Is It Possible to Fight an Ethical Counter Insurgency? Essay

Introduction

One of the most peculiar aspects of a post-industrial living is the fact that it now becomes increasingly more difficult for Western military contingents/units to conduct effective counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the world’s newly emerged ‘hot spots’. In its turn, this can be explained by the fact that, as time goes on, the classical theories of COIN, based upon the assumption that the insurgency should be regarded as an armed extrapolation of people’s will to challenge the political status quo, grow progressively outdated (Berger & Borer, 2007).

This is because; whereas even as recent as thirty-forty years ago, the majority of insurgents were concerned with trying to undermine the effectiveness of legitimate governments’ functioning, as the foremost precondition that would eventually allow them to overthrow these governments and to impose their own rule upon citizens, they nowadays appear to regard the significance of their armed struggle as such that represents a value of ‘thing in itself’ (Lyall & Wilson, 2009).

That is, the bulk of today’s insurgents may very well be discussed as religiously fanatical anarchists, who despise the very notions of law and order. It is specifically the prolonged state of ‘vacuum of power’, which breeds these insurgents and which is why they are being objectively interested in maintaining such a situation for as long as possible. (Kilcullen, 2005). Apparently, given the highly sectarian and purist essence of many of today’s insurgencies, they cannot be regarded as truly ‘popular’, in the conventional sense of this word.

This, however, does not seem to affect the sheer effectiveness of how today’s insurgents go about disrupting externally imposed peace and order. Partially, this can be explained by the fact that, despite lacking local populations’ support, modern insurgents have learned how to take advantage of currently available informational technologies, as a mean of popularizing their cause, and how to utilize highly urbanized areas, as their actual ‘sanctuaries’ (Hoffman, 2007).

This, of course, presents counterinsurgents with the challenge of adopting a proper conceptual approach towards rooting out ‘aimless’ insurgencies, which thrive on people’s heightened sense of religious fanaticism and their hypertrophied identity-seeking anxieties. Enough, the earlier mentioned challenge, presents counterinsurgents with another conceptual dilemma – given the qualitatively transformed nature of how today’s insurgents go about reaching their operational objectives, is it possible to fight them ethically? And, if it is possible, what should be considered the actual instrument for measuring the extent of a particular COIN operation’s ethical appropriateness?

In this paper, we will aim to substantiate the validity of an idea that, even though there can be few doubts as to the fact that, while on the line of their professional duties, counterinsurgents are being obliged to observe the classical conventions of warfare ethics, they nevertheless should be encouraged to utilize a situational approach towards adjusting these conventions to correlate with the environmental particulars of every combat-situation.

This paper is being organized as follows: In Part One, I discuss the notion of ethical counterinsurgency in regards to what appears to be the spatially and discursively transforming essence of both: the concept of insurgency and the concept of counterinsurgency. In Part Two, I explore what I believe accounted for the varying extent of British COIN operations’ effectiveness in different parts of the world. In Part Three, I discuss how the discourse on ‘human rights’ relates to the discourse on COIN. In Conclusion, I summarize the obtained insights, regarding the discussed subject matter. (1)

Main Body

Even though that, as it was mentioned in Introduction, when compared to what it used to be the case with insurgents a few decades ago, many contemporary insurgents appear to be preoccupied with striving to destabilize the political situation in their operational terrains, as not their preliminary but very often their final goal, it still represents a commonplace practice among Western theoreticians of COIN to utilize a classical definition of insurgency, provided by Galula (1964, p. 4), “Insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order”.

In its turn, this explains why the definition of insurgency, found in the most recent U.S. Army Field Manual on insurgency, still implies that insurgents pursue rationale-based objectives, “Each insurgency is unique, although there are often similarities among them. In all cases, insurgents aim to force political change; any military action is secondary and subordinate, a means to an end” (2006, p. 1-5). Nevertheless, in the light of what appeared to be the actual realities of American and British military forces conducting COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, this definition cannot be thought of as representing an undeniable truth-value. After all, as it was noted by Kilcullen (2008, p. 5), “In AQ-linked insurgencies, the insurgent may not seek to do or achieve any practical objective, but rather to be a mujahid, earning God’s favor (and hope of ultimate victory through his intervention) through the act itself”.

