Introduction
The following is a summary of an article done by Edward P. Richards going by the title “Collaboration between Public Health and Law Enforcement: The Constitutional Challenge.” Issues discussed in the article involve some significant insight into the realistic hitches encountered in the process of matching up public health and criminal inquiries. Whereas this hitch is not new in the public health field, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack of America called for immediate action (Richards, 1998, p. 1147). This discussion brings out the legal stumbling blocks on such partnership in a bid to assist public health and law enforcing staff in deciding matters not tackled by the article. Recommendations that could be made are also identified at the end and discussed appropriately.
Dual-purpose bioterrorism investigations in law enforcement and community health protection
The duties carried out by law enforcement officers and community health staff are all aimed at ensuring the safety and wellbeing of all nationals. However, the approach of carrying out inquiries by these two entities differs. For instance, public health officials rush to a scene to help victims who require medical treatment by carrying out first aid on them and then rush them to the hospital if necessary (Richards, 1998, p. 1150). They also aim to seclude individuals who might be harboring contagious infections to avoid further infections.
Law enforcement officers on the other hand rush to the scene to get people to help them in gathering information required in taking into custody of the persons responsible for the mishap and offer proof of a possible offense of biotic terror campaign.
Inquiries by both these officers require certain degrees of confidentiality, thus, making it complicated to carry out these inquiries jointly. The health officials need confidential health reports whilst law enforcement officers are bound by regulations not to reveal reports which may in any way disclose eyewitnesses or throw a spanner in the works of the investigation. Consequently, victims/or eyewitnesses would have to be questioned twice (Potterat, 1999, p. 345).
Other matters complicate such interviews like the Miranda rule which offers that law enforcement officers are obliged to warn you that anything you say may be used as evidence and to read you your constitutional rights (the right to a lawyer and the right to remain silent until advised by a lawyer) when they are interrogating you after apprehension. Gathering and treatment of proof and dishonest accounts all offer disagreeing endings depending on whether it is public health officials or law enforcement officers who are concerned (Potterat, 1999, p. 346). Nevertheless, the aims of both these public welfare teams must be attained as soon as possible.
The difficulty of not carrying out investigations jointly between these two teams was clearly illustrated in July of the year 2001 when State Epidemiologist for Iowa, Patricia Quinlisk, gave congressional proof. The case in question was an investigation on an eruption of a sexually-transmitted infection in a State facility in Iowa for the psychologically and bodily incapacitated (Richards, 1998, p. 1152). Health and law enforcement teams got down to investigations, working separately. Law enforcers were making inquiries on rape. But there was a doubt on this because psychologically incapacitated individuals are not expected to engage in intimate associations. Respondents were asked the same questions and it is thought the exercise would have gone down effectively and in a lesser time, could these entities have worked jointly (Richards, 1998, p. 1153).
Suggestions for working together
From the above discussion, it is clear that a gap exists in communication involving law enforcement and public health officials in the case of a bioterrorism incident. There is, thus, a need for a provision that makes aptness the main concern. Each of these entities, therefore, has to take into consideration the desires of the other. This can be achieved by assimilating their inquiries (Potterat, 1999, p. 349).
The teams should be provided with questionnaires configured to meet both their investigative requirements, meaning that people will be interviewed only once. For instance, if a total of fifty correspondents are to be questioned, then each team will only question twenty-five individuals (Richards, 1998, p. 1154). This serves to enhance the effectiveness and timeliness of the exercise.
It will also be appropriate if both these teams use a general chain of custody form that will be accompanied by documentation of the correspondents’ names and signatures for all relocations of proof between individuals.
From the start of any investigation, a roll of correspondents needs to be upheld. Names and contact details for all people who may have been exposed is vital as it enables timely contact for suitable medical treatment.
Record depository should be another area of concern. Staffs from both the law enforcement and public health teams need to maintain copies of the same accounts for use through the whole inquiry exercise (Richards, 1998, p. 1154). A common ground should be struck as regards the security procedures for those records.
Reference List
Potterat, J. (1999) “Invoking, monitoring, and relinquishing a public health power: the health hold order.” Philadelphia: Temple UP 345 – 349.
Richards, E. (1998) “Public health law.” New York: McGraw-Hill. 1147 – 1154.