The case itself is highly unusual, as it is not common for people convicted to death to go mad, but only to a degree where their condition can be managed with drugs. The rarity of the situation also reduces its relative significance compared to some of the other cases discussed in the article, such as the ones involving the awarding of massive damages to people affected by business misconduct. With that said, the case presents a significant ethical issue regarding whether it is acceptable to drug a mad death row convict and execute them while they are sane. It is possible that this forcible application of a treatment to a convict may find expressions elsewhere in the future, using the case discussed in the article as a catalyst. Many of these practices will likely be similarly morally problematic.
Personally, I believe that the practice is justified because it lets the individual’s assigned sentence to be carried out. The killer was sane when he committed the murder and received the death penalty while still in that state. However, as Lewis (2003) explains, a prior Supreme Court ruling declares the execution of those not aware of it or its cause to be cruel and unusual punishment. If a standard medical procedure is necessary before the appropriate sentence can be carried out, it should be administered. For the same reason, the punishment does not qualify as cruel and unusual. The penalty was appropriate when it was handed out, and, unlike with systems such as prison parole, there was nothing Mr. Singleton could have done to make it lighter. Even should his condition have deteriorated, later on, as long as he was in a state where he could understand the execution, it was appropriate and not overly harsh.
Reference
Lewis, N. A. (2003). Justices let stand ruling that allows forcibly drugging an inmate before execution.The New York Times.