Therefore, throughout the consequential phases of this research, we will make a point in referring to specifically the definition of insurgency, provided by 2009 British Army Field Manual, which emphasizes that insurgents do not need to have any political aspirations of their own, for them to remain strongly committed to trying to undermine governmental authority, as such that appears being the most discursively appropriate. Nevertheless, even though that recent decade saw the emergence of a new kind of insurgency, which can be generally classified as ‘aimless’, it does not undermine the validity of a classical conceptualization as to what accounts for the technical aspects of how insurgents proceed with their agenda (Shafer, 1988).

Given the fact that insurgents cannot expect to be able to succeed in engaging the opposing military forces in conventional combat, they are being naturally predisposed towards challenging the governmental authority by the mean of undermining its integrity from within (Hocking, 1988). Hence, the qualitative nature of just about any insurgency’s objectives, which in turn can be outlined as follows:

1. to disrupt law and order,
2. to prompt citizens to indulge in sectarian violence against each other,
3. to expose government’s ineffectiveness,
4. to intimidate opponents,
5. to ensure that Medias never ceases paying attention to insurgents’ cause (Linebarger, 1963).

In their turn, these objectives determine the clearly defined ‘irregular’ essence of military tactics, deployed by insurgents, “Irregular warfare involves indirect forms of military operations while relying on any relevant force capacities to gain ‘asymmetric advantages’ and weaken or destroy the capability and power of the adversary concerned” (Berger et al., 2007, p. 913).

The foremost tactical advantages, enjoyed by the practitioners of an ‘irregular warfare’, can be listed as follows:

1. insurgents choose the time and place where they strike,
2. insurgents often enjoy the support of local populations,
3. insurgents can ‘blend’ with civilians,
4. insurgents are not being required to observe the code of conventional warfare ethics,
5. insurgents may use neighboring countries as ‘sanctuaries’.

At the same time, however, insurgents remain tactically vulnerable due to the following:

1. the organizational stages of their operations must be conducted in secrecy,
2. insurgents are often unable to get hold of effective weapons,
3. insurgents often depend on external support,
4. insurgencies’ effectiveness suffers from the internal rivalries among insurgents,
5. there is always a possibility to turn even high-ranking insurgents into informants (Zambernardi, 2010).

Nevertheless, the very realities of a post-industrial living, associated with the process of Globalization/urbanization (which presupposes the ‘out-datedness’ of national borders, in the classical sense of this word), the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the fact that last few decades saw several revolutionary breakthroughs in the field of informational technologies, provide insurgents with several previously unknown tactical advantages.

These advantages can be outlined as follows:

1. while operating in densely populated urban areas, insurgents do not only exploit their ability to ‘blend’ with locals, but also the resulting opportunity to strike at particularly ‘lucrative’ (from insurgents’ point of view) targets,
2. due to ongoing progress in the field of informational technologies (the rise of the Internet), insurgents can significantly increase the extent of their mobilizational readiness,
3. because, for the duration of last few decades, the policy of ‘multiculturalism’ has been enjoying an institutionalized status in Western countries, which in turn resulted in the creation of ‘ethnic diasporas’ in these countries, insurgents were able to expand the spatial range of their financing,
4. the enhanced promptness of news-coverages, provided by mainstream Media, allows insurgents to dramatically increase the propagandistic effect of their operations (O’Neill, 1990).

Therefore, it does not come as a particular surprise that, just as it nowadays being the case with the concept of insurgency, the concept of counterinsurgency, which British AFM Code defines as, “That military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat the insurgency, while addressing the root causes” (2009, p. 1-6), continues to undergo a discursive transformation, as well. The validity of this statement can be well illustrated in regards to what used to be the qualitative nature of American COIN operations in Vietnam (1965-1973), on the one hand, and the qualitative nature of British and American COIN operations in Iraq (2003-present).

While in Vietnam, the American troops were primarily concerned with:

1. relying on military action, as a foremost mean of suppressing insurgents,
2. focusing on protection of areas, assumed ‘secure’,
3. raiding native villages, believed to be providing ‘sanctuaries’ to Vietcong insurgents, to kill as many insurgents as possible (Burris, 2008).

In its turn, this resulted in alienating Vietnamese native population to an extent that, by the early seventies, Vietcong insurgency attained the subtleties of the full-scale national liberation war. Eventually, this left America’s politicians no other choice but to decide in favor of withdrawing American troops from Vietnam, before even a single counterinsurgent objective has been reached (Nagl, 2005).

While in Iraq, however, British and American troops deployed a new strategy towards dealing with insurgents. The foremost theoretical premise, upon this strategy, was based, is an assumption that, for a particular insurgency to be deprived of its developmental momentum, it needs to be marginalized in the eyes of natives, on whose behalf counterinsurgents supposedly act (Dobbins, 2005). In its turn, this explains why the conductance of COIN operations in Iraq by Coalition forces can be best defined as having been essential ‘quasi-military’.

