Introduction
Ethics plays a significant role in the engineering profession because it enables engineers to be responsive to the safety, welfare, and health needs of the society. Without ethics, engineers can overlook the safety, welfare, and health consequences of their practices, thus affecting human life and the society negatively.
Thus, ethics guides engineers when exercising their duties in ways that do not pose any threats to humans and the environment. Engineering ethics has developed for centuries due to cumulative lessons learned from engineering failures.
According to Roddis, “major engineering failures act as a catalyst for change in standards of practice and therefore create the opportunity for establishing better ethical practices for the profession” (1539). In this view, past engineering failures did provide invaluable lessons that have become cornerstones of modern engineering ethics.
Therefore, this paper analyzes ethical issues that led to the collapse of the Quebec Bridge with a view of providing the appropriate solution based on an ethical decision making model.
Ethical Issue
In 1907, the Quebec Bridge collapsed. The collapse of the bridge occurred due to a combination of factors that cumulatively contributed to the structural failure. Increased transportation of goods and the growth of trade compelled the Canadian government to construct a bridge across St. Lawrence River.
Since the St. Lawrence River is long, engineers constructed a massive bridge that expanded over a half a kilometer. Historical view of the bridge shows that it started in 1882 when the Quebec Bridge Company received the contract to construct the bridge.
However, owing to challenges of insufficient funds, the construction company did nothing until 1887 when construction started. Under Phoenix Bridge Company, Theodore Cooper was a leading consulting engineer who guided the construction of the bridge through all its phases from foundation to completion.
Nava asserts that although Theodore Cooper reviewed and approved the design of the bridge, he later recommended for modifications to reduce the cost of steel used and increase stresses that it can endure (5).
Lack of enough funds made the project stall until 1903 when construction continued without considering the impact of modifications in the original design.
Since Theodore Cooper was a consulting engineer who was responsible for the overall construction progress of the bridge, he overlooked recommendations from other engineers. Despite the fact that he was a consulting engineer, his health conditions did not allow him to visit the construction site and observe the alleged impacts of stresses on the bridge following change in the original design.
Consequently, the bridge collapsed in 1907 costing the lives of 75 construction workers while leaving 11 survivors only. Hence, the collapse of the Quebec Bridge forms one of the major structural failures of the 20th century that highlighted the need of ethics in engineering profession so that engineers can guarantee safety, welfare, and health of people using various engineering structures.
Pearson and Delatte state that, lack of enough funds made construction engineers to compromise the design and construction process (84). Moreover, as a consulting engineer, Theodore Cooper failed in his duty since he did not recalculate the stresses and load that the bridge required following changes made in its design.
Debate about the Issue
What caused the collapse of the Quebec Bridge has been a debate that has raged over a century. The ongoing debate has great significance in defining ethical and professional requirements of engineers with view of averting similar and related structural failures.
Since the commission of inquiry did find out that the change of design was one of the factors that led to the collapse of the bridge, many engineers perceive that Theodore Cooper changed the design without assessing and recalculating the impact of the modifications on the bridge.
Hence, some engineers attribute the structural failure of the bridge to Theodore Cooper because he was the consulting engineer who recommended and approved for the changes in the bridge design.
Pearson and Delatte argue that, Theodore Cooper “mandated unusually high allowable stresses, and failed to require recalculation of the bridge load dead load when the span was lengthened” (84).
In other words, Theodore Cooper neglected professional procedures during the construction of the bridge. Thus, a significant number of engineers hold this view when debating about the collapse of the Quebec Bridge.
Some engineers also believe that external factors such as inadequate finance and time constraint contributed to the poor construction of the bridge. Although the responsible company received the contract in 1882, it started construction in 1887.
However, due to inadequate funds, the project stalled until 1903 when the Canadian government provided about 6.7 million dollars for the completion of the project. As engineers were racing against time, they overlooked critical issues like assessing the impact of the design modifications and assessing assumed weights.
According to Nava, in 1906, inspectors noted that the steel used in the construction of the bridge was too heavy for the bridge to support because it was beyond the estimated weight (8). Consequently, the compression cords continued to buckle indicating that the bridge was too heavy to support itself.
Therefore, since inadequate funds delayed the progress of construction, engineers were in a hurry to complete the project within a limited time, hence, compelling them to overlook some of the professional procedures or take corrective measures.
Individual factors of the consulting engineer also contributed to the collapse of the bridge. As a consulting engineer, Theodore Cooper had a responsibility of ensuring that the construction process proceeded according to engineering procedures. However, due to poor health, Theodore Cooper was unable to discharge his duties well for he never visited the construction site to observe the construction progress and obtain first hand information.
Instead, Theodore Cooper relied on the information provided to him by Edward Hoare, unqualified engineer who was on the construction site (Nava 11). Additionally, Theodore Cooper refused subordination of his responsibility because his health did not allow him to discharge his duties optimally.
