Introduction
States tend to adapt to governance structures that suffice their national needs and interests. The Middle East sub-system has drawn plenty of global attention in the recent past. Countries constituting this sub-system include Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Tunisia, and Libya among others. Most nations in the region enjoy large crude oil deposits. In 2010 and 2011, the region enjoyed a growth rate of 4.15 and 5.1% respectively (Jorg, 2010).
Interestingly, no single country has influence over the others in the region. This phenomenon coupled with the region’s volatility makes the region an important area of study. It is interesting to explore the system structure and how it relates to the gap of interests among the region’s states. While the paper will briefly present information on events that have shaped the region’s structure since the end of the cold war, its main focus will be on the events that have occurred between 2008 and 2010.
Study Methodology
To adequately discuss the Middle East sub-system, previously collected and documented literature on the region will be used as the primary source of information. However, websites and other media bearing recent structural transformations will also be studied. The research method will therefore be exclusively qualitative.
Research Question
In its quest to understand the processes and systems within the Middle East, the paper will focus on answering the following question:
What is the connection between the system structures in the Middle East to the gaps of interests among the region’s nations?
Theoretical Background
In essence, there exists no single political realism culture, but rather a wholesome knowledge of tensions constituted over history, opinion contradictions, and evasions. Kaplan describes realism proponents as guided by pessimistic human nature view and hence believing that humans are preoccupied with their individual well-being as they compete to relate with each other (Kaplan, 2005). This perspective defines the structures which govern the relations of various nations both at regional and global levels. Waltz noted that if there is any distinct political theory globally, then it has to be the balance of power theory, an assertion, which has received its own share of criticism from constructivists and political economists (Waltz, 2005). An interesting phenomenon of Waltz’s political systems is his discussion of the anarchists system (Waltz, 2005). This is a system that most people from the Middle East are well familiar with. Perhaps it won’t be outrageous to associate this system with the Middle East more than any other region in the world.
International relations systems
Waltz’s definition of international politics takes the form of a firm’s definition within a larger industrial scene. He views states as units within a larger system. He acknowledges that states variations are normal and form the basis upon which they shape their structures and system affiliations (Waltz, 2005). He notes that states vary in geographical size, the power wielded, and form. However, he notes that the general interests of each state are similar although the capacity to achieve them differs. System structures often change in response to capabilities held by their players (Waltz, 2005). System structure defines the way states define their ends and device ways of achieving them. Kaplan on the other hand proposes six systems that describe the international scenario. These include the balance of power systems, loose bi-polar system, universal system, hierarchical system (either directive or in the directive), and the unit veto system (Kaplan, 2005).
The unit veto system is based on an envisagement of international systems where economically divergent states use technological ability to veto decisions of another state more so if they would impinge on the vetoing state national security. Bi-polar systems on the other hand are defined as a state where two opposing systems command the influence of other nations, bets summarized by the statement “You are either with us or against us.”In essence, all the other players are expected to take sides with the two opposing sides (Kaplan, 2005).” However, unlike tight bi-polar systems, such a system can accommodate additional blocs for as long as they are inferior and bear interest which does not encroach into that of the two major blocs (Kaplan, 2005). Generally, the two major blocs involved in tight bi-polar system need to have a strong hierarchical organization. Conceivably, the universal international system results from an extension of the functions exercised by a universal actor within a loose bi-polar system. Hierarchical on there other hand is emerging as anarchical system paves way. Like balance of power system, it a product of evolution of other systems balance of power theory is often motivated by existence of parity between two competing forces (Kaplan, 2005).
National interests
The central importance of national interest cannot be overstated. Although, Hans had earlier stated that primary interest is acquisition and use of powers, his research produced contrary results or rather a directly opposing perspective of the statement (Neuchterlein, 1979). He found that it instead it is the national interests that motivate the quest for power. Neuchterlein proposes a matrix of four concepts often applicable to all sovereign state’s interests. These include defense interests which deal with states and citizens protection, economic interest which covers aspects which enhance financial position of a state, world order which involves maintenance of both international politics and economic interest and finally, ideological interests whose scope involves protection and furtherance of value sets which citizens believe as universally acceptable (Neuchterlein, 1979).
