Introduction
The crisis of 1875-1878 can be considered as an opening port or introduction for the creation of the First World War that occurred in 1914. The crisis was a major political predicament that affected Austria-Hungary, Russia, and other European authorities. The essay that follows is a detailed account of the historic event of the crisis of 1875-1878. The way affected the eastern countries and people of these countries from all lifestyles. The essay that follows is a detailed account of the 1875-1878 crises, including the causes of the war, the events of the war as well as the impact it had on the eastern countries (Ragdale 13).
Diplomatic crisis of 1875-1878
The eastern crisis of 1875-1878 was a crucial diplomatic crisis that affected Austria-Hungary, Russia as well as a good number of the European countries. Starting with the Herzegovinian peasant revolution in July of 1875, the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy was the one that was particularly held responsible for the crisis while the European diplomacy was the one that was generally held responsible for the uprising of the crisis and the two were put into handle the crisis. While three European countries believed their imperative well-being to be in jeopardy that is Russia, Austria-Hungary, and England though this affected them indirectly, the Austro-Hungarians were the ones whose interests were at risk (Ragdale 24).
Andrassy’s appointment
Count Julius Andrassy was on the front leading the Dual Monarchy’s political body. A circuitous path brought on his presence in the foreign ministry. Andrassy had been working with Louis Kossuth in 1848, which was the period for the Hungarian revolution and they had been working towards Hungarian independence. Andrassy and many others were forced to flee when the Russians invaded Hungary the Russians were coming to aid the Austrians who wanted to put an end to the revolution. Andrassy on his part fled to Constantinople for a period of 9 years where he engaged his time in studying the European capitals and therefore gaining a good knowledge of European politics. This would, later on, help him during the crisis that occurred in 1875-1878. He was later amnestied in1858 at which point he returned to Budapest where he worked with Francis Deak to restore the Hungarian constitution. He was also appointed prime minister to the Hungarian nation and in effect, led the Dual Monarchy in the first years. Franz Joseph chose Andrassy in 1871 during which time, Franz wanted to bring a change of policy. From this choice, Andrassy was a representation of the political coalition that played a significant role in cementing the Dual Monarchy. The Andrassy appointment was a good indication of the rapprochement that was very much desired by Germany (Taylor 44).
The appointment landed in the hands of Otto Van Bismarck who was Germany’s Chancellor at that time and the perpetrator of peace that had seen to Germany’s unification. Otto van Bismarck aspired to strengthen the arrangement of the recently unified German by creating an alliance with Austro-Hungary and Russia. This was a scheme to provide fortification for Germany against the French who had just been defeated by Germany in 1871. To understand the crisis that occurred in 1875-1878 the German reorientation of Europe that was geared by Bismarck has to be understood. Bismarck insisted that his impact on the Balkans and Ottoman Empire be indirect but he did not stop to implementing his iron will on the issue of bringing equilibrium of power in Europe (Owen 68).
Bismarck finally realized the alignment that he so wished to make with the founding of the Dreikaisarbund in the year 1872. The Russian, Austrian and Austro-Hungarian emperors that is William I, Alexander I, and Franz Joseph respectively were the ones who took part in the series of meetings that took place between 1872 and 1874. In the alliance, Germany was the one that provided a lynchpin that assured Bismarck that the alliance had provided the security he needed for Germany against the French. The disparity in attitude against the Ottoman Empire and its corruption that had its base in Constantinople played a major role in the crisis (May 73).
The beginning of the crisis
The beginning of the war in 1875 had a set background before the war actually initialized and started. The rebellions that occurred in Bosnia in 1875 due to the subjugating levy condition were already a condition that was rampant in Bosnia. A series of rebellions had already been experienced in Bosnia in the previous years and they were caused by the same issues like the ones that triggered the beginning of the war in Bosnia. The first rebellion was experienced in 1868 and 1869. After this, another rebellion transpired three years later in 1872 that was followed by another one in 1873. During these rebellions that happened in 1872 and 1873, the local leaders that were in Bosnia appealed to the Great Powers that is the first emperor, and then followed the tsar. In their appeals, the local leaders were petitioning for help from these Great Powers to help them deal with the misery and oppression that they were going through and it is this same oppression that was forcing them to be in the hostile conditions in which they were in during these rebellions. A group of refugees that were present in Croatia raised complaints that they were receiving mistreatment from the Ottomans (Jelavich 93).