That is, instead of emphasizing insurgents’ physical elimination, the occupation authorities had made a point in striving to deprive these insurgents of Iraqi people’s popular support, by the mean of

1. encouraging private contractors to invest into rebuilding Iraqi social infrastructure,
2. providing weapons and training to Iraqi provisional government’s army/police,
3. striving to eliminate insurgent leaders, rather than ordinary insurgents,
4. popularizing the cause of democracy among locals (Byman, 2003).

Such Coalition’s tactics correlated perfectly well with the guidelines as to how military commanders should go about increasing the effectiveness of COIN operations, provided by Cassidy (2006, p. 163), “Employ force minimally but credibly and persuasively; ensure there is a unified and joint civil-military interagency approach; take all measures to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the government; co-opt and include the political opposition, to include the former insurgent infrastructure into the legitimate political process”.

In its turn, this partially explains why, even though there were several objective reasons for Iraqi insurgency to be turned into a full-scale partisan-war, as was the case in Vietnam, this never happened (Robinson, 2007). Even though even today, Coalition forces in Iraq continue to sustain casualties, and even though Al-Qaeda-sponsored insurgents did succeed in opposing new Iraqi government’s attempts to establish law and order, these forces were able to reach their foremost objective of preventing insurgents from winning Iraqi people’s unwavering support (Kaufmann, 2006).

Therefore, it will only be logical, on our part, to suggest that the actual reason why the majority of Iraqis refrained from indulging in the armed struggle with foreign invaders is that the approach to suppressing Iraqi insurgents, utilized by British and American forces, was perceived by Iraqi civilians as strongly ethical (Hashim, 2006). This, however, did not have anything to do with Coalition commanders having decided to treat Iraqi insurgents as the subjects of the 1949 Geneva Convention. After all, even today, the practitioners of ‘irregular warfare’ are not being considered lawful combatants (Pavlischek, 2009).

Instead, this approach was concerned with Coalition commanders being required to observe the ‘principle of proportionality’ while designing COIN operational tactics. U.S. Army Field Manual defines this principle as follows, “The principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive about the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained” (2006, p. 7-6). Thus, there can be few doubts as to the fact that, while being formally related to the concept of ethics, the principle of ethical combat-proportionality derives from the notion of rationale-driven reasoning.

To put it plainly – the reason why today’s counterinsurgents are being required to conduct ethical COIN operations is not that it would allow them to appease the armies of human-rights activists, but because, as the representatives of Western civilization, they have moral obligations to act in a manner that would legitimize their positioning, as the guarantors of law and order (Cohen, 1945). And, for as long as natives recognize the full validity of such Western counterinsurgents’ positioning, they will be naturally inclined to side with them (Peterson, 2006).

For example, the reason why, throughout late 19^th century, fifty thousand British administrators were able to keep two hundred and fifty million Indians under control, is because while exercising their colonial authority in India, British administrators never ceased acting as the actual agents of civilized living, which in turn required them to treat native Indians justly (Banerji, 2005).

What it means is that, even though there can be no doubt as to the fact that COIN operations must be conducted ethically (that is – in full accordance to the principle of proportionality), it would be wrong to think of the notion of ‘ethical warfare’ as being synonymous to the notion of ‘ineffective warfare’. As it was pointed out by Rigden (2008, p. 12), “The key (to counterinsurgency’s success) is changing the mindset of the target audience and, sometimes, this requires tough measures and a hard approach i.e., mass movement of the population, curfews and direct military action (riot control)”.

Regardless of how carefully counterinsurgent commanders approach the task of minimizing potential harm to civilians, they should never cease being aware of a simple fact that, just as it was the case throughout history, the actual aim of military action remains the same – killing the enemy (Kaiser, 2009). In its turn, this explains one of the reasons why, even though American and British troops remained in charge of suppressing Al-Qaeda-sponsored Iraqi insurgents for more than nine years now, Iraq continues to be associated with the periodical outbreaks of sectarian violence and with much of social unrest. Just as it is being counter-productive for the counterinsurgent forces to place a hypertrophied emphasis on solely military aspects of COIN operations, it is being equally counter-productive for them to think of COIN operations’ objectives in humanitarian terms alone (de Waal & Omaar, 1994).