National interest is regarded as a product of political processes through which respective governments makes decisions and applies for the states well-being.the term is applicable only to sovereign states rather than organizations and hence decisions pertaining to national interests such as use of military force, trade restrictions imposition, alliance formations among others are made by respective sovereign governments (Robinson, 1967). Robinson on other hand states that, interests define the relation between two nations and hence the two category including single state’s national interest and degree of commonality between various nations. He proposes three key terms that appropriately define national interests. These include primacy degrees, permanence degree and generality degrees (Robinson, 1967). These terms shape the way relations between nations are drawn. Permanency or variability of interests is also key in defining national interests. Robinson, further identify three levels of interests which he classifies as identical, complementary or conflicting. In relating national interest to international relations, Robinson defines diplomacy as the act of accommodating conflicting interests in order to come up with acceptable positions between nations (Robinson, 1967).
Analysis
Historical background
Unlike, the European Union or East Africa, Middle East makes no reference to any political or regional alliance. Rather it is constituted by independently operating states both in terms of policy and culture. Initially, the states within the region refused to acknowledge the term’s usage. Rather, even the constituent countries themselves lack general agreements as to the use of the term. Recently, however, the term has been accepted as the regions geographical reference point. Despite persistence of disagreements, the region is defined as bound by bound by Egypt to the Western side, the Arab peninsula on the southern boundary, Iran on the east boundary. A more expanded definition however covers all the countries in North Africa with membership to the Arab League (Hsiao-pei Yen, 2010).
Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait aimed at preventing its status decline in the global economy as well as the regional sub-system (Hsiao-pei Yen, 2010). The response by the United States on the other hand aimed at protecting its systematic, political, and economic position and hence preserving its global hegemonic status. Further, this would help it maintain a grip of the Middle Eastern sub-system. This scenario, though not the focus of the paper, best illustrates the factors which shape the Middle East sub-system, external influence, regional politics, economic situations and prevailing leadership (Hsiao-pei Yen, 2010). While the Middle East scenario, would almost fit Kaplan’s loose bi-polar, it fails due to the frequent power shift. Most nations in the region are seemingly committed to gain power and becoming regional leaders. Libya, Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia among others are also striving to be regional leaders. Israel has on the other hand remained a dominant power for a long time. However, it has constantly been on alert of threats posed by its neighbors denying it a more stable role it would have assumed. Generally, all evidence indicates that Kaplan’s models fail to adequately define the Middle East scenario.
The end of the cold war in 1991 saw a gradual shift in the Middle East sub-system. Considering that initially the regions countries had either aligned in favor of the United States or The Soviet Union. Nations that had initially aligned to the Soviet Union took their own divergent paths (Hsiao-pei Yen, 2010). The power plays in the Middle East begun with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In response, the United States moved in favor of Kuwait, a move that saw Iraq seek to acquire nuclear power (Hsiao-pei Yen, 2010). On the other hand, the onslaught by Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel saw the regions volatility rise even further. The regional countries took sides either with or against Israel. Turkey for instance, remained a loyal supporter of Israel while most Islam majority nations opted to support Lebanon. However, some nations, in consideration of their national interest opted to take a more neutral ground. Perhaps in a clear illustration of temporary interest, Turkey deemed is relations with Israel convenient then. However, this position has seemed change.
