According anti-materialists, our ordinary, common-sense comprehension of the mind is deeply flawed and that it is possible that all or some of the mental states posited by common-sense are non-existent. Consequently, mental states do not have a role to play in a mind that has matured. In other words, these philosophers believe that our mental states may not necessarily correspond to physical states. However, Rorty disagrees with this assertion, terming it an ontological gap between the events of consciousness and those of the central nervous system. Rorty argues that “the proper reaction to the Antipodean story is to adopt…..materialism” (Rosenthal, 1991, p. 283). This paper examines Rorty’s argument that in accepting the material reality of the universe, we can also accept that the physical universe shapes our beliefs and interpretations, and that our understanding of the universe is valid within our personal experience.
Rorty contends that the correct way to respond to the Antipodean tale is to adopt materialism, which places a strong emphasis on the significance of the physical environment and how humans interact with it (Rosenthal, 1991). If individuals are willing to acknowledge this response, they will be able to develop a greater appreciation for the physical environment and become more aware of their relationships with it (Rosenthal, 1991). Rorty believes that an appreciation of the physical can help people live with greater significance because it enables them to recognize the splendor and intricacy of their physical environment.
By acknowledging the material reality of the universe, people can accept that the physical universe shapes their beliefs and interpretations (Rosenthal, 1991). The materialist worldview allows people to acknowledge the veracity of the Antipodean narrative without requiring us to rely on our interpretations of that narrative. Through interaction with other people, specific identifying characteristics of a person become more stable over time, while others become less noticeable or are replaced by new characteristics.
Rorty also posits that the norm of guiding human behavior is derived from something nonhuman (such as a divine will), and individuals must be responsible for handling such standards (Rosenthal, 1991). This argument is based on the materialist belief that norms influence human behavior. In this regard, people need to communicate with one another in a way that helps them understand the kinds of people they aspire to be. They should also be willing to follow the moral compass to enable them uphold the standards that pave the way for responsibility.
Furthermore, Rorty advances the argument that a Supreme Being does not drive the object of reality in which people identify their physical environment. On the contrary, people find themselves as they identify with the physical environment. This is putative nonhuman authority in which people find themselves is an objective reality that delivers them to problematic situations and determines the nature and practices that bind people in their physical environment (Rosenthal, 1991). Consequently, people have the right to decide what actions to take to establish their reputation as self-determining creatures.
Moreover, Rorty posits that people do not have a Cartesian mind; instead, the decisions that people make depend entirely on the ontological facts and social practices that establish the norms and beliefs of a society (Rosenthal, 1991). Rorty’s argument may be found in his book The Cartesian Mind (Rosenthal, 1991). The material and the world influence how individuals live behave and believe about supernatural beings.
Moreover, according Rorty normalcy sensitivity, which defines the sense of authority established by social activities, is the most crucial notion (Rosenthal, 1991). Therefore, people’s choices are wholly governed by the events that occur in their minds, which are produced from their mental idea of mind nature. The statements and conventions established over time, each of which possesses a unique personality, characterize the authoritative quality of something. Rorty contends that it is acceptable to alter those rules to address some of the existing problematic difficulties.
Norms define human life in societies and the normalcy of discourse, particularly about matters of economic nature, is maintained under joint supervision that addresses critical challenges believed to impact people’s lives in the physical world. According to Rorty, the nature of human life is decided by cultural and religious norms (Rosenthal, 1991). Culture can be determined by the existence of supernatural beings that only exist for natural reasons. Consequently, such beings can determine religion.
In conclusion, Rorty argues that the best way to react to the Antipodean story is to adopt materialism. When humans accept the reality of the universe, they also accept the physical universe which shapes their interpretations and belief. Consequently, their personal experience validates their understanding of the mental states. It is possible, therefore, to agree with the assertion that our consciousness is tied to the physical materials around us. In other words, the mental states that people experience in their minds have corresponding physical states, which enhance the concept of reality. Rorty’s arguments are vital in bridging the ontological gap between the events of consciousness and those of the central nervous system.
The concept of self-identity and individual identification has troubled many people over the years. Locke and Hume crafted Locke’s theory and the Bundle Theory, respectively, to explain these ideas. Locke and Hume agree that memory is essential to defining personal identity (Perry, 2002). According to Locke, memory and consciousness are essential in defining personal identity. This paper discusses the fundamental arguments of Locke, Reid, and Hume, exploring their similarities and differences.
According to Hume’s Bundle Theory, personal identity is, essentially, perceptions (Perry, 2002). According to his ideas, personal identity is not the feeling of existence as many thinkers believe. He proposes that every notion is a product of one impression. Self is not a single impression but a combination of all our impressions which could be joy, grief, pain, or pleasure. These impressions may not necessarily happen at the same time, but they follow each other. Furthermore, Hume contends that the human mind is the stage where perceptions appear. The perceptions are comparable to actors walking across the stage, subjected to diverse environments and situations. Different actors walk across the stage at different times with different perceptions in order to tell the same story, human perceptions also appear in the mind at different times to tell the same story.
The Bundle Theory is comparable to the newer version of Locke’s theory. While Hume thinks that the concept of self is a fiction, Locke holds that there is need for a memory continuum for a person to maintain their identity (self) (Perry, 2002). In this regard, the only things that would be at stake would be whether a person believes that what they think of themselves is fictitious or not, and if they are the same person of not. It is predictable that for many people, the thought of thinking of themselves as being creations of fiction would be very disappointing. Personal identity supersedes memory continuum. Even though Locke’s assertion, that one requires a memory continuum to be the same person, is necessary for the concept of existence, it fails to define personal identify.
