The dropping of an Atomic bomb in Nagasaki followed the prior bombing of Hiroshima military base. On August 9, 1945, the third atomic bomb to be ever made, ‘Fat Man,’ was detonated 1,650 feet above the Japanese city of Nagasaki unleashing untold agony to the city’s residents. Following the Nagasaki bombing, Japan surrendered unconditionally, thereby bringing the Second World War to an end.
The plan of the United States’ government was to coerce Japan into surrender through its previous atomic bombing of Hiroshima. However, a contingency plan, the US government planned a second bombing in the Japanese city of Kokura on the 11th of August. Expectations of bad weather and the smoke hovering above Kokura (as a result of other bombings nearby) prompted the change of bombing venue to Nagasaki.
The detonation of the atomic bomb at Nagasaki produced a destructive force that was equal to twenty-two thousand tons of TNT. There are several historical developments that led to the Nagasaki bombing. President Truman, his advisors, and the Allies had given Japan the ultimatum to surrender unconditionally or face ‘prompt and utter destruction’ (Stimson 12).
On the other hand, Japan was ready to negotiate for peace with the Allies, but the country’s top administration was uncomfortable with the call for ‘unconditional surrender.’ This paper explores the political background of the Nagasaki atomic bombing concerning major political players such as the United States and Russia.
The decision to deploy an atomic bomb over Nagasaki was preceded by the success of the Manhattan Project. President Harry Truman had just taken over leadership from Franklin Roosevelt, and he was faced by the complexities that surrounded the Japan-US standoff (Schelling 102). In his view, Truman could end the war, but the cost of this decision was too high.
Both of the parties that were involved in the conflict were exhausted after being involved in the active war for over four years. The Japanese were reeling from the constant fire bombings from American forces. However, Japan still had an army of over two million soldiers who were guarding the country’s strongholds against further American invasion.
Meanwhile, the American forces had already occupied the Japanese cities of Okinawa and Iwo Jima. From these two cities, the American forces continued to firebomb Japanese towns. There was no end in sight when it came to the conflict between Japan and the US. Consequently, President Truman had a difficult decision to make.
The Hiroshima atomic bomb was detonated on the sixth of August 1945 and “two days later, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan” (Linethal and Engelhardt 37). Before the atomic bombing took place, the Japanese envoy to Russia had been urging his government to surrender. However, the Japanese administration responded to the envoy’s call by requesting him to arrange a meeting between Russia and Japan.
Furthermore, both Winston Churchill and Harry Truman were hoping that Japan would surrender before Russia came into the conflict. According to personal confessions of Walter Brown, the assistant to the US Secretary of State, Russia was not supposed to “get in so much on the kill, thereby being in a position to press claims against China” (Schelling 68).
The Soviet Union’s vested interests in China were the main source of suspicion between Russia and the United States. Thereby, even at the Potsdam Conference, the relationship between Russia and the United States was still being dictated by underlying currents. Experts have argued that Truman’s haste in deploying the atomic bombs was prompted by the need to keep Russia away from the conflict.
Furthermore, the show of military might that was to accompany the atomic bombings was supposed to silence Russia. Harry Truman’s diary confirms some of his mistrust against Russia.
For example, in one passage Harry Truman is happy that America was the country possessing nuclear weapons and not the Germans or the Russians. Truman notes that it was “certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler or Stalin’s crowd did not discover this atomic bomb” (McCullough 122).
Several people were opposed to the use of atomic bombs against Japan, but the most prominent voice was that of atomic scientist Leo Szilard. Szilard’s main concern was that using the atomic bomb would lead to a vicious arms race, especially between the United States and Russia. The United States had earlier refused to conduct a bomb demonstration as a warning to Japan.
This refusal was prompted by a possible failure of the weapon. Henceforth, the US would have appeared militarily inferior to Russia and Germany (Rhodes 42). Truman and his close confidants opted for the unpopular decision to drop weapons of mass destruction on Japanese soil.
When the Hiroshima bomb was dropped, Russia made a quick decision to join the ‘winning side’ of the conflict with the hope of sharing the spoils of the war. On the other hand, Szilard’s fears were confirmed through the events that transpired during the cold war.
The Nagasaki bombing was preceded by various political developments. These developments dated back to the beginning of the Second World War and proceeded through Roosevelt and Truman’s administrations.
Russia had both direct and indirect influences on the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings. Furthermore, the events surrounding the Nagasaki bombing set the stage for the showdown between Russia and the United States during the Cold War.
Works Cited
Linethal, Edward T., and Tom Engelhardt. History wars: The Enola Gay and other battles for the American past, London, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 1996. Print.
McCullough, David. Truman, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2003. Print.
Rhodes, Richard. Making of the Atomic Bomb, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2012. Print.
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword, New York, NY: Yale University Press, 2008. Print.
Stimson, Henry L. “The decision to use the atomic bomb.” SAIS Review 5.2 (1995): 1- 15. Print.