The issue of whether animals posses an intelligence, which should hypothetically allow them to indulge in verbal forms of communications with each other, cannot be effectively discussed unless we establish a theoretical premise, upon which such discussion should be based. In its turn, this would require us to define the conceptual essence of evolutionary theory. What is biological evolution? It is the process of living organisms continuously increasing their existential complexity, for the purpose of remaining fully competitive with other living organisms in the same environmental niche. As of today, the specie of Homo Sapiens represents the most complex product of biological evolution, which explains the reason why people were able to attain an undisputed dominance over the animals. In its turn, this provides us with the insight on what accounts for the foremost difference between people and animals – it is namely people’s ability to operate with highly abstract categories, which came as the result of their minds’ evolutionary predetermined neurological complexity.
However, this does not necessarily mean that animals do not posses a mind capable of performing simplest mental tasks. In their book “The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture”, Christina Erneling and David Johnson make a perfectly good point while stating: “Descartes drew an absolute line between humans, on the one hand, and animals, on the other. Darwin erased that line, creating two new mutually exclusive alternative possibilities: Either animals had minds (albeit simpler than humans’), or no one, animal or human, had a mind, or at least a mind worth considering” (Erneling & Johnson 2005, p. 64). Such authors’ suggestion helps us to formulate thesis, which we will aim at substantiating, throughout paper’s entirety – despite the fact that animals’ mental capabilities appear as being significantly lower then that of humans, we cannot doubt the fact that animals possess a mind of their own, which in its turn, explains the phenomenon of a so-called “animal language”.
Ever since the beginning of 20th century, biologists were trying to define what should serve as a criteria for determining whether different species of animals posses mind capable of performing thoughtful tasks. At first, it was being assumed that such criteria should account for “intelligent” particularities of animals’ behavior. However, it did not take biologists to long to realize the conceptual fallacy of such an approach. In the book from which we have already quoted, Christina Erneling and David Johnson state: “The legitimacy of inferring mind from behavior was soon thrown into greater doubt as psychology expanded its scope and methods. Because animals could not introspect, their behavior had to speak indirectly for their minds” (Erneling & Johnson 2005, p. 65). If living organisms’ behavior could provide us with the insight on their mind, then insects would appear as being so much more intelligent then animals.
For example, an ant colony functions with such a degree of utter precision that, upon being exposed to the sight of how ants go about performing their socially defined duties, an unengaged observer would inevitably conclude that ants are being absolutely capable of operating with such abstract categories as “responsibility” or “sacrifice”. In its turn, this would serve as an undeniable proof of ants’ “intelligence”. On the other hand, there are many instances of animals’ behavior being anything but intelligent, simply because the way they go about addressing life’s challenges often appears being utterly counter-productive, and even suicidal. Yet, it is only mentally inadequate people who might suggest that ants are being more intelligent then mammals, for example. And the reason for this is simple – ants are only being capable of acting intelligently, while within the colony. Their “intelligence” has clearly defined collective subtleties. When being taken away from the colony, an individual ant would simply begin circling around, without any particular purpose, whatsoever. What it means is that insects represent the lower level of evolutional complexity – they have no “personal” mind.
Thus, it appears that we can only expect to be able to gain an indirect introspect on animals’ mind, while observing their behavior. Nowadays, the concept of “emotional intelligence” has become especially popular among enforcers of political correctness in places of learning, because this concept helps to explain why representatives of racial minorities score so poorly during the course of “euro-centric” IQ tests, without having their existential status being downgraded to that of sub-humans, as a result. However, it is namely the representatives of animal kingdom, to which the theory of “emotional intelligence” was meant to apply originally, because it explains why despite animals’ inability to adjust their behavior to considerations of logic, they should still be considered as intelligent creatures.