The soundness of this statement appears especially self-evident in the light of what accounted for the realities of most recent Iraqi and Afghani insurgencies, which point out to the fact that, as time goes on, more and more modern insurgencies grow progressively distanced from the concept of a ‘partisan-war’, and become increasingly associated with the concept of ‘global terrorism’ (Siqueira & Sandler, 2006).

And, unlike what it is being often the case with insurgents’ agenda, terrorists’ agenda, cannot have any association with the notion of ‘people’s will’, whatsoever. This is because, for terrorists, civilian populations represent a legitimate target, regardless of whether they are being related to these populations culturally/religiously, or not. Hence, the theoretical premise, upon which Western anti-terrorist policies are based, “Terrorist is an unrepresentative aberration. No negotiation with terrorists… Terrorists are psychologically and morally flawed, with personal (psychopathic) tendencies toward violence” (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 606).

Therefore, while dealing with insurgents who are essentially terrorists, counterinsurgents cannot possibly expect to be able to diminish the extent of these ‘insurgents” commitment to their agenda, by the mean of offering them amnesty and including them into the legitimate political process. The reason for this is apparent – the overwhelming majority of today’s insurgents hate the very notion of a ‘legitimate political process’ with utter passion (Caplan, 2006).

Does it mean that, since there are good reasons to think of contemporary religiously-minded insurgents as being nothing short of mentally inadequate individuals, the ‘ethical imperative’ of counterinsurgency, which stipulates that counterinsurgents must always remain ‘culturally aware’ of their operational terrains, should simply be dropped? We believe that the proper answer to this question is negative. This is because even the most bloodthirsty and irrationally minded affiliates of a ‘global jihad’ appear being culturally motivated to commit acts of terror.

As it was argued by McFate (2005, p. 43), “Neither Al-Qaeda nor insurgents in Iraq are fighting a Clausewitzian war, where armed conflict is a rational extension of politics by other means. These adversaries neither think nor act like nation-states. Rather, their form of warfare, organizational structure, and motivations are determined by the society and culture from which they come”. It is understood, of course, that due to their purist/sectarian ways, insurgents affiliated with the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism, cannot be considered as such that represent some deeper discursive issues. Still, the validity of McFate’s suggestion can be well illustrated regarding the qualitative essence of demographic trends within Muslim societies.

Given the fact that most of these societies even today remain pre-industrialized/rural, it creates the objective precondition for these societies’ members to strive to have as many children as possible, as it increases their chances of physical survival as parents because children can be turned into agricultural workers (Abernethy, 2002). And, the more there are children in a particular family, the more these children’s lives drop in value. This explains many young Muslim men and women’s willingness to become suicide bombers, for example – their very belonging to the societies where the value of one’s life is being depreciated, naturally prompt them to depreciate the value of their own lives, as well.

Therefore, even though counterinsurgents should never cease remaining ‘culturally aware’, it does not necessarily imply that they must necessarily be highly appreciative of insurgents’ cultural values, as these values often reflect its affiliates’ lessened extent of evolutionary advancement. This once again points out to the fact that the notion of ‘ethical counterinsurgency’ is being synonymous to the notion of ‘rationale-driven counterinsurgency’ (2)

As was mentioned earlier, ever since the 19^th century, the British Army adopted an integrative approach towards dealing with insurgents. This approach is being commonly discussed in terms of a so-called ‘winning hearts and minds’ concept. According to Dixon (2009, p. 357), “The British Army has used the term ‘hearts and minds’ to refer to what it claims is its less coercive approach to counter-insurgency which emphasizes winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people, the importance of politics and rejects the idea of a ‘purely’ military approach”.

Counterinsurgents’ chances in ‘winning hearts’ positively correspond to their ability to ensure emotional support, on the part of native populations. Alternatively, the notion of ‘winning minds’ refers to counterinsurgents’ varying ability to prompt native populations to come to realize the fact that it is in their very interests to affiliate themselves with the counterinsurgent cause. The key features of ‘winning hearts and minds’ approach’s practical implementation are:

• encouraging native populations to indulge in the nation-building process,
• subjecting insurgents to a ‘psychological warfare’,
• establishing objective prerequisites for the native populations to remain loyal to the counterinsurgents’ cause (Mockaitis,1995).

At the same time, however, it would be wrong to think that this particular approach has always been concerned with the British Army’s commanders striving to refrain from the utilization of direct military action, as a means of rooting out a particular insurgency. It often appears that to be able to win intellectually, culturally and technologically backward people’s ‘hearts and minds’, counterinsurgents must act as the representatives of an undisputed military/civil authority, which in turn would require them to adopt a particularly firm stance while striving to put an end to an ongoing insurgency (Maechling, 1987).

