Introduction
Maritime technology has advanced to modern ships equipped with sophisticated techniques, including e-navigation, onboard information systems, and bridge resource management systems. Despite the advancement in bridge resources, human factors remain the leading cause of maritime accidents. According to the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), individual errors and technological failures are responsible for most mishaps involving ships and watercraft.
Human factors and technological failures cause most maritime accidents. The report aims to investigate the role of human factors and technological failures in contributing to maritime accidents. It provides recommendations to maritime organizations to enhance their bridge resources and prevent such incidents in the future. It focuses on an incident where an English Cargo inbound vessel ran aground after leaving the navigational channel while turning in good visibility while approaching its berth at Liverpool Port, to demonstrate how failures in human resources and technological inefficiencies contributed to the accident.
The study employs an ontological method to research information and a systematic review technique to comprehensively analyze and review past literature on the topic, ensuring objectivity and minimizing bias. Findings indicate that human factors, including incompetence, poor communication, technological failures, and a lack of situational awareness, among other individual failures, are primarily responsible for most maritime accidents, as observed in the case study. The research recommends training on competency, situation awareness, and visual observation skills to equip crews with the necessary experience to prevent similar accidents in the future.
Incident Summary
The accident occurred on September 5, 2022, at approximately 4 a.m. Several factors contributed to the occurrence, including negligence and technological failures of the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) and the Automatic Identification System (AIS). The report findings can be used by the International Maritime Organization and other relevant maritime bodies, such as the MAIB, to improve safety and efficiency in water transport. Some limitations of the research include the lack of sufficient studies on the topic.
On this day, the English Cargo Ship 450 ran aground after straying from the navigational channel during a turn while coming to Liverpool Port despite clear conditions. The incident resulted in minor damage to the vessel and the beach. Additionally, the crew members on board sustained some minor injuries. The ship was transporting wheat from the Scottish port of Greenock to Liverpool. The vessel had 50 people on board, comprising 15 armature bridge team members, of which nine were watch-standing personnel, andthree were guarding the starboard. However, the crew was short of a pilot to help maneuver through the waterway.
The English Cargo Ship was sailing south towards Liverpool port at an estimated speed of 10-12 knots, with the Automatic Identification System (AIS) in passive mode, not transmitting the AIS signal. Some of the deck lights were on to illuminate the deck for the crew manning the vessel, and visibility was good throughout the sailing journey.
The Cargo bridge team had notified the local VTS station in Liverpool Port of its arrival and observed the reported voyage. Moments before the accident, the VTS failed to track and monitor Cargo’s movement towards the western terminal. At around 3:58 a.m., the Cargo Ship began drifting towards the banks of the western terminal along the channel. After two minutes, the vessel reached a depthless waterway it could not navigate.
Causal Factors
Generally, cargo ships rely on several factors to facilitate smooth sailing along the channels. However, if the aspects are not performed accordingly, captains might find it challenging to operate the vessels effectively. Several causal factors contributed to the incident. For instance, the AIS were wrongly set in a passive receiver mode, limiting the transmission of information (Lan et al., 2023). This aspect made it difficult for the crew members to communicate effectively with their counterparts.
Failure made it challenging for the team to identify the ship’s deviation from its waterway (Zhang et al., 2022). Although the starboard guard detected the straying, they didn not alert the other team members, thereby facilitating the incident. The mentioned factors played a significant role in enhancing the chances of the marine accident.
Pilotage Exemption
Maritime voyages are full of anticipated and abrupt risks and accidents. As a result, it is advisable for ships, regardless of their nature, to have pilots on standby to assist during emergencies such as impending collision, running aground, or capsizing (Goerlandt & Liu, 2023). The Cargo Ship, however, was on a pilotage exemption with no pilot for emergency services. Since there was no pilot, the deviation could not be corrected, causing the vessel to run aground.
Unfamiliarity of the Crew
Generally, every sailing ship requires the bridge team members to have sufficient experience to read and understand the navigational information from the Electronic Chart Display and Information System for a safe voyage.However, the bridge team of the Cargo Ship was full of trainees who had inadequate knowledge of navigation and the use of the ECDIS, leading to the failure to notice and read the signs of the vessel’s deviation from the main way (Ma et al., 2022).
The nine watch-standing personnel monitoring the traffic situation did not have enough expertise to track the ship’s movement correctly. Similarly, the starboard noticed the deviation but, due to a lack of experience, failed to alert the other bridge team members. Furthermore, the ship lacked an experienced pilot to help return it to the right direction.
Inadequate BRM Techniques
The BRM techniques failed to identify the impending accident after failing to notice the mistake. The VTS operator lost track of the Cargo Ship while approaching the Liverpool port, failing to provide the essential sailing information (Lan et al., 2022). The VTS machine, which had been functioning properly, suddenly became faulty, affecting the track monitoring work.
Due to the machine’s faultiness, the operator was unable to monitor the traffic situation and identify the navigation mistake that led the ship to run aground. In addition, the cargo ship’s radar failed to trace the correct waterway and provide navigation guidance for the captain. Insufficient BRM technique was evident in the poor communication among the bridge team and the AIS dysfunction. Finally, the Cargo Ship lacked a pilot to provide emergency services during the incident.
Poor Track Monitoring
During the incident, the crew failed to notice the deviation from the navigational channel. The starboard guards realized the straying but failed to inform the other bridge team members to shift the Cargo sideways (Lan et al., 2023). Additionally, the VTS operator and the watch-standing personnel did not properly monitor the traffic situation, failing to notice the deviations from the right waterway.