In his article “Animal Minds and Animal Emotions”, Marian Dawkins outlines the theoretical framework for measuring the extent of animals’ intelligence in the form of rhetorical question: “It does not take much intellectual effort to experience pain, fear or hunger. We can be conscious of a headache or afraid of flying without being able to put the experience into words or reason about it…Might it be, then, that our search for animal consciousness could fruitfully be extended to the realm of the emotions and therefore potentially to a much wider range of animals than just the ones that are outstandingly clever?” (Dawkins 2000, p. 884). Despite the fact that so-called “scientific creationists” are trying their best to undermine the validity of Darwin’s theory, there can be absolutely no doubt as to the fact that the specie of Homo Sapiens had descended from apes. And the reason for this is simple – there are a variety of atavistic features about people’s appearance and their behavior. For example, it is only on the seventh month of their development in the womb that human embryos loose tales. Why is it that human children enjoy so much being given ride on seesaw? This is because children are much closer to animals, as compared to adults, which in its turn, corresponds to the sheer acuteness of their genetic memory of the time when our ancestors were primates, living up on trees. (This also explains why children’s dreams often involve flying). The existential mode of members of primitive tribes still closely reminds that of apes – all these people are being concerned about is looking for food, indulging in tribal-warfare and making babies.
What it means is that we can refer to emotions as a precursor of intellect, in evolutionary sense of this word. Moreover, it might very well be the case that emotions should be thought of as the channel, through which underdeveloped but fully operational intellect expresses itself. And, there can be absolutely no doubt that animals (particularly mammals) are highly emotional beings. Dawn Weinberger’s article “Dogs Grieve for the Same Reason People Do’”, contains extensive observations of how dogs deal with the loss of a loved one: “Dogs grieve for the same reason people do… In extreme eases, the grieving dog might suffer sleep disturbances, engage in compulsive behavior, such as obsessively licking his paws, or even stop eating” (Weinberger 2008, p. 10). The feeling of grief, as a particularly strong emotional experience can only originate in the mind capable of establishing mental construct “adequateness” vs. “inadequateness”. The dog, affected by the death of his master, experiences emotional suffering for highly abstract reasons, which in its turn, implies such dog’s ability to memorize, to deduct and to realize the existential significance of its emotional feelings.
Thus, it will only be logical to assume if there is an “animal language” out there, it would be primarily concerned with expression of emotions. Moreover, the varying degree of expressional complexity in “animal language”, associated with representatives of particular specie, should also signify the degree of these animals’ physiological complexity. The empirical studies in the field of ethology (the science of animal behavior) fully confirm the conceptual validity of such our assumption. For example, the “language” of marmots consists of only five different high-pitched whistles, with the notions expressed through these vocalizations being emotionally-charged: “danger!”, “attention!”, “possible danger!”, “food!” and “run!”.
Given the fact that popular perception regards cats as being “sophisticate” animals, their language should reflect this fact. And, this appears to be exactly the case. In her article “Deciphering Cat Chat”, Fran Pennock Shaw states: “There are at least 200 of distinct phonetic patterns in cat vocalizations, including vowels and consonants. By adjusting their meows, house cats seek petting, sympathy and services from humans or express greeting, complaint and distress… Common concepts cats are expressing include ‘Hello’, ‘Pay attention to me’, ‘I want’ and ‘I don’t like” (Shaw 2008, p. 4). Despite the fact that cats’ language is being clearly concerned with expression of emotions, just as it is the case with other animals, the way cats communicate with each other and with humans implies their ability to rationalize these emotions. Therefore, it was not by an accident that cats became domesticated – apparently, cats’ emotional sophistication had created objective preconditions for these animals to be endowed with basic ability to adjust their behavior to rudimentary considerations of rationale. As of today, the number of cats in U.S. alone is estimated to account for 60 million.
In its turn, this provides us with the insight on the very origins of intellect as such that originates out specie members’ ability to “utilize” emotions”, as opposed to simply “experiencing” them. For example, cats and dogs are being fully capable of anticipating human reactions, in regards to the expression of their own emotions. This is the reason why especially smart cats have been noticed faking their emotions, in order to make their owners to act in one way or another. In her article “The Cat Always Gets What She Wants”, Kathleen Doane admits that her cat Moley fully controls its owner: “The cat (Moley) certainly knows how to get what she wants. I’ve always admired that trait in people. I confess, begrudgingly, that it impresses me in felines, too” (Doane 2008, p. 5). In other words, these animals appear being capable of understanding the sequential relationship between the concepts of “cause” and “effect”, which can be thought of as a metaphysical foundation, upon which just about any form of abstract theorizing is based.