Locke argues that the sameness of man or substance is unnecessary and insufficient for personal identity but that consciousness is equal (Perry, 2002). Hume agrees with Locke that it is memory’s role to shape people’s senses. Hume disagrees with Locke’s assertion that the sense of self is not limited to memories (Perry, 2002). Surprisingly, Hume does not even admit Locke’s contention that “person” is a forensic term, neither does he content with Locke’s distinction between the terms “person,” “man,” and “material” (Rosenthal, 1984). Locke created this distinction to discuss moral responsibility issues, which he considered crucial.
At first glance, it seems even more surprising that Hume’s treatment of the self leaves less room for separating persons from human beings than his treatment. The experience is perplexing because Locke first articulated the difference to address concerns about moral accountability, and Hume’s treatment of self in arguments forms the basis of his moral theory (Kim, 1984). There must be a solution to this mystery, which leaves a dilemma of whether Hume made a sloppy mistake or has philosophical objections to Locke’s distinction. Hume does not share Locke’s particular moral and theological convictions that have no allure in Locke’s distinction between individuals and human beings.
It is helpful to establish in what sense if any, Locke and Hume distinguish individuals and human beings to explain how their moral, religious, and philosophical background assumptions influence their unique explanations of persons and personal identity. First, Locke defines the difference between “person,” “man,” and “stuff” conceptually (Rosenthal, 1991). Locke distinguishes between the identity of people and substances and contends that individual identity is grounded in a shared mental state (Kim, 1984). It is a claim about the nature of reality itself. The idea of the nature of reality has been modernized into the contention that humans, other humans, and inorganic substances have unique persistence requirements.
On the other hand, in contrast to Locke’s theory, Hume’s does not provide any opportunity for a theistic foundation for his philosophical principles. According to Hume’s description, math, science, religion, ethics, and politics are all tied to human nature and other scientific endeavors (Kim, 1984). According to Hume, it is necessary to investigate the principles and mechanisms governing human nature before attempting to build morality separate from such a study. This is because human nature is the foundation upon which morality is built (Kim, 1984).
Locke’s theory was developed to draw attention to the limitations of human comprehension and reduce the breadth of knowledge to only that which can be understood with absolute certainty. Locke makes the critical point that the fact that contemporary scientific expertise cannot provide an answer to a question does not indicate that the question is without value. Locke argues that a person can still build plausible hypotheses or have self-confidence in such topics (Perry, 2008). The most important thing is distinguishing between having a reasonable opinion and blind faith. Locke says that it is beyond people’s ken to establish whether or not these thoughts are anchored in something substantial or immaterial, even though it is common knowledge that persons have thoughts.
In his article “Of the Immortality of the Soul,” David Hume articulates his skepticism regarding various religious beliefs. By outlining several philosophical, ethical, and scientific arguments, Hume can cast doubt on the reality of an afterlife and the soul’s immortality (Kim, 1984). Although Locke and Hume agree that the soul’s immortality cannot be demonstrated a priori and share a certain metaphysical agnosticism, several subtle distinctions become apparent when we turn to Hume’s physical arguments. Locke and Hume share a certain metaphysical agnosticism (Perry, 2008). Although Locke acknowledges that it is impossible to know for certain whether thought occurs in a material or immaterial substance. He argues that immaterial substances are more likely to be the locus of thought than material substances. On the other hand, Hume states that it is more likely that humans are mortal material things because we are similar to nonhuman animals, and the great analogy lends support to the notion that this is the case.
Locke’s religious perspectives partly shaped his understanding of the concept of individuality. Locke was a devout Christian, he was adamant that the Bible be accorded the utmost respect. Despite the fact that faith is based on revelation is not entirely certain, he maintains that faith cannot be correctly denied and is almost as certain as knowledge (Rosenthal, 1991). When one considers Locke’s religious beliefs, it becomes clear how important it was for him to present a theory of personal identity that could accept the possibility of life after the death of the physical body, just as the Bible teaches that there will be the hereafter. Locke’s theory had to account for the possibility of the afterlife.
Reid differs with Locke’s theory in a number of ways. Firstly, he does not believe in Locke’s insistence that there are different identity conditions for different things so that the conditions of identity for a rock, an animal, a tree, or a person are not the same. According to Reid identity is limited only to substances whose existence is continued and uninterrupted, and do not exist in parts. In simple terms, according to Reid, personal identity is the only real identity. Another major criticism of Reid on Locke’s theory is that the latter confounds consciousness with memory yet the two are distinct phenomena. He explains that while memory is directed towards past events, consciousness deals with present mental acts and operations.
In conclusion, in their attempt to explain the concept of self-identity, Hume and Locke agree that the sense of self is not limited to memories and that memory shapes people’s senses. However, while Locke believes that self is limited to memories, Hume thinks that a person requires more than a memory continuum to be the same person. While Locke’s ideas were shaped by his religious perspectives, Hume does not provide any chance for a theistic foundation for his philosophical principles. Reid on the other hand believes that the only real identity is personal identity and consciousness and memory are distinct phenomena.
References
Kim, J. (1984). Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9(1), 257–270. Web.
Perry, J. (2002). Identity, personal identity, and the self. Hackett Publishing.
Rosenthal, D. M. (1984). Armstrong’s causal theory of mind. D.M. Armstrong, 79–120. Web.