Poor Communication
The case summary depicts poor communication as a significant factor facilitating the incident. Poor communication between the cargo ship’s starboard guards and other bridge team members led to the failure to turn the starboard until the last moment of the accident (Goerland, 2023). In addition, there was reduced interaction between the bridge team and the VTS operator because the AIS was in a passive mode, restricting information.
Poor Organization
Despite the ECDIS operating correctly, the crew lacked familiarity with sailing. In addition, the frigate had no pilot on board to facilitate the maneuver. The navigational training of trainees was conducted during sailing, affecting the functionality of the bridge team (Zhang et al., 2022). Moreover, the BRM techniques were inadequate and could not support the operations. Finally, the poor organization was demonstrated by the failure to put the AIS on active mode to allow both reception and sending of information, leading to flawed communication between the VTS operator and the bridge team.
Analysis: Human Error
The vessel had poor organization in the teams and the operation system. The bridge team had no proper teamwork, which led to miscommunication between the crew members. The starboard guards, the nine watch-standing personnel, and the captains did not coordinate well. Similarly, poor organization saw the ship begin navigation without a pilot on board despite the emergency cases in maritime voyages (Wang & Fu, 2022). In addition, the lack of organization saw the Cargo being manned by trainees with insufficient navigation knowledge.
Despite the availability of AIS and VTS technology, there was evidence of poor communication between the ship’s bridge team and the VTS and AIS operators. The starboard guards noticed the deviation but failed to inform the other crew members to shift the cargo sideways to return the ship to the correct waterway (Wu et al., 2022). The poor communication limited the nine watch-standing personnel from coordinating with the other bridge team members.
Furthermore, the accident was caused by the incompetence of the Cargo’s bridge team and the VTS operator. The English Cargo Ship bridge team lacked situational awareness to properly read, understand, and correctly interpret the information from the ECDIS. They failed to realize that the ship was straying from the main seaway, causing the vessel to run aground. Moreover, the VTS operator lacked situational awareness by failing to track, monitor, and provide the correct information to the crew.
Recommendations
Situational Awareness
Companies should train their crews on situational awareness and competency. The accident was primarily caused by a lack of situational awareness among the crews, who could not read the signs to notice the ship deviating from the main waterway, leading the vessel to run aground (Goerlandt & Liu, 2023).The crews should be taught about possible maritime mishaps and their causes, and how to identify and anticipate a counterstrategy to deal with the problems.
Visual Observation
Good observation skills are essential for reading navigation lines, identifying distant objects, and avoiding a collision during sailing. Maritime accidents are not limited to collisions between ships but can result from being hit by other objects along the seaway or deviating from the waterway, leading to running aground (Park et al., 2022).It is, therefore, important for crews to be able to identify possible accidents early enough and maneuver to avoid them and related accidents.
Competency and Proper Communication
Companies should train their crews on competency and proper communication. Skills such as the last maneuver, navigating narrow seaways, and using radio communications are essential for pilots and other crew members (Sui et al., 2023). Similarly, the organization needs to train the bridge team on using BRM equipment such as the ECDIS, AIS, and radars. In addition, the organizations should train their personnel to set the minimum distance to clear stationery targets and the dangers of assuming radar echoes.
Conclusion
Generally, human factors and technological failures remain the highest contributors to most maritime accidents globally. Human errors of the crews and technological failures caused the English Cargo Ship grounding. Some of the causal factors included poor communication, lack of organization, and incompetence, which contributed to poor coordination between the bridge teams of the ship and the VTS operator, thereby leading to the accident. To prevent similar incidents in the future, the companies must improve their bridge resource management by training on competency, visual observation skills, and situational awareness among the personnel.
References
Goerlandt, F., & Liu, H. (2023). Readability of maritime accident reports: a comparative analysis. Maritime Policy & Management, 1-13. Web.
Lan, H., Ma, X., Ma, L., & Qiao, W. (2023). Pattern investigation of total loss maritime accidents based on association rule mining. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 229, 108893. Web.
Li, H., Ren, X., & Yang, Z. (2023). Data-driven Bayesian network for risk analysis of global maritime accidents. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 230, 108938. Web.
Ma, L., Ma, X., Lan, H., Liu, Y., & Deng, W. (2022). A data-driven method for modeling human factors in maritime accidents by integrating DEMATEL and FCM based on HFACS: A case of ship collisions. Ocean Engineering, 266, 112699. Web.
Park, Y. S., Jeong, J. S., & Aydogdu, Y. V. (2022). Advances in maritime safety. Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 10(11), 1721. Web.
Sui, Z., Wen, Y., Huang, Y., Song, R., & Piera, M. A. (2023). Maritime accidents in the Yangtze River: A time series analysis for 2011–2020. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 180, 106901. Web.
Wang, Y., & Fu, S. (2022). Framework for process analysis of maritime accidents caused by the unsafe acts of seafarers: A case study of ship collision. Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 10(11), 1793. Web.
Wu, B., Yip, T. L., Yan, X., & Soares, C. G. (2022). Review of techniques and challenges of human and organizational factors analysis in maritime transportation. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 219, 108249. Web.
Zaib, A., Yin, J., & Khan, R. U. (2022). Determining the role of human factors in maritime transportation accidents by fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA). Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 10(3), 381. Web.
Zhang, Y., Zhai, Y., Chen, J., Xu, Q., Fu, S., & Wang, H. (2022). Factors contributing to fatality and injury outcomes of maritime accidents: A comparative study of two accident-prone areas. Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 10(12), 1945. Web.