Introduction
Mead refers to the first philosophy of the US foreign strategy as Hamiltonian after the country’s first secretary of the Treasury and President Washington’s most trusted adviser. The goal of American international affairs, according to Mead’s Hamiltonians, is to strengthen the country’s standing in the global economy (Mead, 2021). While they are optimistic about the advantages that will come along with the expansion of trade and the mechanisms that sustain it, they are conservative in the view that they deny the universal applicability, or even the considerable improvability, of humanity.
The Hamiltonians promoted collaboration with Britain, the top trader in the globe, throughout the first hundred years of the US independence. They promoted the United States to the forefront of global commerce after Britain’s fall in the 20th century (Immerwahr, 2019). However, their core conviction – that business was the driving force behind foreign affairs and the enabler of side effects like peace and stability –remains unchanged.
Discussion
The Jeffersonian school of international politics, which Mead identified as his second school, emerged concurrently with the Hamiltonian philosophy and in contrast to it. The cornerstone of Jeffersonian ideology is a democracy, which, in their opinion, does not arise as a pleasant byproduct of trade but rather emerges as a consequence of diligent development. The Jeffersonians are the exact antithesis of the Hamiltonians, who are romantics regarding the systems of business but cynics concerning human nature (Mead, 2021). They value individuality and worry that institutions, particularly those related to business, may taint moral character.
They have been wary of dealing with other countries as a result (Immerwahr, 2019). It is preferable to establish democracy at home than to take a chance on it in the flurry of international affairs. Although Mead likes the label nationalist, their adversaries have referred to them as isolationists. However they may be described, the Jeffersonians have always given the appearance that they do not care about, or are even hostile to, the world outside of American borders.
Despite their role as the main driver behind some of the US’s most ardent claims of interests and authority overseas, the Jacksonians share a similar home perspective. Jacksonians are ideologues who believe that democracy emerges from the people directly, in contrast to the Jeffersonians, who have a tendency to favor elitism and pass down democratic values from above (Mead, 2021). The Jacksonians, in opposition to the taciturn patriotism of the Jeffersonians, display a combative nationalism that is quick to retaliate, meticulous about honor, and unconcerned about the denial of privileges to immigrants and other inferior breeds outside of the law.
The Jacksonians, the most belligerent of the schools, have always advocated funding for defense and were never unwilling to utilize the weapons they have acquired. However, their focus in the struggle has been American triumph, not world redemption (Immerwahr, 2019). The Jacksonians do not waste time on such fanciful matters since their only priority is the tenacious protection of American dignity and interests overseas.
The Wilsonian school holds that the US has a responsibility to safeguard the world and that it is capable of being saved. The Wilsonians, who are named after the leader who supported the League of Nations and pledged to make the globe “safe for democracy,” have frequently collaborated with the Jeffersonians because they both believe that the democratic system is the most important social virtue. While Wilsonians worry that a lack of touch will weaken democracies at home, Jeffersonians worry that interaction with the outside world will do so. The United States is to rescue the world in order to preserve itself (Immerwahr, 2019).
There are several challenges for anybody attempting to revive the faltering Wilsonian endeavor. One of Biden’s fundamental presumptions, in particular, is that when nations grow, they lean on the liberal capitalist paradigm that governs the US and continental Europe. This is among the core elements that underlie the desire for a Wilsonian order (Mead, 2021). The participating nations of a Wilsonian system should be democratic and ready, and competent to handle their international affairs under liberal multinational organizations.
The idea of confluence cannot really be upheld, especially in the medium run. China, India, Russian Federation, and Turkey all appear to be less inclined than they did in the 1990s to settle on democratic values. These nations, along with several others, have advanced financially and technically not to resemble the West more but rather to grow further apart from it and chase their own geopolitical and civilizational objectives. In actuality, Wilsonianism is a uniquely European response to a uniquely European set of issues (Mead, 2021). European governments evolved a more complex framework of diplomatic and international relations than did nations in other areas of the world due to the continual threat of great-power conflict.
However, the situation in Europe has not been typical everywhere. China has been a unified nation for the majority of its history, notwithstanding occasional nomadic invasions and eras when multiple independent Chinese governments fought for dominance – like Taiwan. Both the concept of a multistate paradigm based on reciprocal recognition and the premise of a single valid state with no actual international peers are firmly ingrained in the political cultures of China and Europe, respectively. Although there have been conflicts between China, Japan, and Korea, interstate warfare was uncommon before the late 19th century.
The reality that any globalist alliance in the US foreign policy should rely heavily on Wilsonian voters will enclose those divisions. The legitimacy of Biden’s principles among American voters has, however, been considerably diminished through a period of overreach and bad political judgment. Most Americans did not view Presidents George W. Bush’s disastrous nation-building campaign in Iraq or President Barack Obama’s humanitarian intervention catastrophe in Libya as successes, and there is scant popular support for democratization efforts overseas. In view of the altered political landscape both domestically and internationally, Biden’s administration will need to re-evaluate the relationship between the Wilsonian perspective and the theories of the other schools, according to Mead (2021). It should be admitted that the Wilsonian order’s global crises offer complex issues for American officials that are likely to engage presidencies for years to come.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that the Wilsonian approach requires an exact extent of reconsideration and amendments, it still seems the best option for the US. In a world where Russia is among the most powerful nations only due to the possession of its nuclear arsenal and natural resources but still able to dictate its will to less powerful countries like Ukraine, the US should be its absolute opposite and promote different values. It should rely on the principles of cooperation but not oppression of developing states, appeal to democratic values but not suppress people, and use instruments of soft power but not military force.
It might be assumed that the US administration can somehow combine the principles of Wilsonians and Hamiltonians – the dominance and victory over the Russian outrage should be achieved via international cooperation and economic superiority. Given the fatal global catastrophe that is possible after the nuclear war, the Jacksonian doctrine should be limited to the greatest degree. Thus, the four schools are a valuable instrument to evaluate a country’s foreign policy and define its further directions.
References
Immerwahr, D. (2019). How to hide an empire: The history of the greater United States. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Mead, W. R. (2021). The end of the Wilsonian era: Why liberal internationalism failed. Foreign Affairs, 100(1), 1–6.