At this time, the Governor representing Ottoman who was present in Bosnia also appealed to Vienna and talked of an increment in cultural activities, seemingly, the “cultural” activities were observed to increase in and the surrounding consulates of Sarajevo. As the year progressed, a new batch of refugees came in and reported that great numbers of Christians had been killed due to condemnation to death as a result of associating themselves with the Austrian diplomats. On getting knowledge of these happenings from Anton Mollinary who was in Zagreb, Andrassy decided to address the issue even though it was against his wishes because he did not want to bother the status quo. He was therefore forced to make an official appeal to Constantinople and request him to make Improvements on the issues that were affecting the people in Bosnia1. The rebel leaders played with the reverse of power from one to the other in their frantic efforts at getting some form of relief but unfortunately, not an iota was imminent (Burns 77).
Taxing peasant farmers
In the year 1874, the peasant farmers had a shortage in the harvest but the tax collectors relentlessly demanded payment of tax in kind. This situation aggravated the local leaders of the district of Nevesinje that was located in Herzegovina and because of this aggravation, they held a meeting in which they discussed and agreed that come spring, they would not give in to the orders and make tax payments. After they reached this conclusion, they made knowledge of their decision to Montenegro and Serbia. When the Ottoman officials heard of the local leader’s decision, they did not take to it and decided to hunt down the leaders and kill as great a number as they could. After the killing of the local leaders, the officials tried to make a collection of taxes during the summer of 1875 but because the people were leaving under anxiety, a quick spread of rebellion took place. By the time the summer period was ending, almost all the peasant farmers were outraged and most of them had already taken to taking flight from Bosnia. To respond to this flight, the governor ordered for the army to be set up and a harsh crackdown followed and to add to this the landlords on their part also organized their own troops which took part in terrorizing the population. This resulted in a mass evacuation of the many Christian peasants who were in Bosnia. The peasant Christians migrated to other areas including Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia. By the time 1876 was ending, there had been a mass exodus of peasant Christians ranging from 100,000 to 250,000 individuals. Almost 5,000 individuals had died and several villages had been burnt down (Langer 114).
Austro-Hungarian Empire before crisis
An area that should be keenly noted is the era that was in the Austro-Hungarian Empire before the beginning of the crisis. The holdings that were presented by nationalism had been washed out throughout the monarchy. There were ethnic conflicts throughout the empire in the 1870s. Czechs were gaining in popularity in various aspects of life including population density among the Czechs was increasing, their level of education was expanding and finally, their representation was also increasing and this posed a threat to the Germans who felt as if the Czechs were overpowering and becoming more dominant than them. If a situation occurred and the Germans felt overwhelmed by the great numbers of the Czechs, they would impose sanctions on the Bohemian diet. The Czechs on their part would stay away from the imperial government when the political ramblings were not in favor with them. The poles who were present in Galicia supported the Vienna policies because in their own opinions they were at a greater advantage under the Hapsburg rule than the Russian or German rule. Due to this, the Poles tended repeatedly putting the Ruthenia’s down because the Ruthenia’s were under Russian control. In their quest for self-rule, the Croats were experiencing suppression, and to emphasize this Charles Khuen-Hedevary was appointed as governor to enhance the suppression to the Croats who wanted to have independence. The Hungarians also suppressed the Romanians. What was being experienced in the eastern countries was just a feud for national identification that was usually smothered by the stronger group’s greed and the quest for self-identification (Burns 135).
