Introduction
Throughout the course of the human history, people have always asked questions about the sense of life and the reasons that they have for certain actions. Some of them, especially at the initial stages of the development of the mankind, kept to the point of view that certain supernatural forces control and predetermine all actions of people and events in the world. Others, on the contrary, supported the point according to which people decide their actions and influence their lives only by themselves.
Both points of view had times of their rise and fall, but nevertheless, the uniform opinion about these issues has not yet been formed by philosophers (Schick and Vaughn, 3 – 5). Ancient Greek philosophers, medieval theologians and modern thinkers have dedicated their works to the issues of fatalism and free will, and the present essay is the reflection of the author’s opinion about these concepts. In this paper, I am going to consider the phenomena of fatalism and free will and support my argument by reputable scholarly sources information.
Basic Definitions
To begin with, it is necessary to find out the differences between the terms that people use, sometimes incorrectly, to name as they thing the same phenomenon but it is not so in reality. First of all, fatalism is the belief that Divine or other supernatural power determines all human actions and events beforehand. This is rather a theological concept. However, determinism, which is sometimes confused with fatalism, is the belief in existence of causes for all events and actions of people.
They are not necessarily divine, but rather temporal and consequential. Moreover, the concept of free will is the belief that people use their rational thinking to motivate their actions and only they can direct their deeds. At the same time, the concept of indeterminism is rather chaotic in its essence because it presupposes no actual cause – result relations of people’s past, present and future actions, and explains them as biochemical reactions that took place within a human organism. Thus, the matter to be considered in this paper is the interrelation of free will and fatalism in basic spheres of human life (Brown, 285 – 295).
Fatalism
Numerous scholars considered the concept of fatalism in their works. For example, Aristotle found fatalism to be a relative category because it is proved only if the event that was thought of as predetermined really happens in the future. On the contrary, if that event does not happen, fatalism is denied in this case. The ideas of Boethius were rather different but their essence is close to Aristotle’s ideas – fatalism can not be proven.
According to Boethius, God exists outside the temporal relations and can not determine anything for past or future. God sees everything at once and presents people the freedom to choose between the good predetermined by him or the evil. Drawing from this, it is evident that going of a soul to Hell or Heaven is predetermined not by actions of a person but by God’s decision made before the birth of the person (McCann, 582 – 598). Thus, despite of the certain criticism of fatalism, it is acknowledged as the concept that dominates the existence of the mankind.
In my opinion, fatalism is not to be absolutely recognized. It goes without saying that certain events, like death in the old age, natural aging of a person, etc. are predetermined, but the time when they happen can be influenced by the decisions made by people on themselves. For instance, healthy way of life can postpone physical aging by keeping people fit and sound. It is evident that people’s decisions are necessary for taking these steps and fatalism is not the means to explain them. However, if, for instance, a road accident happens to a person who is a qualified driver there can often be no other explanation than fate.
Fatalism can also be observed in the facts that no one chooses the family he or she is born in. There is no free will or right of free choice and this fact can be considered the predetermined destination of a certain person (Prtill, 185 – 192). Nevertheless, the activities of people in mature age can not be completely explained by determination, fate or divine will. People can only post factum try to explain somebody’s achievements as fate. In reality, the success one achieves in life and the decisions one makes throughout his or her life are predetermined by free will of this person.
Free Will
The concept of the so called free will has also been studied by numerous scholars in the history of philosophy. This concept was mainly considered by either atheist or anthropocentric philosophers who examined all events that happen to a person as the result of the choices and decision he or she makes. Machiavelli, Nietzsche and many others stated the priority of personal interests above all other motivations and defended the right for free choice of purposes and means o their achieving.
The central figure of their theories was a person who does not pay attention to all public norms and standards and goes directly to his or her outlined aim. Divine or supernatural forces were denied completely, and the world was characterized as the struggle in which only the strongest and the most decisive people will survive (Talbott, 65 – 88).
On the contrary, the criticism of free will concept also exists among the ideas of philosophers. For instance, Schopenhauer considers free will to be an invention of the human mind as in reality no human being is able to decide anything in his or her life. Everything is predetermined by the divine providence and people only have illusions of deciding something, because even their future decisions are predetermined. Another important point of the free will concept is the environmental factors that limit the freedom of decisions of people.
Even if the decision is made based on the free will of a person, certain outside factors can influence this decision because a human being can not foresee the actions of others that could influence his freedom. For example, if a person based on his or her free will decides to apply for a University position but the tutorial fee there is too high for his or her family, the decision to enter another University with lower fees becomes not free but limited and conditioned by outside factors.
These factors can be called fate, but can be considered as objective reality. In some other examples, pure free will can be observed, for instance, when people decide the circle of friends and people they want or do not want to communicate with. These steps are based on the free will and influence the further lives of people. Thus, if a certain event happens to a person because of the decision he or she made in past, not fate but the free will improperly used should be the explanation for it (Schick and Vaughn, 7 – 10).
Conclusion
To conclude the present essay, it is necessary to state that relation of fatalism and free will are quite vague in their essence. Thus, fatalism is the belief in divine force predetermining of life and actions, while free will is trust in the abilities of a person to decide everything in his or her life. Keeping to one viewpoint means denying another one, but the truth lies in the middle of the two concepts. Life in the society does not provide for absolute freedom of decisions and actions, and the outside influences on the decisions made by free will can be considered as fatalism preventing a person from realization of his or her decisions. But the absolute support of either of the concepts is not quite adequate.
Works Cited
Brown, Robert F. “Divine Omniscience, Immutability, Aseity and Human Free Will,” Religious Studies 27, 3 (2001): 285-295.
McCann, Hugh. “Divine Sovereignty and the Freedom of the Will,” Faith and Philosophy 12, (2005): 582-598.
Purtill, Richard. “Fatalism and the Omnitemporality of Truth,” Faith and Philosophy 5:2 (2001): 185-192.
Schick, Theodore and Vaughn, Lewis. Doing Philosophy An Intoduction Through Thought Experiments, Third Edition. McGraw-Hill College, 2005.
Talbott, Thomas. “Theological Fatalism and Modal Confusion,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (2003): 65-88.