According to Kant’s philosophy, the distinction between a person and a thing runs through several basic criteria, largely related to independence and dignity. A thing is only a means to finitude, that is, to any completion, while man contains completion in himself. Man differs in his finitude from the infinity of the world, but he is valuable in himself and cannot be used as a means. This determines autonomy, that is, the independence of a person. Implicit autonomy determines the inner ability of a person to do anything and, accordingly, the ability to distinguish between good and evil. According to Kant, a person, in contrast to a thing, has a moral navigator that is common to everyone. It is because of the opportunity to master the concepts of good and evil and use them morally a person differs from a thing. A person cannot be used as a means and therefore, unlike a thing, has no value.
Dignity should be perceived as an innate and inalienable trait of any person, regardless of social institutions, class, and experience. At the same time, dignity is not only an internal concept since it is something that can be given by one person to another, such as respect or favor. This means that the concept of human dignity may not always be strictly intrinsic. Concepts about the transfer or innateness of dignity can have a significant impact on medical practice. A doctor who believes that it is they who give dignity to other people by paying attention to them runs the risk of falling into misconceptions that distort moral representations. At the same time, a physician who professes equal human dignity and believes it is intrinsic is able to respect the patient’s autonomy. However, this, in turn, can create treatment dilemmas if patient autonomy conflicts with the specialist’s professionalism. In any case, a medical worker who professes human dignity as an inalienable value follows key principles of bioethics such as autonomy and justice more closely.
By the uselessness of dignity in medical practice, McLean means that talking about criteria for dignity in bioethics only distracts from the primary immediate goal of treatment. Somerville argues in her book that when dialogue in bioethics comes to a general agreement, the term dignity seems useful and relevant. If it is impossible to agree, the concept of dignity is depreciated and becomes useless. However, the idea of dignity can vary and be distorted in such a way that the very dignity of a person will be humiliated; there will be no dignity in a person. There is a constructionist approach to human perception, in which the personality must meet the criteria to be considered truly human. This is the third use case for this concept, in which the misuse of this view becomes really dangerous.
A person can be determined by a higher awareness and cognitive ability, which determines the knowledge of their goal on Earth and moral criterion. However, some people with mental disabilities may thus actually not fit the criteria for being human. Consequently, their external dignity will be diminished by those who believe that their internal dignity is worthless. This is a terrible mistake in moral judgment and is very dangerous for medical ethics. Moreover, the question of human dignity arises in the case of embryos and embryos, which significantly complicates the issue of moral responsibility and giving dignity to a person in the case of an abortion procedure. Thus, the external dignity of a person comes from the field of social experience and the attitude of other people to a person, which is most valuable in bioethics and medical practice. The pursuit of dignity in each person can help a doctor make truly valuable ethical decisions and can help other professionals make them.