A marked shift of policy in the region was marked by the fall of Iraq’s former president, Saddam Hussein. This saw a shift of attention to Iran which assumed the role initially played by Iraq. Turkey found itself living with the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran. However, its national interest required that it cooperate with Iran more so in energy related field. Israel on the other hand continued to wrestle constant rocket firing, suicide bombing and other forms of lethal threat from Palestinian insurgents who never seem to give up (Hsiao-pei Yen, 2010). This marked a beginning of conflict of respective nation’s interests. While the relationship between Iran and Turkey have been largely structured around the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and Israel-Palestinian conflict, the respective national incidents have played critical roles in the recent past. The recent election in Turkey saw a shift in relations between Turkey and Iran. Despite Iran’s renunciation of any possible recognition of Israel, Turkey has extended an olive branch based on the energy gains it expects to draw from the relationship. Ankara and Tehran work hand in hand in the recent past. However, historical pride, sectarian ambitions, and geostrategic competition amongst the two are likely to spoil the prevailing harmony.
Recent cooperation efforts between Tehran and Ankara saw Turkey support Iran’s right to have nuclear power with definition of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The nation further supported a diplomatic approach to solving the international conflict between Iran, US and EU (Hsiao-pei Yen, 2010). However, Turkey has since shifted this position after Iran’s failure to honor its promise tor return to negotiations. This case defines the hot-cold relations that have often existed between the two nations majorly due to conflicting interest.
The case of Middle East
The global political climate has been characterized with varying conditions. A reflection of time pre-occupations and structural alignment of international politics in the middle 20th century seemed to focus on the political interactions in the east and western nations. However, the eclectic regional group sub-systems analysis has created an exception to this dominance. These analyses have counteracted the perceived distortions associated with the global bi-polar perspective (Zaman, 2009). The Middle Eastern sub-system draws a lot of study interest having undergone significant changes over time. The global perception of the Middle East is perhaps one of the most distorted globally. The world media has often presented contradicting pictures of the region. While most pro-Arabic stations have depicted the western nations as the root cause of the regions problems, western media have displayed the region as volatile, full of religious fanatics and characterized with endemic terrorism. Many persons with experience from the Middle East have often cited that there is little semblance of the region to stereotyped representation often displayed to the world population. However, the regions volatility remains unquestionable.
Unlike many parts of the world, the region has been buffeted by various conflicts and wars. Few arts of the world have received as much coverage as the Middle East in the recent past, both in print and in visual media. While widely stereotyped and misunderstood, its analysis cannot ignore the events that have hit the region. As one scholar put it, reflecting on the legacy of fifty years of academic study of the Middle East, its political processes defy observation, discourage absolute generalization and resist unthought-of explanations (Zaman, 2009). Understanding international relations of the Middle Eastern region can not be devoid of the international scenario. International Relations and Middle East Studies bear high dependence as has been shown by a cursory survey of the regions major works. No book can clear demarcate the line of disjoint between international politics and the case of Middle East. The effect of external forces to the sub-system can not be wished away. Recently, various treaties have been brokered both at regional and national level. These treaties have shaped the structure and political organization of the regions layers.
Iran-Turkey relations
Turkey is a staunchly secular democracy, a NATO member, and an ally of Israel (Koprulu, 2009). Its national interests are purely economic although due to the regions volatility, defense is part of its priority. In contrast, Iran is a theocratic autocracy that attempts to alter the balance of power in the region by meddling in its neighbors’ domestic politics, believes the United States to be the world’s “Great Satan,” and openly calls for the destruction of Israel (Takeyh, 2011). Iran has constantly pursued aggression policies in pursuit of power and hence it defense is of primary concern to its interests (Takeyh, 2011). As such, each country seems to embody the very principles that the other diametrically opposes. No common interests can be claimed to guide the relations between the two nations.
