The European crisis is a significant issue in the modern world as it affects the majority of the states of the continent. The are several diverse reasons for this problem, which should not be underestimated. Wood (2012) proposes the hypothesis that one of the most noticeable causes is the specificity of monetary policy. The participants of the Union maintain that their unity is in their diversity (Wood, 2012). Nevertheless, particular situations show the imperfection of this claim: in the era of turbo-capitalism, it is hard to reach an agreement in establishing a unique financial strategy (Wood, 2012). The governmental representatives are concentrated on social questions and the topics concerning equity, tolerance, and brand awareness of their states. However, it is crucial to pay specific attention to the monetary processes in the European Union. Wood (2012) puts forward the thesis that there are external factors that influence the decision-making of the authorities and public behavior. It has negative consequences for the development of the democratic community and fair electoral cycles.
The creation of the European Union was important in the post-War era when the financial situation was dangerous for the whole region. Support of other states was crucial for surviving and functioning the international market. Nowadays, it is possible to assume that the state of affairs is more balanced and regulated. However, the European Union has to arrange the majority of actions and decisions with each other which causes noticeable problems. For example, the recovery of the USA after World War II was faster because the system was more dynamic and flexible (Wood, 2012). The necessity to coordinate the activities and the operations made the European Union a powerful but conservative and bureaucratic system. The governments of the countries do not have a unique solution to this problem, which makes their financial situation more serious and dangerous.
Reference
Wood, S. (2012). The Euro crisis. Journal of Public Policy and Ideas, 28(1), 32–37.