Introduction
David Hume’s line of reasoning against Paley-style design arguments, in connection with the modern fine-tuning argument for God’s existence, is insightful. Design argument entails that the world is bordering on a finely tuned machine that is intricate but effective (Eshleman 23). This fine-tuning argument entails a machine that has a designer as the cause and the manufacturing of the machine as the effect (Eshleman 24). Therefore, it is possible to consider God as the designer of the world, as well. This paper focuses on Hume’s criticisms of the classical design argument which is, the designer needs not to be God.
Hume’s Objection – the designer needs not to be God
According to Swinburne’s paper on fine-tuning in the Eshleman text, Hume advances objections to the classical design argument. The subject of the cause in Paley’s fashion design arguments is vivid where Hume claims that the designer of the world needs not to be God (Eshleman 16). The subject of the cause elicits a number of questions. For instance, how can we acknowledge the cause of occurrence of an entity, founded on facts of distinctive effects, significantly when we are not familiar with these effects? “House” or “painting” is evidence for an intelligent designer only because we have in times past seen “house” and “builder” or “painting” and “artist” associated.” (Eshleman 18)
In Hume’s argument, the question of whether the origin of the world is an outcome of nature or the creation of God is vivid. Hume argues that limited information about the cause of the world is available (Eshleman 19). This is clearly a significant reason why Hume criticizes the design argument on the subject of the cause of the world. William Paley’s argument of design considers that the world is comparable to the fine-tuning argument of a machine that serves its purpose resourcefully. It is owing to this claim that the existence of God as the designer or the cause of the world exists.
Primarily, Hume reasons that it is possible to establish the fundamental connection flanked by a cause and the effects by a continuous harmony on the basis of the two actions (Eshleman 19). Therefore, Hume claims that it is not correct to conclude the cause of every effect except when familiar with the actions continuously combined. For example, it is evident that when planting seeds, the outcome is germination. This is given that there is apparent knowledge of seeds germinating after planting. In this regard, there exists a continuous relationship flanked by this distinctive feature of germination and the seeds right for planting.
On the contrary, in the instance of the cause of the presence of the world, no one is familiar with the continuous relationship flanked by the cause (God) and the effect (making of the world). This is given that the creation of the world was one occasion. In particular, it is unlikely that we are familiar with this occasion.
Fine-Tuning Argument
According to Eshleman in Observations on David Hume and the Argument from Fine‐Tuning (2008) the Fine-Tuning argument is a contemporary deviation of the design argument of the presence of God. This is an argument that originated from the advancement of the Big Bang theory of the 20th century. Hume fails to understand how the world is relevant to the fine-tuning argument of a machine (Eshleman 23). In his argument, he finds it unbelievable that God can design the world to function brilliantly such as a finely tuned argument of a machine without any sign of error. Cleanthes or Paley suggests this argument to justify the reality of God.
Cleanthes compares the features of God with that of architects whose design of the world functions in a mechanized style (Eshleman 27). Cleanthes’s correlation is in contact with human innovation. This implies that fine-tuning means there is orderliness on the features of the world. For instance, in case human beings have the ability to manufacture machinery then the correlation entails that anything formed with orderliness and design in the world ought to have a skillful designer.
Machines and the designer have a cause-and-effect connection for Cleanthes. Human beings make use of their knowledge and experience to manufacture machines such as the cause and the machinery works such as an effect. In Cleanthes’s comparison, God stands as the cause of the world whereas the world stands for the effect that works as an outcome. It is, therefore, possible to acknowledge God as the definite cause of the world. This is given that God can interrelate with the world similar to the way human beings work with machines.
On the other hand, as Cleanthes’s line of reasoning provides an active comparison to justify God’s existence, the author’s reasoning is limited. Philo is a character in the book who plays a doubtful role of Hume by criticizing Cleanthes’ design argument. Philo indicates that the comparison is insubstantial. Conversely, he points out that the faults are in relation to man’s belief in God. These faults justify Philo’s atheist perspective. This shows that he does not object to the existence of God, but criticizes the line of reasoning of God’s existence.