Despite such divergent positions by the two nations, recent reports have shown a growth in relation between the two. In 2008, the Turkish President invited Iran’s president to Turkey. This was in addition to nine ministerial meetings held within the same year. According to Tehran, the two countries were enlarging bilateral trade between them more so in the energy sector (Dunn, 2010). In 2009, increased diplomatic were also witnessed with Iranian parliament president’s visit to Turkey in January. According to Cihan news agency, the year was also designated as “Iran-Turkey Culture Year (Champoin, 2010).” This position is largely derived from the complementary interests between the two nations. While Turkey is pursuing economic prosperity, Iran is pursuing a means to access the larger global oil market. Turkey offers a means to market accessibility by Iran while Iran offers the much needed energy by Turkey.
The growth in relations was also witnessed by the signing of an agreement to improve the transport network between the two nations (Champoin, 2010). Recent reports have indicated that Turkey has become a platform upon which Iran communicates to the world in a bid to ends its isolation. This is further evidenced by Iran’s request to Turkey to act as a mediator between it and the United States. What remains to be seen is whether the change in Turkey –Iran relations will benefit the two or one. However, what is clear is that the cooperation effort from the two nations is largely guided by their respective national interest. For instance, it has been Turkey’s goal to double its trade with Iran (Elliot, 2010).
Despite, its isolation from the world as a result of its intended nuclear program, Turkey hasn’t shown much concern instead focusing on its national interests. Conspicuously, Tehran’s nuclear ambition has never been a part of the deepening diplomatic relation between Turkey and Iran (Koprulu, 2009). Rather, both nations have focused on the bilateral relations between them. On June 9th, 2010, Turkey voted against a UN resolution to impose more sanctions on Iran (Elliot, 2010). Arabic commentators have been recorded in many instances mentioning that the new cooperation alliance incorporates Turkey, Iran and Syria and is largely aimed at retaliating to the west lack of retribution of Israel actions in Gaza (Uslu, 2009).
In a recent event, the Turkish Prime minister made an unscheduled trip to Tehran aimed at requesting Iran to outsource its Uranium enrichment from Brazil. Such events have increased international concern as to the extent of Turkey-Iran alliances against Israel and the United States (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). However, the relation is built on skeptism as witnessed by the recent frustration by Turkey over Iran’s failure to return to the negotiating table. In general, the relation between Iran and Turkey offer clear illustrations of Robinson’s definition of diplomacy. The two nations have found a way of accommodating the conflicting interests between them. However, both still care about their defense interests and are wary of each other. This is guided by the fact that it would be ideal to achieve wholesome accommodation of conflicting interests.
The role of political processes can not be ignored in the case of Turkey-Iran relations. A case in point is the change in leadership in Turkey which paved way for warmer relations between the tow countries. As Robinson asserts, alliances are formed based on prevailing politics within respective nations. Change in political processes in Turkey is believed to have partially contributed to the shift in Turkey’s policy. This shift in relation between Turkey and Iran is likely to have direct impact on the region’s relations more so considering that Turkey has long been an ally to Israel. However, it would be important to note that while Turkey’s interest in relating to Iran is primary, Iran’s interest is partially primary and partially secondary. While the economic co-operation is primary, its pursuit of nuclear ambition and seeking assistance from Turkey in relation to international sanctions is rather secondary as other energy options have been availed to the nation to no avail. Virtually, the Turkey- Iran relationship is likely to result in re-alignments across the region, in a bid to respond to the possibility of Nuclear Iran. Israel is likely to seek new allies if Turkey opts to support Iraq. Syria on the other hand is likely to steadfastly remain behind Iran alongside most of the Arab nations within the region. The possibility of new alliance can not be ruled out. However, all these are speculations and only time can prove or disapprove of the same.
Turkish –Iran relations compared to international relations
It is widely expected that Turkey could be the key to reintegration of the state of Iran into the international arena. Its initiatives are expected to influence the state and offer more pro-active policy routings than engagement in confrontations (Guray 2001). The increased trade between the two countries is expected to largely opened dialogue fronts between the two nations and later the international community. These political and economic initiatives by Turkey and Iran are expected to replace the aggressive military approach adopted by the western world in dealing with the Iranian situation.