The validity of this statement can be well illustrated regarding how the British Army went about reestablishing law and order in Kenya (1953-1956). While understanding perfectly well that, if Mau Mau insurgents were allowed to expand their operational terrains, it would only be the matter of time, before they would begin receiving weapons from the Soviet Union, which would complicate the situation even further, British commanders decided to utilize the ‘preventive’ approach towards dealing with Kenyan insurgents (Berman, 1976).

This approach was concerned with British troops conducting large-scale ‘sweep and kill’ operations, as a means of preventing Mau Mau insurgents from establishing their ‘sanctuary’ in Forest Reserves. The rest of the deployed operational tactics included: subjecting civilians to a curfew and bombing Kenyan forests, where insurgents were suspected to hide (Beckett, 2007). Nevertheless, even though British COIN operations in Kenya prioritized ‘killing the enemy’ objective over ‘winning hearts and minds’ objective, they proved utterly effective – by the end of 1956, the Ma Mau rebellion came to an end.

In its turn, this can be explained by the fact that, while in Kenya, British counterinsurgents, unaffected by the considerations of political correctness, were perfectly aware that it was wining people’s ‘hearts’, which represented their foremost agenda, simply because due to the specifics of their physiological constitution, native Africans are not being endowed with much of a ‘mind’, to speak of (Lynn & Vanhanen, 2002). And, to ensure the emotional loyalty of intellectually primitive populations, counterinsurgents must be able to expose these populations to the sheer strength of their resolution to use military force – pure and simple (Mack, 1975).

The validity of this idea can be partially explored in regards to what accounted for the specifics of British counterinsurgency in Malaya (1948–1956). After having reclaimed its colonial possessions from Japan in South-East Asia, Britain had to deal with the problem of the Malayan population having grown infected with Communism, which in turn resulted in the outbreak of a so-called ‘Malayan Emergency’, which was a war between British (Commonwealth) forces and Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA).

As compared to what accounted for the essence of a tactical approach to conducting COIN operations in Kenya, the essence of British COIN operations in Malaya was fully observant of ‘winning hearts and minds’ principle (Warner, 1962). After having realized that the overwhelming majority of MNLA insurgents consisted of ethnic Chinese, British counterinsurgents had made a point in exposing MNLA rebellion as such that was utterly inconsistent with Malayan people’s interests. The soundness of such British idea was further supported by the fact that, unlike what it was the case in Kenya, British Army refrained from trying to ‘sweep clean’ Malayan insurgents’ operational terrains, which would have resulted in civilian casualties and consequently – in Malayans growing progressively alienated from the British cause.

Nevertheless, this particular species of British counterinsurgent warfare in Malaya cannot be thought of as simply the consequence of British commanders having adopted a ‘humanitarian’ stance towards dealing with MNLA, but rather as a consequence of them remaining fully aware of tactical implications of a jungle-based counterinsurgency. As it was noted by Ucko (2010, p. 23), “The jungle terrain combined with MRLA’s reluctance to engage in open battle, turned the Malayan counter-insurgency into something of a ‘shooting war’… locating and surprising the rebels was more important than outgunning them and operational success, therefore, depended on outsmarting and outmaneuvering your adversary”.

In the tactical sense of this word, the British Malayan Emergency was not any different from American Vietnam War (Deery, 2003). Yet, unlike their American counterparts, the British did succeed in rooting out the Malayan insurgency rather spectacularly. This can be explained by the fact that British counterinsurgents were able to turn the factor of racial animosity between Chinese and Malayans to their tactical advantage; and the fact that British authorities succeeded in convincing ordinary Malayans that British plight against MNLA was fully consistent with these people’s aspirations for independence (Roff, 1965).

Given the British Army’s extensive experience in conducting effective COIN operations, it was assumed that, after being deployed in Afghanistan’s province Helmand in 2001, British forces would be able to achieve their counterinsurgent objectives in that part of the world, as well. This, however, proved far from being the case. It was not only that British Task Force did not succeed in securing the entire operational terrain under their formal control, but also as time went on, the areas under British control were becoming progressively lessened in size.

According to Egnell (2011, p. 303), “British forces were completely surprised by the level of resistance from the Taliban, who launched conventional attacks on British positions throughout the summer of 2006. The widely dispersed and overstretched British forces came under fierce attack and were besieged throughout the province”. As of today, it is being assumed that two factors contributed towards preventing British COIN operations in Afghanistan from being able to reach their operational objectives: the factor of lack of intelligence information about the Taliban and the factor of deployed troops’ numerical inadequacy (Warren, 2010).

