Partisanship within the workplace has never been welcomed with open arms in the democratic system of modern enterprises. Although it is obvious that avoiding favoritism in its various forms completely is impossible, there are still efficient ways to reduce the instances of partisanship in the workplace.
In a recent case study Monitoring Merit, Natasha Caverley considers the problem of partisanship within the realm of the BC Public Service. Despite the fact that Caverley addresses the problem adequately, the choice of tools and mechanisms with the help of which the merits is not complete yet.
One of the most obvious questions that need an urgent solution is who should monitor the Canadian business companies to detect the instances of politicization within the business sphere. While the existing code of conducting an audit offers exhaustive descriptions concerning the requirements for auditing process, it is still not clear who should monitor the entire process. It seems most reasonable, however, to appoint an independent observer who should check the audit. Thus, it will be possible to achieve maximum objectivity.
When dealing with the re-appointing people for the positions of commissioners for checking the companies for the instances of politicization, one must take proper precautions against the instances of partisanship among the members of the committee as well. The given goal can be achieved by establishing the policy of absolute clearness among the PSERC members on all levels, as well as providing a quality check system with strict requirements for the members of the PSERC to meet.
Hence comes the necessity to reorganize the current structure of the Office of the Merit Commissioner. It is important to note that at present, it is not efficient enough to prevent the instances of partisanship within companies because of the lack of cooperation and connection between the members of the office.
Therefore, it is highly recommended that the number of assistants should be reduced to one (since at present, there are two assistants), as well as the number of development specialists. In addition, it is desirable that the system of knowledge sharing should be introduced into the Office. With the help of the given system, a more accurate evaluation of the data becomes possible.
While Caverley does provide extensive discussion of the current standards for an audit process, as well as evaluates the work of the Merit Commissioner and the PSERC Commissioner, it seems that the report could have used more focus on the politicization issue. Although Caverley states clearly whose job it is to control a company to prevent the politicization issues from occurring, she does not provide the means to avoid the given phenomenon.
One of the possible changes to the current policy, according to Caverley, is assigning the Merit Commissioner with the duties of a PSERC Commissioner as well. According to Caverley, the given change will allow to track the instances of politicization in the workplace more efficiently by “conducting random audits of appointments in the public service to assess whether selection processes were properly applied and resulted in meritorious appointments; and whether successful candidates possessed the required qualifications for government positions” (Caverley, 2002, 2–3).
However, the given decision seems a bit rushed. To start with, it is doubtful that one can handle the responsibilities of both the Merit Commissioner and the PSERC Commissioner.
Secondly, once there is a single person at the helm of the entire process of system check, the risk of corruption increases proportionally. In addition, the qualifications that are needed to figure out whether “appointments are based on merit and whether the individuals appointed have the required qualifications for the positions” (Caverley, 2002, 3), which is the duty of a Merit Commissioner, do not match the duties of a PSERC manager, who is supposed to deal with the complaints regarding specific instances.
While the former presupposes conducting a range of general procedures, the latter involves the analysis of a specific case, which requires a more detailed consideration of the issue. Hence, it would be a reasonable suggestion to authorize the PSERC Commissioner to delegate the case to the Merit Commissioner if there is the need to consider the issue concerning a specific company more carefully.
Finally, speaking of the tools that should be used in the course of a company analysis, data collection and its further evaluation, not only random audits, but also anonymous surveys and questionnaires should be provided. Thus, it will be possible to obtain objective data.
Even though making the policy completely bulletproof to any instances of partisanship is hardly possible, it seems that with the help of the strategy outlined above, it will be possible to drive the instances of partisanship within the realm of the Canadian business world to minimum. Once the responsibilities and the strategy for the further actions of the Merit Commissioner and the PSERC Commissioner are outlined, it can be expected that the rates of politicization in the workplace are going to drop substantially.
Reference List
Caverley, N. (2002). Monitoring Merit. Toronto, Canada: IPAC.