Recent trends in Turkey-Iran Relations
Perhaps a clear mark of Turkey paradigm shift in relation its association with Iran, On November 10, 2008, shortly Barack Obama’s election as the new president of America, Turkish Prime Minister announced his wish for Turkey to be a “mediator between the new Obama administration and Iran (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). Turkey has in the recent past presented itself as a diplomatic linkage between the east and the west rather than as a player to either side. Being the regions most populous nations, Turkey and Iran have over time been contemporary rivals. However recent trends have seen a rise in trade relations between the two nations evidenced by the ongoing energy cooperation (Yan, 2011).
In a direct disregard of sanctions imposed on firms investing in Iran’s oil fields, Turkey has continued to show determination in its endeavor to continue cooperating with Iran on energy issues. It is a final deal that Iran’s oil will find its way into the European Market via Turkey. It’s a case of national interest against international policies (Dunn, 2010). The possible earnings from sale of Iranian gas are in line with Turkey’s national interest of increase its income earnings.
Turkey has also extended an olive branch in regard to the Iranian nuclear stand off with the west. Despite its secularist view of Ahmadinejad with lots of suspicion, the current regime unlike the past has entertained a visit by Ahmadinejad to discuss the nuclear issue (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). The Turkish government however, in fear of international repercussions opted to treat the visit as a tour rather than an official event.
Turkey’s relation with Iran has generally been full of suspicion more so considering its cordial relations with United States and Israel within the sub-system. It is probably only Muslim country with significant military cooperation with the Israel, a position likely to change especially after its recent exclusion of Israel in its annual military drills (Dunn, 2010). It’s however subject to a myriad of new challenges in its bid to balance its power within the sub-system. The push for nuclear by Iran tops its agenda. This is taking into consideration a recent scenario where turkey was duped by Iran into believing that it would engage in negotiations only to renege on the pledge after passing of UN resolution (Dunn, 2010). The Iran case is expected to motivate regional powers including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey itself to seek deterrence nuclear power.
On the other hand, its cooperation with Iran seems to effectively serve its national interest at the moment. Up to 10 billion m3 of gas is exported into Turkey from Iran annually (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). Turkey therefore plays a major role in transit of Iranian gas into the European market. Additionally, a $1.5 billion in agreements has been signed between Turkey and Iran for joint construction of three power stations, two of which are in Iran (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). The Turkish prime minister has in the recent past ruled out any probability of dropping the nation’s cooperation with Iran. The current level of association is an all time high, a decade a go, this was basically unthought-of The Jamestown Foundation, 2007).
Nevertheless, cooperation between the two has not quelled the anxiety within the region of a nuclear-armed Iran. Most Middle East nations are jittery about this prospect, Turkey included. Israel for instance has been keen at convincing the Turkish government to publicly rebuke Iran for its nuclear program. Despite its previous support for Iran’s nuclear power mainly for peaceful purposes, the refusal by Iran to enter negotiations ahs left the Turks anxious than ever before. The Turkish ambassador to the US recently publicly asserted that Iran’s nuclear pursuit would pose serious threats to the regions stability (Takeyh, 2011). It is no longer a supposition that the nations within the region are busy preparing for such an eventuality making the regions even more volatile. Policy decisions in the Middle East are not determined between countries but rather depending on the Middle East events. The stand of Hezbollah and Hamas for instance, with regard to Israel is fundamental to relations within the Middle East. The nations are either pro or anti-Israel. Turkey has for a long time been an ally of Israel while Iran’s president has on many occasions publicly stated that Israel as a nation has no right to exist.
