Introduction
Modern Georgia is still waiting for a complete embrace of Europe despite its objectives. Georgia attained more long-lasting independence when the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991 (Lejava, 2021). Even while the new state made erratic internal policy decisions, its foreign policy compass was once more consistently pointed toward the West. However, today’s Georgia frames its European destiny in rather grand but frequently unfavorable terms (Lejava, 2021). Many of its inhabitants believe that the country’s objectives for Europe are an indefinitely drawn-out undertaking. Although Georgians may perceive a glimmer of optimism in the potential of closer links with Europe, this hope is frequently as elusive as the bright future envisioned by the Soviet Union’s disastrous communism decades before. Thus, the paper aims to discuss how the European integration process reflects on Georgia’s internal politics.
Integration Theory
Integration is the process by which political players in several separate national contexts are convinced to transfer their allegiances, expectations, and political actions toward a new center whose institutions have authority over the pre-existing national states or demand that they do. This wide concept covers both a political and social process, such as the shifting of loyalties (Wiener & Diez, 2009). Given the degrees of political interconnectivity within it, Europe has consequences for the future of democracy in both the general system and its constituent sections (Chryssochoou, 2009). In many ways, the concept of organized synarchy expands on the first edition’s portrayal of the EU as a confederal consociation and represents the next phase in the development of the bigger entity.
Political Instability
The electorate was given a choice to create a coalition administration for the first time, breaking Georgia’s tradition of one-party dominance. The opposition parties and their supporters and even the general public expected this. Georgia lost the opportunity. The opposition parties have launched a widespread protest and a call for new elections while refusing to enter parliament. The opposition sees only two options for Georgia’s political future: new elections or the continuation of the rule of Georgian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili (Mikhelidze, 2020). However, it seems improbable that there would be a prolonged revolutionary movement to bring about fresh elections and significant political change in the nation, given the coronavirus epidemic. Georgia is most likely destined for another four years of oligarchic governance.
That will include unofficial government, covert policymaking, lax checks and balances, and a court swayed by politics and under the power of various interest groups. The EU’s flexibility and stabilization strategies have failed after the 2020 election, producing a parliament with only one party (Mikhelidze, 2020). The signing of the association agreement with Georgia in 2014 was insufficient to start the process of democracy’s required evolution; the EU might take a significant follow-up in the form of political and financial conditionality (Mikhelidze, 2020). At least formally, Georgia is still committed to moving toward European integration. This offers the EU significant leverage to evaluate the activities of the Georgian administration and its shortcomings in the democratic transition process. More unpredictability and volatility in an area that has historically shown to be very flammable cannot be tolerated by Brussels. However, it must recognize that genuine democratic transition is the only path to long-term stability.
EU Perspectives on Georgia’s Integration
The EU assesses a nation’s democratic institutions for stability and economic strength when evaluating membership applications. The European Commission first provides a thorough assessment of a country’s application, either proposing that it be accepted as an official candidate or explaining the changes that must be made for it to do so. The European Council and the EU General Affairs Council, composed of ministers of foreign affairs from member states, must both approve of its suggestion (Why is Georgia struggling to join EU?, 2022). A nation may begin negotiations on an accession strategy after granting candidate status. However, being an official candidate does not ensure membership. Georgia appeared to have the easiest path forward five or six years ago, which would have come as a surprise (Waal, 2022). The nation is now further away from EU membership than its peers due to a divisive and resentful ruling elite.
The leaders of the bloc are concerned by recent democratic regress. The panel gave twelve suggestions for political change; they included steps to strengthen the legal system, promote media freedom, and combat corruption. The term “de-oligarchization” was used to describe the main problem. That may reference the billionaire and former prime minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, who built his money in post-Soviet Russia. He asserts to have left politics, having resigned from his position as Georgian Dream chairman in 2021 (Why is Georgia struggling to join EU?, 2022).
The opinions of EU respondents on the risks to Georgia are a further crucial subject to discuss in the EU’s perceptions of Georgia. Political elites in the EU perceived Georgia to be externally vulnerable due to its connection with Russia and Russia’s policy against Georgia (Gamkrelidze, 2022). However, most respondents emphasized that Georgia’s internal military conflicts and weak political institutions were the main causes of micro-level instability.
Nevertheless, since the middle of the 1990s, Georgia has made enormous strides in modernizing its political system, economy, and military (Stronski & Vreeman, 2017). However, the new geopolitical and geoeconomic difficulties it faces appear less severe than the previous ones and will call for skillful leadership. Assuming Tbilisi continues on its present path, Georgia has so far put in place several sensible policies that it does not need to completely overhaul its current framework as many of its neighbors do (Stronski & Vreeman, 2017). The nation has a proven track record of reforms, conformity with EU ideals, and a strongly pro-European population (Papuashvili, 2022). However, in recent years, the nation’s support for EU membership has increased, highlighting the significance of the EU awarding the nation’s candidate status.
Conclusion
The subsequent generation of Georgians, those born in the post-Soviet era of freedom, will be tasked with transforming idealized conceptions of Europe into a more tangible reality. After their forebears left the post-Soviet environment, they might be able to carve out a place for Georgia in a globalized placelessness, if they can develop a successful political vision. Otherwise, a nation’s identity will be more tightly defined if there is no willingness or ability to overcome a peripheral consciousness. One possibility for the future is that Georgia will be identified as a connecting but marginal corridor between East and West on the geopolitical map. Another possibility is that Europe’s balcony, a gorgeous feature that looks out over the rest of the globe but is not entirely within the European house, will be used to represent its position.
References
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