Franz Joseph and federalism
Franz Joseph and the crown prince Rudolph who was to be his heir saw that the only clear way to reduce these suppressions was to introduce federalism. Federalism would in turn generate a loose alliance of state entities that would have equal representation in Vienna and at the same time have greater opportunities at sharing power centrally. However, this plan did not materialize because its policy led to greater social ethnic ramblings inside the empire’s provinces together with foreign affairs. There was little or no room for new political ideologies and the political cooperation that Franz was trying to suggest (Seton 108).
Serbia and Ottoman Empire
The province where Bosnia and Herzegovina lay had been under bad governance and was constantly over levied by Constantinople over a period of many years, almost centuries. Due to this, the Austrian military leaders had already targeted the region as early as the 1850s during the period when Moldavia and Wallachia had an invasion from Russia, and Serbia seemed ready to take on a lead at doing away with the Ottoman Empire. This desi6re was later on rejuvenated after the series of continued revolts that were accompanied by 1867. During this period, a field marshal by the name of Count Friedrich Beck-Rzikowsky had a desire to expand their throne to Salonika so that they could be able to provide fortification for Dalmatia. The fortification of Dalmatia would thereafter provide a good foundation for the new Adriatic trade that was just developing. Beck who was a Russophile hoped to have collaborated with the Russians and so partitioned for a pacific capturing of the ottoman lands that were weak. This idea was backed up by Franz (Seton 114).
Serbia that was a self-governing province next to the Ottoman thrones, had been developing a desire to go in and save their Slav brothers since the 1840s. Montenegro, which was a province under the Ottoman Empire, had never acknowledged the Ottoman rule over them. Due to the attitude they had developed against the ottoman throne, they would plan raids on the ottoman authorities. They had hideouts in the mountains and conduct ambushes on the Ottomans. They were generally against Constantinople and the tyrannical rule they had on them together with the fact that the Ottomans were Muslims trying to impose their ways on Montenegro. They played a major role in the crisis that later happened in 1875-1878 (May 159).
At the borders of Montenegro near Podgorica, Ottoman officials massacred a good number of Montenegrins around twenty. After this massacre, the infuriated people appealed to prince Nicholas who in turn made an appeal to the Austro-Hungarian and Russian officials for help. Although the Dreikaisarbund representatives heard about it and they ordered for investigation into the issue and retribution for the perpetrators. Although Constantinople heard the issue, they decided to ignore it and took no measure to investigate it. Reports also reached Vienna that Herzegovinians were fleeing from their places to Montenegro and they appealed to Nicholas for help to these refugees (Kiraly and Stokes 103).
Fleeing of Herzegovinians in summer 1875
Bosnia and Herzegovina presented desperate situations locally and the intentions of the Austrian military force were well known by the martial commanders. The situation presented an opportune time for their plans, the period was ripe for them to strike (Ragdale 102).
In the summer of 1875, numerous Herzegovinians fled to the mountains armed with guns and ammunition. To respond to this, the governor-general Dervish Pasha decided to send two notable locals to the insurrectionists so that they could try to confer with them so that the rebellions could cease or cool down. To his dismay, the attempts did not yield any fruits and so he decided to turn to the Ottoman Frontier commissioner called constant Effendi so that he could also attempt to talk to the insurgents but this also did not bring in any improvements. It was probably because of these failures that a battalion of Turkish military soldiers was promptly dispatched on the scene of these rebels on July 16, 1885. Andrassy and other officials that were in Constantinople refused to acknowledge the urgent situation of the rebellion. Despite their ignorance, a good number of 30,300 men were already on the battlefield, and a thousand more were reported to be marching according to the information conveyed to Andrassy from the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople called count Francis Zichy (Woodward 128).
Local populations who were present in Dalmatia and Croatia, encouraged by the fervor of governor Rodic, decided to supply ammunition to the insurgents. They also supplied supplies and arms to the rebels. Those rebels present in Bosnia were at an advantageous point due to the Croatian diet and soon, Ragusa, which was on the Dalmatian coastline, became a center where plans were made and supplies received and exchanged. As much as the Ottomans received these supplies of ammunitions so did the rebels receive tones of ammunitions from the Austro-Hungarian steamer that would bring in these ammunitions, which would be hastily collected by the rebels and quickly ferried to the hinterlands. A proxy battle was in motion as early as June of 1875 was (Seton 183).