A clear evaluation of the points raised so far with regard to the nations within the Middle East, illustrates a multi-polar system where various nations wield lots of influence. Unlike most regions of the world where a unified approach has been taken, in the Middle East most countries pursue their own policies for as long as the policies suffice their immediate national interests. Israel for instance, remains a major power player in the region though acting independently. The same can be said of Iran which has grown in volatility since the fall of Iraq. Other players include United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia which have remained largely independent and attempted to dissociate themselves from the conflict plaguing the region. Basically no nation seems to have complete influence on another. Rather, policies of individual nations are shaped by their respective national interests. While Israel is largely focusing on protecting its boundaries from external aggression, Iran is largely focusing on pursuing of geographical power (Takeyh, 2011). Turkey on the other hand has in the recent past adopted policies which increase its income and addresses the immediate needs of its citizen shoving aside international issues.
Conclusion
A look at the relations between Turkey and Iran reveals a definite effect of international politics and relations. Only within the last few years have elements of the Turkish security establishment come to see Iran as a serious challenge, and even today there are strong countervailing interests in improved relations. The sources of Turkish concern are straightforward. First, Turkey’s secular elites, including the military, increasingly have been concerned about the export of Islamic radicalism from Iran. This concern is driven by Iranian financial and other support for activists abroad, and the ebb and flow of Iran’s support for international terrorism. An Iranian hand is sometimes seen in the construction of Turkish religious schools (where Saudi backing has certainly played a larger role) and the financing of Islamist movements. In reality, these are marginal factors on the Turkish political scene. But those inclined to worry about secularism in Turkey, including harder-line elements in the military and Kemalists of the old school, tend to see Iran as an internal security threat.
It is vital to mention that Turkish-Iranian cooperation is largely driven by the respective national interests. While Iran is seeking an alternative where connecting to the world after lengthy periods of isolation and sanctions, Turkey views the relation as an opportunity to advance its economic prosperity. The paper sought to establish how the system structures in the Middle East relate to the gap of interests among the regions interest, an assertion that is largely proven more so with respect to the case of Iran and Turkey relations. In a system that is largely multi-polar, rather than bring together by common interests, the nations are largely driven by their individual gaps of interest.
References
Champoin, M. (2010). Turkey Asks Iran to Return to Negotiating Table,” Wall Street Journal. Web.
Dunn, M. C. (2010). The changing Turkey-Iran Relationship. The Middle East Journal, 64(1), pp. 231-235.
Elliot, H. (2010). Turkey’s Gain Is Iran’s Loss. New York Times.
Farrar-Wellman, A. (2010). Turkey-Iran Foreign Relations. Web.
Guray A. (2001). Turkey’s Response to Threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. Web.
Hsiao-pei Yen. (2010). History in the News: The Middle East. Department of History, SUNY-Albany. Web.
Jorg, K. (2010). Economic and Market Monitor Research. Frankfurt: CommerzBank Cooperate.
Kaplan, M. A. (2005). System and Process in International Politics. Colchester, England: ECPR.
Koprulu, K. (2009). Paradigm Shift in Turkey’s Foreign Policy. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 16 (1), pp 182-189.
Neuchterlein, D. B. (1979). The Concept of National Interest: New Approaches. Orbis, 23 (1), pp. 73-92.
Poyraz, S. (2009).Turkish-Iranian Relations: A Wider Perspective, Policy Brief, 01.
Robinson, T. (1967) National Interests” in: James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: Free Press, 1967, pp. 182-190.
Takeyh, R. (2011). Iran’s aspiring autocrat seeks a hard-line era. Web.
The Jamestown Foundation (2007). Turkey Determined to press Ahead with Iranian Gas.
Uslu, E. (2009). Turkey-Iran Relations: A Trade Partnership or a Gateway for Iran to Escape International Sanctions? Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 6 Issue: 41, pp 43-44.
Waltz, K. (2005).“The Anarchic Structure of World Politics”, in: Robert Art and Robert Jervis (eds.), International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 7th edition, NY: Pearson, pp. 49-68.
Yan, H. (2011). Iran, Turkey aim at energy cooperation. Web.
Zaman, J. (2009). Turkey should try mediate with Iran despite limited room for manoeuvre. Web.