Therefore, it would be logical, on our part, to expect animals with a developed “emotional intelligence” to succeed in performing essentially “human” mental tasks. In his article “What do Animals Think About Numbers?”, Marc D. Hauser talks about experiments, conducted on monkeys by psychologists from Columbia University, for the purpose of determining these animals’ ability to operate with numbers. The results of these experiments point out to the fact that monkeys posses a so-called “innate numerical sense”: “Recent experiments by psychologists Elizabeth Brannon and Herb Terrace of Columbia University show that captive rhesus monkeys can understand the ordinal relations among the numbers one to nine” (Hauser 2000, p. 146). According to Darwinian Theory, animals’ existential abilities cannot be thought of as “thing in itself” – that is, if monkey is being endowed with an ability to count, it means that there must be an objectively defined purpose for that. And, as it appears from recent ethological studies, the reason why monkeys can count is because they go about addressing existential challenges in similar manner with humans, which in its turn, implies these animals being intelligent creatures.
In her article “The Evolution of Economic Rationality: Do Monkeys Understand Money?”, Kathleen D. Vohs comes up with a suggestion that it is not only that monkeys can count, but that they are also capable of utilizing such their ability for the purpose of gaining economic control over their mates: “Keith Chen and Marc Hauser at Yale University taught monkeys about resources that bear a strong resemblance to money. Monkeys don’t care about money, per se, but they do care about marshmallows” (Vohs 2008). Researches have taught monkeys to repeatedly pull lever, in order to be paid with colored tokens for their “labor”. These tokens could be exchanged for marshmallows. However; whereas, some monkeys would go about pulling the lever, the others would not, while preferring to take tokens away from “working” monkeys with the mean of physical force or with the mean of deceit. Within a matter of short time, the monkeys that participated in experiment, had attained the status of “capitalist sharks” and “exploited proletarians” – just as it is the case with people within human societies.
Readers might ask – if monkeys are being so smart, how come they did not create a civilization of their own, in traditional sense of this word? Why did not they evolve beyond the Stone Age? The answer to this question fits well within a context of evolutionary theory – while being continuously evolved, a particular specie eventually reaches such a level of complexity that, in order for it to proceed with developing even further, it would have to undergo a so-called “evolutionary jump” (this explains the phenomenon of a “missing link”). While being nothing but hairless apes, in physiological sense of this word, humans nevertheless represent completely new specie, which can be best referred to as “super-apes”.
On the other hand, the part of primate specie from which we have descended, had simply become “specialized” – thus, proving its inability to cope up with the process of evolution. However, this does not mean that these primates are being “unintelligent”, as it is assumed to be the case with all animals by adherents of Semitic religions, but simply less intelligent. Moreover, just as it was the case among apes hundreds of thousands of years ago, Homo Sapiens’ existential complexity continues to be ever-increased, which will inevitably result in creation of a new specie. As Friedrich Nietzsche had put it in his prophetic book “Thus Spake Zarathustra”: “All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and you want to be the ebb of that great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than surpass man? What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame. And just the same shall man be to the Superman: a laughing-stock, a thing of shame” (Nietzsche 2003, p. 8). Apparently, there was nothing extraordinary about the process of primates slowly attaining bipedalism and becoming the dominant specie on Earth. While being deprived of a sheer physical strength, which would allow them to successfully compete with predators, our ape-like ancestors had no choice to increasingly rely on their emerging intellect, as the instrument of ensuring their physical survival.
However, the fact that high mammals have long ago been proven capable of utilizing their emotions as communicational medium, suggests that their intellect possesses although rudimentary, but essentially the same operational subtleties. In its turn, this explains why there is no fundamental difference in behavior of human and ape toddlers. We can say that the concept of intelligence itself continues to undergo a transformation – from “emotional” through “rationalistic” to “artificial”. This is the reason why domesticated high mammals can actually be communicated with by the mean of “emotional language”.