The Ottoman Empire was falling apart in the nineteenth century and this paved a way for the eastern crisis to occur. The empire was literally drifting apart and the management of its Affairs was a problem. A void in the power system already existed even before Franz Joseph, Friedrich Beck, and the military planners in 1875, presumably made the instigation for the war. The people’s desire to have a system of power that practiced justice was already existent. The European emissaries for their part had been already envisioning a way that they could ultimately fill this void, which already existed in the power system. The British ambassador at that time was Sir Henry Elliot who already had the attention of the sultan and represented the stronghold for the Turkish supporters. It was the wish of the British to see that the Ottoman Empire continue to remain as the buffer [point for the expansion of the Russian empire. The Russian count Nicholas Ignatiev who was an adamant pan-slavist supporter had a dream for the Balkan federation that would be best achieved in his own opinion through Russian dominion. Franz for his part decided to follow Andrassy’s will while the Ottomans participated in a game of power against the other (Malcolm 126).
Conflict between Andrassy and Ignatiev
There existed a personal conflict between Andrassy and Ignatiev. Because of this, Ignatiev was jealous of any decision that was made by Andrassy. Due to this Ignatiev was jealous of any successful decision that was made by Andrassy and as result, he was determined to impact the official edict that was to be made by the Porte, and by doing this he would be able to keep maintenance of the activities that happened in his realm which was in Constantinople. The Porte finally issued an irade on 2nd October after pressure had been exerted on him from the European powers. The irade included reserved tax reorganization. It also contained mechanisms in which the people could be able to appeal to the Sultan about their complaints. Many of these had been Ignatiev’s ideas (Zimmerman 145).
Acceptance of Andrassy’s note
Due to the personal feud that existed between Ignatiev and Andrassy, Andrassy detected these ideas to have originated from Ignatiev. He, therefore, chose to reject the irade. He did this on the basis that the irade did not focus on the more important issues that should be addressed like the social and moral adjustments but instead the irade focused on material things. He then decided to construct his own draft and send the proposals to St. Petersburg. In his proposal, he requested a different administration from that which was in Serbia and Montenegro. He also wanted complete equality in religion; he also wanted the eradication of medieval corvee together with the seigneurial tithes. Also, in his proposal, he wanted tax-farming to be done away with. Another thing that he proposed was that there should be political rearrangement at that time and that Bosnia and Herzegovina continue being under Turkish control. These proposals represented the pedestal of the Andrassy note that was consequently accepted by the six great powers. It had been Andrassy’s desire that his proposal is accepted so that the decision-making body can be transferred from Constantinople which was Ignatievs base so that the decision-making would be centered at the great powers. The proposals presented by Andrassy presented a situation whereby the provinces would experience as little change as possible for the Austro- Hungarian initiative to be retained in the case of any reforms that would later be presented. At this point, it should be noted that Andrassy in his own skillful was smoothly having a transition from one policy to another. He had already started to campaign for full neutrality and no international intervention in solving the issues affecting the local population (Killary and Stokes 133).
France and Italy accepted the note that contained Andrassy’s proposals almost immediately while Britain decided to stall because they preferred not to tag on the coattails of others. The French had raised a question that the British Prime Minister Disraeli decided to recap. The question that was asked was whether the money that was generated in each province should be used on that province or was to be used on Bosnia and Herzegovina alone. It is of importance to note that England presented a main source of money to the Porte. Coincidentally the Porte had affirmed insolvency in October. Disraeli’s question was therefore meant to ask exactly where the Ottoman money went. Did it fund the creditors that were present in the European nations or did the money go to use by the subjects that were in the provinces? The Russian Ambassador, who was Count Peter Shuvalov, made a report that England was at the moment not interested in ideas of humanity and evolution. In the end, England and Disraeli were appealed to by the Porte to sign the note that was presented by Andrassy (Malcolm 150).
