Introduction
Epistemological Coherentism, as per contemporary debates provides a way to the theory of justification and hence an optimum solution to the epistemic regress problem. Discussion over coherentism begins with opposition to foundationalism and through the text “Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005”, Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa have again delved into this justification theory. Coherentism till date has only been viewed as a negation to foundationalism and hence its true benefits remain under-discussed and at the same time, its potential being least appreciated. Coherence has its definition while relating itself with several other objective systems but still some of the social versions relate it to common knowledge prevailed in the given society. Similarly religious versions have its roots to theological doctrine. The above specifically mentioned two systems have been found to be objective in the sense that it’s the people’s belief which has got evaluated while enabling implication. There is also a possibility that versions could come out after combining subjective and objective systems. A theory which is based on person’s beliefs and is later supplemented with additional believable claims of coincidence with higher probability of occurrence; is perhaps the best example for combined subjective and objective systems (Kvanvig 257). The structure of this paper is as follows: first introduce a way general foundationalist thesis and coherent justification, thereby taking a first approach to the coherence theory.
The coherence theory of justification: a first look over foundationalism
Foundationalism is important in epistemology because it represents the classic choice about the definition of justification, and how this notion is related to the notion of knowledge. Foundationalism accepts the following two basics:
- There are two types of belief, namely, that represent the basic beliefs foundation of knowledge, and basic beliefs, in which justification depends on the relationship with the basic beliefs.
- The justification of beliefs depends on other beliefs, but all justification rests ultimately on appeal to the basic beliefs which do not require justification by other beliefs.
So, the justification is unidirectional and the basic beliefs to justify beliefs basic, while the justification of basic beliefs is not dependent on support of other beliefs. Without delving deeper into the characterization of the foundational theory of justification, analyze the basic ideas of coherence theory (Kvanvig, 257-275).
A Coherence Theory of justification is one that supports two central ideas that distinguish it from foundationalism:
- There are basic beliefs that serve as the basis for other beliefs, and
- Any justification between beliefs is not linear, i.e. no justification is unidirectional while going from basic beliefs to other beliefs.
These two features can be understood more appropriately with respect to foundationalism. The property of coherentism is not a distinction between different beliefs where all beliefs in principle have the same status epistemic, i.e., no self-beliefs that require no justification by other beliefs. As the justification for foundationalism is linear, but coherentism belief based justification may be bidirectional, ie, a belief can be justified by a group of beliefs, but in turn this belief along with others may warrant those beliefs that she had been justified (Kvanvig, 257-275).
A very loose and vague definition of the coherence theory runs the risk of being implausible as it will look more carefully similar to what is meant by a theory of empirical justification. Hence, the first thing to note is that the theory of justification through Coherence is clearly separated from the coherence theory of truth. Coherence theory of truth should be distinguished from theory of justification, although these theories were conceived almost simultaneously. The confusion is perhaps due to the coherence theory of truth was intended as a theory about the criterion of truth of propositions, i.e. as the theory provides answer to the question then under what criteria can we know whether a proposition is true or false. Moreover, coherence theories of justification does not involve acceptance of coherence theories of truth. Hence, it is possible to make a defense of the coherence theory of justification, while accept a correspondence theory of truth. Before continuing our analysis of the coherence theory of justification look at one of the problems that attempts to answer, then see how foundationalism theory relates to the justification for this problem and analyze which of the two theories-the-foundationalism and coherence can provide a better output the problem (Kvanvig, 257-275).
The weaknesses of the foundationalist position
The critique of foundationalist position usually focuses on showing that basic beliefs (which underlie all the knowledge) had different properties that many foundations have believed they have, properties such as that these beliefs appear to be true, infallible, indubitable, and so on. Bonjour argues that a genuine critique of foundationalism-both in its classic form and in its weak version is to make clear that there are beliefs that are justified without appeal to other beliefs. This criticism would be that the beliefs basic really would not end the infinite regress argument outlined by the return of the justifications. Foundationalism would seem to be incapable in solving the problem of the return argument of the justifications that are invoked as the strongest argument for his position (Kvanvig, 257-275).
The argument against foundationalism by Bonjour reveals the following: justification always seems to suggest that it refers to a goal or purpose. Hence one could morally justified in accepting a belief while referencing to certain standards and moral principles as illustrated by Bonjour in the following example: Let us suppose we have a friend who helped us in difficult moments of our lives, often at the expense of his own interests, of moment. All of a sudden, we come to know that our friend has been accused of a horrible crime and everyone thinks he is really guilty and under these circumstances we also believe that our friend is innocent, and our belief is justified morally. Epistemic justification certain similarities with the moral justification, but while what we interested in epistemic justification is knowledge, epistemic justification be closely related to the cognitive value of truth. “Cognitive doings epsitemically are justified, on this conception, only if and to extent that they are Aimed at this goal-which means roughly that one accepts all and beliefs which one has good reasons to think are true “(Bonjour p. 5). A corollary of this idea would be for a possible criterion for choosing a theory of epistemic justification is that justification is a good conductor to the truth, namely that the beliefs are justified on the theory of epistemetic justification to defend are more likely to be true.