Unlike what it is the case with human languages, which often consist of as many as 300.000.000 words, the semantic significance of “emotional language” is being primarily concerned with the tone of pronounced words or sounds and with facial expressions, on the part of communicating parties. When we say “bad!” to misbehaving dog, while adjusting our facial expression accordingly, the animal will immediately know what we are trying to tell him. In his article “Our Inner Animal”, Lev Grossman says: “Beasts are more human and humans more bestial than we think. Vervet monkeys, prairie dogs and European starlings have rudimentary language systems, concerned with expressions of emotions” (Grossman 2009, p. 60). Therefore, it is namely the intensity of emotions, experienced by non-human animals, and their ability to use these emotions as communicational medium, which should be referred to as the quotient of these animals’ intelligence. And, the more representatives of a particular culture are being capable of recognizing this fact, the more they can be considered as humans, in full sense of this word. This is the reason why, the more civilized a particular country appears to be, the more its citizens are likely to provide humane treatment to animals. In the next part of this paper, we will strive to substantiate the validity of earlier articulated thesis by providing readers with relevant examples of “emotional communication” among different animals and by elaborating on how animals relate to humans, in behavioral context of this word.
There is very little doubt as to the fact that animals’ ability to communicate with each other by vocalizing their emotions should be thought of as the conceptual framework, upon which “animal language” is being based. However, it would be wrong to consider this language as serving exclamational purposes alone. In their article “Signalers and Receivers in Animal Communication”, Robert Seyfarth and Dorothy Cheney make a lot of sense while stating: “Vocal communication in animals is generally thought to differ from human language largely because the former is an “affective” system based on emotion, whereas the latter is a “referential” system based on the relation between words and the objects or events they represent. However, highly referential signals could, in principle, be caused entirely by a signaler’s emotions, or their production could be relatively independent of measures of arousal” (Seyfarth & Cheney 2003, p. 160). As we have pointed out earlier, marmots’ language consists of only five vocalizations, concerned with expressions of emotions. However, some ethological studies on how marmots communicate with each other provide us with the good reason to think that their language might have referential qualities, despite its simplicity.
For example, in their study “Situational Specificity in Alpine-marmot Alarm Communication”, Daniel Blumstein and Walter Arnold have proven marmots’ “language” to contain rudiments of referential specificity: “Our observations are consistent with the hypothesis that acoustic variation may be a function of the degree of risk that callers experience. Calls with fewer notes were elicited when humans were closer, and one-note alarm calls were often elicited to close aerial stimuli. By producing fewer notes in higher-risk situations, alpine marmots may vary their calls in a way that reduces conspicuousness to predators” (Blumstein & Arnold 1995, p. 11). Thus, there is certain intelligence about how even such comparatively primitive mammals as marmots communicate. However, when we analyze the behavior of chimpanzees, it will appear that their language is not only being operationally referential but even abstragized to a degree. There are many indirect proofs as to validity of this suggestion.
For example, chimpanzees seem to understand the semiotic significance of such terms as “friendship”, “envy”, “domination”, “law”, “economy”, “war”, “religion” etc. Just as humans, they are being highly ritualistic creatures. For example, while in the wild, the elders in chimpanzee colony go about performing something that appears to be a prayer – every morning, they claim up the nearest hill in order to greet rising sun by throwing their hands up and bowing. There is absolutely no logical explanation to such their behavior, unless we assume that these animals do perform an equivalent of ritualistic prayer. In her article “Chimps “R” Us?”, Kirsten Weir says: “We humans (Homo sapiens) are an amazing species. We solve difficult problems and use tools to make our work easier. We understand language and live in complex political societies. We can learn to operate computers and act in movies. We must be a unique bunch, right? Not really. Chimpanzees, our closest living relatives, do all those things too. New research suggests that chimps should be relabeled a second species of human” (Weir 2003, p. 4). Nevertheless, the numerous attempts to teach primates (not even to mention other animals) human language turned out to be unsuccessful. How can this be explained? The answer to this question has to do with the matters of physiology – primates have only one pair of vocal glands. They can be taught to understand the meaning of highly abstract concepts, but they cannot confirm such their understanding vocally.
The same thesis applies to other high mammals, although to varying extent. In this turn, this explains rationale behind a widespread human belief that if animals could talk, they would. There are numerous stories out there about cats and dogs trying to save their owners from an impending danger in absolutely rational manner. The editorial “Cairns Cat Saves Owners from Fire”, available on the web site of BBC, tells the story of Australian family of four being rescued from fire by their cat: “The occupant was woken by the household cat which was scratching his face, alerting (him) to the ensuing dangers” (BBC 2006). Apparently, most animals do not have an urgent need to indulge in communication with humans (which is explainable, given people’s tendency to think of these animals in terms of food), but when they do, they go about it with utter efficiency.