The six ambassadors finally decide to present the Andrassy note after a series of haggling over the issues of timing and methodology in Constantinople. The presentation of the note to the Foreign Minister, Rashid had a series of stories that went along with the presentation. The note clearly defined or indicated the problems that were presented by the Ottoman Empire and the fundamental origin of the difficulties that now faced the Empire. The ambassador’s presentation of the note was met up by a series of absurd events. First, the sultan issued a threat that he would release his foreign minister from office and then he summoned a band of bashi-bazoukis to get ready for Bosnia. On 10 February, after he had eaten eighteen eggs and claimed to have been poisoned he refused to leave the harem and for the first time in almost a century, a Sultan refused to go to the mosque. This same government had ridiculous people governing the people, and it was the same one that Andrassy and the rest of the people in England kept on insisting during the crisis that they continue heading the government (Burns 178).
Implementation of Andrassy’s note
Andrassy had already worked out a plan to prepare the Porte for the implementation of the reforms that he had proposed in the note. He outlined a repatriation plan in which the plan included a pardon period for the people who were responsible for leading the rebels; it also included a safeguard to the Christians against vengeance that the Muslims intended to enact. Andrassy also proposed for aid to be given to the Christians to enable them to rebuild their churches and houses, the last proposal was that the Christians provide with seeds for the planting season that was already approaching. Andrassy reached out to governor Rodic so that he would issue instructions to the rebels since he was better understood by them but the situation on the ground as it was at this time could not be controlled by orderly instructions. Reports were still being made that houses were still being burnt down women were raped and all sorts of war activities were still being reported as occurring. Rodic, later on, attempted to have a talk with the rebels but they responded by telling him that they could not return to their homes because their homes were already destroyed and they did not have trust towards the Turkish authorities and that they also wanted the troops to be the first to withdraw.
A report was finally prepared by the Porte after a series of talks that Rodic had tried to hold with both sides. The rebels refused to comply with the reforms because there was no promise of amnesty and they still did not see any changes in the policies. On their part, they also presented Rodic with their own catalog of written conditions that would make them let go of their weapons. They requested that a third of the land should be given to Christians to belong to them, that sir garrisons should be the only ones who remain from the Turkish troops and that Muslims let go of their weapons among other things. A week had not passed after the recommendations that another rebel occurred (Lampe and Mazower 176).
By the time may was coming to an end, it was clear that Serbia was preparing to declare war on the ottoman empire and that soon afterward Montenegro would also declare war (Lampe and Mazower 199).
The character of the international interventions that occurred in the eastern crisis of 1875-1878 was in a way provoked by the Hungarians or also by the selfish interests of key people like Andrassy and Ignatiev. Due to the fragile unity that existed between the Dreikaisarbund, there were tardy conferences that were conducted by the powers, this tended to bring about delay in dealing with the situation on the ground, and also the interests of the great powers impended the solutions that were required. The Andrassy note was rightly delivered to the Porte but the proposals it suggested were not implemented. Others like the Berlin memo were not even delivered. These two attempts at reaching some form of peace were fruitless and it can be argued that the consular mission would have originally seen possible solutions to the problems that arose from the Ottoman Empire2. The consul actually called for the direct involvement of the great powers so that they could help deal with the situation but since Andrassy was not for the idea the consul’s calls were unheeded instead (Jelavich 201).
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be seen that Germans supported Andrassy’s schemes. The support that was offered by Bismarck to Andrassy meant nothing to the people living in southern Slav. The implementation of Bismarck and Andrassy’s plans was affected greatly by their attitudes. These plans were not guided by any thoughts that concerned justice or even economic improvement for the people. Andrassy and Bismarck were driven by their own self-greed for power and implementation of their own ideas rather than putting in mind the needs of the citizens (Seton 75).
Works Cited
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