According to Lyndal Roper, the process by which the judges elicited a confession from the accused witch regarding her maleficia, especially her pact with the devil, was complicated since the accused witch was not always certain what the exact script for witchcraft was based on the judges’ expectations. Thus, sometimes, according to Lyndal Roper, the accused witches might “emphasize parts of the witch fantasy which were not necessarily those which demonology stressed” (Roper 52). For example, Tempel Anneke states that she did not engage in bewitchment and only wanted to know “whether or not her husband was still alive” (Morton and Dähms, p. 88). This confession does not fit into the traditional notions of a witch engaging in malicious acts for personal gain. Instead, it suggests that witchcraft could also be used as a means of seeking knowledge regarding the well-being of others.
Furthermore, Tempel Anneke admits to signing a pact with the devil framed differently than what would have been expected by demonologists of her time. She asserts that “the contract between them was based on mutual trust: he promised to give her goods, and she swore never to betray him” (Morton and Dähms, p. 86). This is a unique portrayal of the devil-witch contract, which does not fit into the typical framework of witches having to obey and serve the devil’s bidding in return for power or wealth.
Given the unpredictable nature of the content of an accused witch’s confessions, the judges tried to impose some basic ideas of their official demonological theories upon the accused witch’s testimony. For instance, the judges might ask questions to re-direct the accused witch’s testimony and get it back on track. In the Trial of Tempel Anneke, for example, when she suggested that her pact with the devil was to help her husband and children, the court immediately expressed disbelief. In response, one of the judges asked her, “Why didn’t you go to God for help?” (Morton and Dähms p. 36). This question reinforces the official discourse that any form of pact with a supernatural being must be evil and forbidden by God.
Nevertheless, it would not suffice if an accused witch offered a stock answer like “Yes, I made a pact with the devil.” Too simple of a response to end her pain at the hands of the torturer would have lacked narrative and contextual specificity, which the judges demanded to confirm their suspicions of her criminal activities. In order to persuade the judges and encourage them to stop the application of further torture, the confession needed to convince the interrogator by providing him with details specific to her life circumstances. As a result, the confession had to “incorporate her story about the Devil into the tissue of [her] everyday life” (Roper 52).
In the Trial of Tempel Anneke, she admits to making a pact with the devil in exchange for goods and states that “the contract between them was based on mutual trust: he promised to give her goods, and she swore never to betray him” (Morton and Dähms p. 83). This response does not fit into the typical framework of witches having to obey and serve the devil’s bidding in return for power or wealth. Instead, it suggests that Tempel Anneke made a unique arrangement with the devil, implying that she had more autonomy than what is usually associated with witchcraft. When asked whether or not she practiced maleficia upon others, Tempel Anneke responds, “I wanted to know whether or not her husband was still alive” (Morton and Dähms p. 87). This response further deviates from the conventional view of witches using their power to harm others for personal gain. It suggests that Tempel Anneke only intended to use her magical powers to obtain knowledge rather than inflict pain upon others.
If Lyndal Roper’s argument about the back-and-forth quality of interrogations is correct, then it speaks to the power dynamics present between accused witches and interrogators in a court trial. The accused witch is forced to construct a narrative that conforms to the official discourse on witchcraft while still providing enough specificity to make her confession believable, thus making them dependent on the interrogator’s willingness to accept their account. It also implies that any evidence presented by an accused witch must be concrete for it to be admissible in the eyes of the court. Finally, this dynamic reveals how both parties are emotionally invested in convincing each other of their stories. The interrogator seeks proof that the story is accurate, and the accused desperately tries to provide enough detail for it to be credible, all within a limited time and resources. This back-and-forth reveals the complex negotiation between truth and fiction that was at play in early modern witch trials.
Works Cited
Morton, Peter A., and Dähms Barbara. The Trial of Tempel Anneke Records of a Witchcraft Trial in Brunswick, Germany, 1663. Broadview Press, 2017.
Roper, Lyndal. Witch Craze: Terror and Fantasy in Baroque Germany. Yale University Press, 2006.