As we all have learnt by observing the behavior of today’s politicians, one’s ability to indulge in sophistically sounding but utterly meaningless rhetoric, does not necessarily serve as an ultimate proof of his or her high intelligence. For example, former U.S. President Bill Clinton is now being commonly referred to as “buffoon” by great many people, throughout the world, despite the fact that he used to think of himself as a “sophisticate”. Alternatively, high mammals’ inability to use our language, while trying to communicate with us, should not be thought of as the proof of their “unintelligibility”.
It is not person’s ability to memorize as many words as possible, which should be thought of as a reflection this person’s existential worth, but his or her ability to appropriately utilize words as verbal signifiers. For example, students that are being referred to as “nerds”, know how to operate with highly specialized/abstract terms – yet, it usually does not prevent them from acting absolutely dumb, while addressing life’s even simplest challenges. This can be explained by the fact that, unlike truly educated people, “nerds” are being incapable of understanding how the things they have learnt in school relate to surrounding reality. They do “know” a lot, but “understand” very little.
We can take a primitive savage from Africa and drop him in the middle of New York – the chances that he will be able to survive for even few days are rather slim. However, we can also grab one of those sophisticate New York’s professors, specializing in “existentialism”, out of Starbucks coffee shop and drop him somewhere in the middle of Equatorial Guinea – the effect will be essentially the same. This example was meant to illustrate that intelligence should be thought of as the measure of one’s ability to adequately address challenges, posed surrounding reality – despite our hypothetical professor’s existential sophistication, the natives of Equatorial Guinea would think of him as not particularly bright individual, because of his lack of a knowledge in regards to which bugs and snakes can be eaten and which cannot. Therefore, given the fact that animals are being specifically “designed” to cope up with objectively existing challenges in their environmental niche (just as it is the case with Guinea’s natives), they must be thought of as fully intelligent.
It is a truth, of course, that animals’ behavior is essentially instinctive. But the same can also be said about humans. After all – don’t we study to get a good education, so that we would be able to get a well-paid job, so that we would make a lot of money, so that this money would endow us with power, so that this power would make us especially attractive in the eyes of women, so that the survival of our genes would be ensured? Yes, it is a truth that the continuous well-being of domesticated animals depends exclusively on people’s good graces. Yet, there are also cases when people’s continuous well-being depends on their ability to enjoy animals’ companionship.
For example, the lives of many lonely blind people would become unbearable, if it was not up to assistance-dogs’ “good graces”. In her article “The Meaning of Companionship between a Person with a Disability and an Assistance Dog”, Laurel Rabschutz states: “Assistance dogs not only ameliorate functional limitations, but also enhance the psychological and social aspects of the lives of persons with disabilities. Insights on the individual meaningfulness of the companionship provided by partnering with an assistance dog are valuable in understanding the disability experience. It is estimated that over 20,000 assistance dogs (guide, hearing, and service) are currently working with persons with disabilities in the U.S.” (Rabschutz 2009, p. 59). It is namely people’s ability to relate to animals more then to representatives of their own specie, which explains the origins of a saying: “The more I get to know people, the more I like dogs”. And, the reason why many individuals feel that way is because, while pursuing close and personal relationship with domesticated animals, they never risk a chance of being lied to or being betrayed. While observing animals’ behavior, people come in touch with their own existential essence as beasts endowed with intellect. In its turn, this prevents them from abusing their existential superiority over the creatures of the wild. The Rudyard Kipling’s famous character Mowgli used to say to animals: “We are of the same blood, you and I”, without becoming less human, as a result. Therefore, whatever the illogical it might sound – the more people are being capable of recognizing the semiotic significance of animals’ emotions, the more they qualify for the title Homo Sapiens.
The conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows: 1) All animals are being endowed with “emotional intelligence”, although their behavior does not necessarily reflect the operational subtleties of such an intelligence. 2) Most domesticated mammals and primates are capable of utilizing their emotions as semiotic significants, which in its turn, allows these animals to indulge in rudimentary forms of rationalization. 3) Under no circumstances should the animals be referred to as “unintelligible”, but rather as intelligent-in-their-own-way creatures. 4) It is a myth that animals cannot be communicated with. However, the particularities of animals’ physiology prevent communication between animals and humans from becoming truly effective.
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