The latter factor resulted in British troops being naturally prompted to compensate for their lack of numbers with the sheer strength of their firepower, which in turn increased the extent of an affiliated ‘collateral damage’ and consequently – alienated ordinary Afghanis from the Allied cause. Nevertheless, there appears to have been another contributing factor – namely, British Task Force’s often blind adherence to the conventions of ‘winning hearts and minds’ concept, even though that this concept is only being applicable in situations when insurgents enjoy people’s popular support (Lopez, 2007).

In Afghanistan, however, Taliban insurgents were conducting an essentially sectarian/tribal ‘irregular warfare’, which means that they never ceased being alienated from the majority of ordinary Afghanis, by definition. This once again points out to the fact that the concept of ‘ethical counterinsurgency’ is the subject of a continual discursive transformation – it is only when military commanders pay utter attention to the environmental/discursive aspects of every combat-situation, that their adherence to conducting ethical COIN operations may prove beneficial. (3)

The extent of a particular counterinsurgency’s moral legitimacy is being reflective of counterinsurgents’ willingness to observe the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention and the provisions of the U.N. Charter on human rights. The very conceptual legality of counterinsurgency derives from the fact that, unlike what it is being often the case with insurgents (particularly, in recent times), counterinsurgents may never consider killing civilians, as their actual operational objective (Sitaraman, 2009).

Nevertheless, given the fact that during the last few decades, insurgents were becoming increasingly affiliated with the concept of terrorism, the importance of human rights’ observation, on the part of counterinsurgents, attained a qualitatively new dimension. That is, instead of assessing the concept of human rights, in regards to how it applies to the unlawful combatants, counterinsurgents now grow progressively concerned with assessing this concept in regards to the affected civilians’ ability to enjoy the safety and pursue happiness (Piazza & Walsh, 2009). The realities of post-industrial living, however, point out to the fact that such people’s ability can only be ensured at the expense of denying certain human rights to those, whose foremost existential agenda is being concerned with terrorizing civilians (Luban, 2002).

It is important to understand that ‘human rights’ is an essentially discursive concept, which means that, as time goes on, it will be the only natural for this concept to continue assuming earlier unforeseen implicational subtleties. Given the fact that, as it was mentioned earlier, it becomes increasingly harder to distinguish ‘insurgency’ from ‘terrorism’, it may very well be the case that, shortly, only the insurgents that can be qualified as ‘humans’, in the first place, who will remain protected by The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Conclusion

The provided earlier line of argumentation, in defense of this paper initial thesis’s legitimacy, suggests the following reasons for choosing in favor of conducting ethical counterinsurgency:

1. Conducting ethical counterinsurgency is key to ensuring ordinary people’s support.
2. By treating insurgents ethically, counterinsurgents expose themselves to being powerful enough to be able to afford to do it, which in turn convinces the practitioners of an ‘irregular warfare’ of insurgents’ undisputed tactical dominance.
3. Conducting ethical COIN operations makes it possible for counterinsurgents to reduce its military expenditures.

The reasons for choosing in favor of conducting unethical COIN operations can be listed as follows:

1. Unethical counterinsurgency presupposes the reduced rate of casualties among counterinsurgents.
2. The concept of ‘ethics’ and its warfare-related implications can be interpreted differently.
3. The fact that, as time goes one, insurgents grow increasingly affiliated with the concept of terrorism, which in turn prevents them from being considered ‘human’, in the full sense of this word.

We believe that this conclusion is being fully consistent with the paper’s initial thesis as to the fact that counterinsurgents should be encouraged to utilize a situational approach towards adjusting the conventions of ethical warfare to correlate with every combat situation tactical and discursive subtleties.

The provided earlier line of argumentation is also being suggestive of the fact that, as time goes on; the ethical value of a particular counterinsurgency campaign will be increasingly discussed in regards to how such a campaign ensures the well-being of those capable of understanding of what the concept of ‘ethics’ stands for, in the first place – even if these people live thousands of miles away. In other words, just as it used to be the case throughout the sixties and seventies, counterinsurgents will be increasingly concerned with enforcing law and order upon the unruly populations, rather than with trying to introduce these populations to the notion of democracy. The qualitative essence of today’s demographic dynamics in the world may well serve as an additional proof of this particular speculation’s validity.

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