The question of individual moral obligations concerning the subject of personal greenhouse gas emissions has become particularly relevant with the increase of global warming. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong explores this issue and argues that individual actions do not have the impact to sway such global phenomena, claiming that, thereby, individuals do not have moral obligations to regulate their greenhouse gas emissions. As a counterargument, Avram Hiller states that both human lives and individual human actions have significant causal effects, and it is crucial for people to be morally responsible for their greenhouse gas emissions.
Sinnott-Armstrong presents the gravity of the issue of global warming by describing how it affects and will continue to affect people around the world, pointing out that this is a dire global problem. However, Sinnott-Armstrong also concedes that this problem should not affect how individuals live their lives (333). He illustrates this by describing how wasteful driving by separate individuals cannot be viewed as morally wrong (Sinnott-Armstrong, 343). Sinnott-Armstrong supports his main point by claiming that individual moral obligations are not the same as collective moral obligations (Sinnott-Armstrong, 333). Since there are no moral principles that effectively support the need for individual moral obligations, it is governments, rather than individuals, that should be responsible for greenhouse gas emissions.
Hiller presents a different point of view on this issue, claiming that ICI, or individual causal inefficacy, fails to grasp the impact of both individual human lives and single individual actions (349). As a result, taking leisurely Sunday drives and believing that they are not harmful in any way is also wrong. Hiller states that taking wasteful drives and discounting any responsibility for them is prima facie wrong (350). In other words, Hiller objects to Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim that individual actions do not have sufficient impact and that leisurely Sunday drives are permissible.
While Hiller argues for individual moral responsibility when it comes to personal greenhouse gas emissions, Sinnott-Armstrong disclaims this obligation. The main reason for the rebuttal appears to be the belief that collective moral obligations are not the same as individual ones (Sinnott-Armstrong, 333). Sinnott-Armstrong exemplifies this by pointing out that the government’s failure to perform its specific duties does not mean that these duties become the responsibility of individuals (333). For example, if a bridge needs to be repaired, the government solely must see that it is successfully maintained (Sinnott-Armstrong, 333). Therefore, individuals should not be accountable for responsibilities that are not directly assigned to them.
Hiller, on the other hand, explains that it is within the bounds of human nature to relinquish moral responsibility for the potential harm of global phenomena (349). Since such phenomena have many possible causes and their impact is indirect, it is easier to question the influence of individual actions (Hiller, 349). Based on this, it seems that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument about the inefficiency of individual actions regarding Sunday drives and global warming is not valid. If individuals have a measurable impact on the environment, then how can they refute moral responsibility? As a follow-up, Hiller’s main point states that it is prima facie wrong to “perform an act which has an expected amount of harm greater than another easily available alternative” (352). It appears that whenever individuals can mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions, it is morally justified that they should do so.
Based on the principle that it is appropriate to replace more harmful acts with less harmful alternatives, Hiller argues that going for Sunday drives is likely to contribute to an increase in AGCC, or anthropogenic global climate change, and increase the possibility of harm (352). On the other hand, holding back from Sunday drives is an alternative without any evident harmful effects (Hiller, 352). This argument seems valid and sound as cars inevitably expel greenhouse gases, a contributing factor to global warming, which is linked to various damaging and harmful effects. Moreover, since Sunday drives are an optional activity related to an individual’s tastes and preferences, it is always possible to refrain from engaging in this activity.
Sinnott-Armstrong also touches upon the principle of harm, claiming that Sunday drives do not cause harm in most cases and that global warming will not occur unless many other people also expel greenhouse gas emissions (334). Accordingly, an individual act of driving a car on Sunday does not contribute directly to global warming and cannot cause harm. The objection to this premise is that the act of driving a car is difficult to define as an entirely individual act. Hiller also points out that there is an element of error in separating individual drives from the system of driving, which includes the building of roads and oil drilling (354). Moreover, it is implausible that the collective use of cars should lead to greenhouse gas emissions and the subsequent harm of global warming while the effects of individual driving should be close to null (Hiller, 354). Accordingly, Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection to the harmful effects of individual driving does not seem to be completely valid.
On the other hand, Sinnott-Armstrong is inclined to agree that if individual driving does release a few greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, these gases may even have a positive effect and will not cause any harm to the environment (335). The positive effect is grounded on the fact that the compounds of these gases, such as carbon dioxide and water, are beneficial for the growth of plants (Sinnott-Armstrong, 335). However, it is doubtful how insignificant individual greenhouse gas output is in the long term. If a person engaged in the habit of taking Sunday drives, it is likely that their greenhouse gas contribution would increase over time and have a more significant impact on the environment. Hiller also takes this point of view into account when presenting John Nolt’s data about the contribution of individuals to global warming (357). Based on Nolt’s calculations, each American’s lifetime contributes roughly enough greenhouse gas emissions to seriously harm one or two people from developing countries (Hiller, 357). As a result, individual impact, particularly when accumulated throughout a lifetime, is quite significant.
Consequentially, it seems that Hiller’s arguments are more valid and sound in their presentation of individual moral obligations regarding greenhouse gas emissions. Individual driving, when viewed as a recurring act incorporated into the system of driving, has much more far-reaching consequences than those presented by Sinnott-Armstrong (Hiller, 354). In addition, Sinnott-Armstrong’s view that individuals are not morally obligated to carry out the responsibilities of the government is somewhat unclear. How can we adequately define the boundaries of individual and collective moral obligations? Is it possible that some responsibilities can be shared by both individuals and the government? Moreover, as Hiller points out, similar arguments could be used to refute the causal effects of political efforts as were implemented to undermine the effects of individual driving (365). Therefore, Hiller’s arguments appear to be more valid and sound when exploring the issue of individual moral obligations and the significance of taking into account personal greenhouse gas emissions.
On the other hand, Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments are valid as well. Sinnott-Armstrong reasons that although it is very difficult to find moral principles to back up the issue of individual obligations regarding greenhouse gas emissions, it does not mean that no such principles exist (343). Furthermore, as far as global warming is concerned, only governments can considerably impact this phenomenon (Sinnott-Armstrong, 344). While it is uncertain whether governments alone can impact global warming, it is likely that government laws and regulations are crucial in decreasing the factors that contribute to this phenomenon. Thus, while Hiller’s arguments seem more valid and sound, there is still reason to take into account Sinnott-Armstrong’s claims.
Hence, Hiller’s arguments in favor of individual responsibility for acts that contribute to global warming refute Sinnott-Armstrong’s claims to refrain from individual obligations regarding greenhouse gas emissions. While Sinnott-Armstrong presents a strong position regarding the role of governments in mitigating global warming, it is made evident by Hiller that individuals are also responsible when it comes to influencing this phenomenon. Moreover, the accumulation of individual actions over a lifetime increases the impact that individuals have on global warming.