An example of this argument by Philo is the subject of wickedness on earth. The frequent man’s perception of God is a perfect picture of a man who is greatly knowledgeable and compassionate. Therefore, it is disputable that Philo argues the existence of wickedness in the world designed by God who is knowledgeable and compassionate. Demea a character of an inflexible religious line of reasoning maintains that evil is an outcome of man’s sinfulness (Eshleman 27). It is debatable that human beings can allow innovations to take on evil actions. This argument is on the basis of God being knowledgeable and compassionate to allow evil to prevail on earth.
It turns out to Philo that Cleanthes’s comparison is not matching with the man’s view of God as knowledgeable and compassionate. It is not practical for God to show compassion and still permit the wickedness of mankind. This is an argument that Philo manages to make use of with the intention of criticizing the character of God in comparison to his existence.
In case this argument is valid in the present day, in opposition to Hume’s perspective of the past, Philo’s argument would notwithstanding, be applicable. This is because man’s sinful acts are evident in the present day such as illness and terror campaigns. It is apparent in the media that everyone fears the wickedness of man that holds back the safety or wellbeing of human beings. For instance, a number of Arabian countries worry about the evil nature of the West. On the other hand, the West worries about the evil nature of the Arabs, with reference to Terrorism. While every country regards one another as terrorists, and it is evident that God is the creator of mankind and the entire world, then this goes against the matchless feature of God in the human mind.
The subject of the wickedness of man may not back up the man’s perspective of God as the compassion designer. In addition, it does not invalidate the design comparison. God can stand as the only draftsman of the design and be knowledgeable. This is not an insinuation that God will be of extreme moral quality. Wickedness may form part of the creation of God and act as an objective so that human beings can realize what is morally right. Essentially, God can be an unresponsive creator who embarked on his test of designing the world exclusive of the intention of morally right things or bad but only existence.
It is evident that there is a probability that God created the earth with exclusive moral rights or bad objectives. Wickedness is likely to be a fraction of a structured creation that provides backup to Paley’s design argument but does not disprove it. The fine-tuning argument example of a machine or an object such as a watch as well describes a well-planned existence where every fraction has a given objective (Eshleman 28). Therefore, Philo’s argument on the subject of wickedness merely criticizes the perception of God with the compassion in his creation of the world but not the comparison of design. “Watches are well suited to the tasks of measuring time. Therefore, watches are produced by an intelligent designer”. (“Observations on David Hume” 28).
It is evident that Hume’s argument disputes the assumption obtained from Paley’s design argument. The line of reasoning of design considers the world as a creation of God. In the case where this line of reasoning is justifiable that the world has a creator, then it is correct to refer to the creator as the cause of the world. On the other hand, Hume’s line of reasoning disputes the idea that an individual can learn about the causes of a number of effects on the basis of merely a distinctive occasion. In this regard, we cannot hold as true the cause of the world is on account of the creator. Possibly the cause of the world is a thing completely varying from the creator. Or it can be possible that the world is the outcome of a natural occurrence.
Hume attempts to justify that merely subsequent to familiarizing with continuous correlation with cause and effect that we learn about what leads to an effect. This is by reserving the scientific fact and religious accounts on the subject of the creation of the world. Additionally, the design of the world only took place once. This means that no one is familiar with the continuous correlation of cause and effect. Therefore, it is possible to conclude the cause of the world. On the other hand, the design of the world is distinctive and contrary to any other occasion that human beings are familiar with. Consequently, human beings have limited instances of cause and effects to put to comparison. In any case, comparison intended to bring about correlation need to form part of this argument.
Conclusion
Finally, it is possible to criticize Hume’s line of reasoning that he considers the earth as an effect. When it turns out possible to show that the world is not an effect, Hume’s line of reasoning will lose credibility. This is given that his line of reasoning stands completely on the argument of correlation on the basis of cause and effect.
Works Cited
Eshleman, Andrew. “Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Religion”. Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: East Meets West. Ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. 12-28. Print.
“Observations on David Hume and the Argument from Fine‐Tuning”. Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: East Meets West. Ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. 23-28. Print.