Coherentism, its belief and other structure of justification
The subjectivity of belief in Coherentism has some appeal for the theorists but at the same time, the uniformity among coherentists is also a belief which needs to be defined. The reasons for all this possibility for uniform agreement is that of the relevancy in mental state i.e. appearance state and sensation state (Davidson 137-159). Other truthful way to move forward with the argument is that whether the mentioned states could have a role in justification or would substantiate the propositional content. This line of argument creeps with a range of difficulty like whether there should be a reason on the virtue of its content or the experience of people could be cited as the possible reason. Is it just an explanation of beliefs or a broad citation of experience; or it is like if one gets injured then through experience one could provide an explanation or he or she should rely on reasons that could make one think that the belief of an injury is correct (Kvanvig, 257-275). As coherentist’s thesis has got formulated as a contradiction to foundationalism, hence, coherentism encircles over the concept that negates pro foundationlistic approach of knowledge and justification based on noninferential wisdom and belief.
As the structure of justification or knowledge is being viewed as coherentism; this issue of coherentism has been the outcome of the regress problem. Epistemology due to the prominence of the regress problem, has led to the occurrence of negative construal of coherentism. Among several coherentists, it is widely prevailed that justification as a whole is a collective outcome of some plausible links between non privileged foundationalists’ beliefs with thoroughly substantiated specific relationships. Justification from several other beliefs creates a chain of inferential beliefs often classified as belief chain. This belief chain actually follows one of the two paths; one with indefinite continuation or the one to an end. In case of indefinite continuation, it goes into Infinitism i.e., continuously chain creation or into a continuous loop where the chain circles back to it which is separately categorized as Liner Coherentism. The end of the regress brings in beliefs justified through direct or indirect inferencing. As a whole, the delineation of regress problem would carve into three possible structures as well as four possible theories of justification. These four theories are namely Infinitism, which relies on infinite chain of beliefs, Linear Coherentism, which is based on a circular chain of beliefs and finite chain of belief based Foundationalism and Contextualism (Caraway 78).
Issues related to coherentism
As most of the versions of coherentism have followed a purely non-linear approach, it has also raised concerns on issues like the incompatibility of this coherentism with the basing religion. The concerns behind all these is that of the possibilities when clash of opinions creeps into while explanations for a person’s belief doesn’t get proper support from required evidences. It would be like basing the entire system of an individual who’s each belief would need basing and justification. Another problematic issue with coherentism is that of isolation objection which actually relies on empirical beliefs. A system would be justified and can be a constituent of empirical knowledge but cannot be dictated from the requirements of a coherent system. This actually dives into the inputs from the world which may influence the system as a whole (Bonjour 108). The outcome of a system of belief while following inputs from external world decides the relationship of that particular system and the world. The net result might be that of the theories which permits application of coherence even to those systems’s of beliefs where the subject matter doesn’t have any direct worldly experience.
Coherence: a relation on beliefs and Motivation
Coherence as a relation on beliefs has often involved issues that circumscribes over relevancy factor behind mental states while questioning the epistemic status of certain belief. The generation of positive epistemic status, like sensation state or appearance state or the issues that takes an individual beyond the range of sensation, argues over the insufficiency of appeals to experiential states for justification. The deeper motivation which dissuades coherentists from defining coherence through experiential states over a subjective system is that it may result into some version of foundationalism. This line of argument sprawled over various range of difficulty is like there should have various reason on the virtue of its relation to the experience of people. A range of beliefs and its relation fall under the roof of subjectivity with some of them are relatively more appealing. The understanding of foundationalism dissolves further into two features. The first of the two is that of an asymmetry condition when inferential beliefs have some justification in some other way than the non-inferential beliefs. The second feature is that of intrinsically and foundationally warranted as well as justified beliefs. The proposals which base over full justification despite its foundationalistic appearance, also includes some positive warrant notwithstanding any relationship to other beliefs. Positive epistemic status gets imparted through foundationalism. This foundationalism is actually the outcome of relationship between the appearance as well as beliefs. This warrant-conferring requirement tends to propagate coherentism which bypasses the above mentioned argument and doesn’t makes room for coherentists to impart any positive epistemic status. Coherentist from here continues with the belief that appearances are a necessity for all such beliefs so that there could have some certain degree of positive epistemic status. The net outcome of this theory is that it’s the experience which has got certain role which is indistinctive of foundationalism (Kvanvig, 257-275).
Conclusion
The structure of justification through coherentism has been ultimately viewed as something which is not committed to carve any relation with person’s beliefs. At one stage, coherence might propagate some relation on an objective body of information which could get supplemented through subjectivity of normal person’s belief. The subjective versions over a system of beliefs when viewed for defining coherence render any definitional requirement as meaningless. These conclusion as a whole is the outcome which relies on the sound argument according to which any relationship with experience would transform the presented theory into some specific version of foundationalism (Kvanvig, 257-275).
References
BonJour, Laurence, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 108. Cambridge, Mass., 1985.
Davidson, Donald. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, in Truth and Interpretation:Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, 137- 259 Ernest LePore, ed. :New York, 1989.
Kvanvig, Jonathan, Coherentists’ Distractions, Philosophical Topics23: 257-275, 1995.
Steup, Matthias and Sosa, Ernest (eds). Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell. 2005