Mother with Tuberculosis Scenario
Summary
A young woman who is four months pregnant has recently discovered that she has tuberculosis. The doctor informs her that she must take a drug that will cure her disease, but that the drug will also have the effect of aborting the fetus. There is no other available drug that will cure her disease, and if she does not take the drug immediately she will die.
According to natural law, may the young woman take the drug?
Considering the fact that the life of the infant is connected to the life of the mother it can be stated that such a procedure is definitely justified by natural law. What you have to understand is that if the mother refuses treatment not only will she die but the infant will die as well. If she does take the treatment then it is only the infant that will die. While it is understandable that the death of the infant can be considered a severe consequence of the treatment it still falls under the 4 conditions of the principle of the double effect since it encompasses the “means-end condition” as well as the proportionality condition.
The case example does not indicate that it is the abortion that would save the mother but rather it is the treatment for tuberculosis that will save her. The death of the infant is an unintended yet unavoidable consequence of the action. It must also be noted that a worse act would be to attempt to give birth to the infant despite having a condition that would gradually worsen as time goes on (Smith, 2007).
There is no specific guarantee that the mother will have the strength to complete the full 9 months needed to ensure that the infant can be born properly. A more likely result would be that within the next few months the mother will die along with an almost fully formed infant which can be considered an act of undue suffering and foolishness since the mother would in effect make the death of the infant that much worse considering the number of months it was already alive and could already be considered a fully formed person (Stuchlik, 2011). It is based on this that the act of taking the treatment would be the most viable option at the moment.
Hydrocephalic Fetus Scenario
Summary
In the process of attempting to deliver a fetus, a physician discovers that the fetus is hydrocephalic. The fetus’s large cranium makes a normal vaginal delivery impossible; both the woman and fetus would die in the attempt. Neither the mother nor the fetus would survive a cesarean section, so the only way to save the mother’s life is to crush the skull of the fetus (craniotomy), thus rendering a vaginal delivery of the stillborn fetus possible.
Would craniotomy be justified by natural law?
One of the inherent problems with this particular case is the fact that it does not indicate whether the mother is involved in the decision making process within the case study. First and foremost, while it is true that the case does fulfill some of the aspects related to the principle of double effect such as the right-intention condition, the problem is that it also happens to violate the means to an end condition wherein the life of the mother has to be saved at the expense of the life of the infant (Wenkel, 2007).
This in effect classifies the action as a violation of the principle of double effect since the means by which a good outcome arises should not come as a direct result of the bad effect (MAGILL, 2011). This is distinctly different than the previous case since the death of the infant does not come as an unintended consequence of the treatment but an intended consequence in order to save the life of the mother.
The fact also remains that the choice of whether or not to kill a baby in order to save the life of the mother should be a decision left to the mother and not to the doctor. Not only that, the basis of the case argument does not specifically elaborate as to precisely why the cesarean section would not work. It is based on this that this particular case cannot be considered applicable under natural law nor would it apply under the principle of double effect.
Reference List
Magill, G. (2011). Threat of imminent death in pregnancy: a role for double-effect reasoning. Theological Studies, 72(4), 848-876.
Smith, I. A. (2007). A New Defense of Quinn’s Principle of Double Effect. Journal Of Social Philosophy, 38(2), 349-364.
Stuchlik, J. (2012). A Critique of Scanlon on Double Effect. Journal Of Moral Philosophy, 9(2), 178-199.
Wenkel, D. H. (2006). Separation of Conjoined Twins and the Principle of Double Effect. Christian Bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies In Medical Morality, 12(3), 291-300.