The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion was both an engineering tragedy that had extensive social, environmental, and economic consequences. 11 people died, 115 individuals suffered emotional turmoil, several were injured, the local economy was disrupted, and marine ecosystems were destroyed. The primary ethical issues involved in the tragedy included the legal and moral obligations toward human and wildlife health and safety, as well as the environment. Scientists could not accurately predict the long-term effects of the spill on wildlife and the ecosystem. However, the immediate effects were observable in the form of dead wildlife and workers. Poor good design, inadequate centralizers, the exclusion of a cement bond log, and the decision to leave out a lockdown sleeve led to the explosion. BP allowed unprofessionalism to pervade the project and, as a result, but the health, safety, and welfare of the people and the environment at risk. They chose lowering costs over ethical decision-making.
Unprofessionalism, disregard for safety, and cost-cutting were among the causes of the tragic explosion. BP management’s actions betrayed the trust the public had in the company because, to them, reducing expenses was more important than protecting the environment and enhancing human safety. The tragedy tarnished their reputation. However, taking responsibility and paying for the damages improved their public image significantly. As the engineer in charge, I would have relied on mathematical calculations to make decisions even though they would have cost more money. The National Society of Professional Engineers Code requires all stakeholders to “hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.” All these components of engineering ethics were absent in the decision-making process. Another tenet of the code requires engineers to desist from signing plans that do not meet applicable engineering standards. BP engineers violated these rules in favor of economic gains. Human safety and environmental conservation come at a cost. The engineers involved were legally responsible because of their negligence. They failed to notice the leaking seals during negative pressure tests, conducted poor design and maintenance of the blowout preventer, and agreed with BP’s decision to use only six centralizers.
The decision to allow unlicensed engineers to perform design services not offered to the public is unacceptable. A lack of professionalism and oversight leads to unethical decisions that value cost-cutting more than human safety and health. Engineers have an obligation to assess and manage risks because of the risk posed by their designs and management of systems and infrastructure. In that regard, they apply a wide array of methods to estimate the probable causes of harm. The BP engineers had knowledge of the inadequacy of six centralizers, but they went ahead with the project. Moreover, they contravened one of the major tenets of engineering: safety. Service to the public should be defined as any activity that has a direct or indirect effect on the environment and that risks the safety, health, and welfare of the people. That definition would have classified the Deepwater Horizon as a public service and, therefore, stricter regulations and oversight would have been applied to avert the disaster.
A creative midway public policy to solve the problem would involve a requirement for the minimum number of licensed engineers that should work on big projects that pose massive risks to human wellbeing and the environment. Moreover, the policy would give decision-making power to licensed engineers only. This would mitigate the challenge of improving the economy while protecting public welfare.