to more effective cross-domain problem-solving.
The most notable difference of view between Russia and the U.S. is probably the reliance of the latter on deterrence through retaliation both at the document level and in practice. The Russian demonstration of deterrence through retaliation is lacking at the official level; the practice of action shows that the state is more prone to coercive policies (Valeriano et al., 2018). Approaches to deterrence in cyberspace in both countries are evolving, with some changes related to the other side’s behavior (Nye, 2017). This process is long-term and closely related to the problem of developing common global approaches to cyberspace, including adaptation to international humanitarian law. The latter is one of the main mechanisms regulating and maintaining strategic stability.
Cyber operations carried out by several countries are not currently a risk factor for the escalation of the war in Ukraine. The practice of cyberattacks on the Ukrainian government website by Russia in February 2022 attests to this. Some of them were unsuccessful, and although a certain amount of data was seized, the response of other countries was able to activate a deterrence mechanism. The latter has been successful in preventing attacks and providing stability.
Currently, any cyberattacks, regardless of their level of success, receive a response from the international community or individual countries intent on deterring aggressive actions in the digital realm. Some states, including the U.S., provide deterrence through retaliation. This policy allows for a balance of power and prevents some countries from feeling advantage and launching a large-scale cyber operation that could lead to an increase in the intensity of hostilities.
An important factor in successful deterrence is also the enshrining of digital responses at the legislative level in some countries. This will ensure that the development of responses works more effectively. Moreover, cyber operations cannot cause the escalation of the war since the level of technical equipment of the U.S., and many other countries allows to deter attacks by Russia, and there are no preconditions for changing the situation shortly.
References
Gartzke, E., & Lindsay, J. R. (2017). Thermonuclear cyberwar. Journal of Cybersecurity. Published.
Nye, J. S. (2017). Deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace. International Security, 41(3), 44–71.
Schneider, J. G. (2019). Deterrence in and through cyberspace. Cross-Domain Deterrence, 95–120.
Valeriano, B., Jensen, B., & Maness, R. C. (2018). How rival states employ cyber strategy. In Cyber strategy: The evolving character of power and coercion (Illustrated ed.). Oxford University Press.