Theodore Cooper did not want anyone to assume his responsibility despite the fact that he was unwell. Hence, ego and selfishness of the Theodore Cooper hindered other engineers from making their contribution during construction of the bridge.
In the debate, some engineers attribute the collapse of the bridge to organizational culture. As the Royal Commission attributed the structural failure to misjudgment of two engineers, Theodore Cooper and Peter Szlapka, the view of organizational culture disputes it as a narrow perception.
Engineers who attribute organizational culture argue that many errors that are inherent in organization culture were responsible for the collapse of the bridge. Although the commission provided errors that made the bridge to collapse, Kranakis asserts that, “the combined weight of this evidence suggests, rather, that the errors behind the collapse were rooted in the project’s organizational culture” (487).
Firstly, the construction company did not provide a mechanism of teamwork since Theodore Cooper assumed all responsibility even when he was sick. Secondly, the construction company allowed unqualified engineer to work on the site while unsupervised.
Thirdly, the management did not follow engineering procedures during construction as it allowed Theodore Cooper to change the design without assessing its impact on the bridge.
Analysis of Different Viewpoints
Analysis of different viewpoints of the debate shows that the collapse of the Quebec Bridge occurred due to a number of factors that reflect ethical and professional aspects of engineering. The first viewpoint is that the collapse of the bridge happened because the consulting engineer modified the design of the bridge without assessing the overall impact of the design.
Uff asserts that engineers experience challenges when developing novel and progressive designs that are economical (9). The modification of the design occurred due to the second viewpoint that attributes inadequate funds and limited time for construction.
Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins recommend that engineers must have an ethical responsibility so that they can utilize funds in an economical manner, and complete their assigned projects within a reasonable time. However, utilization of funds should not compromise the quality of the structure.
The third viewpoint of the debate is that individual factors contributed to the collapse of the bridge. The consulting engineer, Theodore Cooper was sick, and thus was unable to discharge his duties well. Middleton states that Theodore Cooper was absent during construction because of ill health (53).
Additionally, Theodore denied other engineers to assume his responsibility and provide their invaluable input during construction. Hence, the fourth viewpoint holds that organizational culture caused the collapse of the bridge.
Yeomans argues that even though warnings of the impending structural failure were evident, the management did not initiate appropriate corrective measures (9). Thus, the management was not responsive to the construction progress of the project as it allowed workers to continue constructing the bridge yet apparent faults were evident.
My Opinion
I perceive that the collapse of the Quebec Bridge occurred due to a number of factors that range from professional to individual factors. From the construction history, it is evident that inadequate funds stalled the project, thus compelling the engineers to work extra hard in an effort to complete the project within the shortest time possible.
Moreover, sickness of Theodore Cooper, professional negligence, and irresponsibility of the management constitute a complex of factors that led to the collapse of the bridge. Hence, decision engineering is the best decision-making model that aids in the resolution of the errors like the ones that caused structural failure of the bridge.
According to Blackburn, engineers should “understand network of rules or ‘norms’ that sustain our lives” (44). Given that network of rules have significant impact on organizational culture, engineers should utilize them in shaping their diverse engineering societies so that they can adopt and nurture ethical principles that guarantee human safety, welfare, and health.
Conclusion
Engineering ethics is indispensable in the engineering profession. The structural failure of the Quebec Bridge provides an example of how violation of ethics occurs in engineering practice.
Change in the design, negligence of responsibility, individual factors, and organizational culture are some of the factors that contributed to the collapse of the bridge.
Therefore, resolution of these factors requires enhancement of engineering ethics so that engineers can follow clear stipulations in their code of ethics and adhere to professional practices.
Works Cited
Blackburn, Simon. Ethics: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Print.
Harris, Charles, Michael Pritchard, and Michael Rabins. Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases. New York: Cengage Learning, 2009. Print.
Kranakis, Eda. “Fixing the blame: Organizational Culture and the Quebec Bridge Collapse.” Technology and Culture 45.3 (2004): 487-518.
Middleton, William. The Bridge at Quebec. New York: Indiana University Press, 2001. Print.
Nava, Ahalika. The Collapse of the Quebec Bridge. 2006. Web.
Pearson, Cynthia, and Norbert Delatte. “Collapse of the Quebec Bridge, 1907.” Journal of Performance, Construction, and Facilitation 20.1 (2006): 84–91. Print.
Roddis, Kim. “Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics.” Journal of Structural Engineering 119.5 (1993):1539-1555. Print.
Uff, John. Engineering Ethics: Do Engineers Owe Duties to the Public? 2000. Web.
Yeomans, David. How Structures Work: Design and Behavior from Bridges to Buildings. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2009. Print.