Introduction
Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union was marked by Operation Barbarossa, the primary purpose of which was the rapid seizure of the western part of the territories of the USSR for the subsequent settlement of the Germans and the suppression of Soviet troops. This operation owes its name to Friedrich Barbarossa, Holy Roman Emperor and an ancient twelfth-century German king. It likewise included the realization of ideological goals and the use of some of the conquered and taken into captivity people as laborers. Despite the eventual failure, planning for the operation was sufficient, but no consideration was given to the possibility of the conflict turning into a protracted form.
The preparation and execution of the operation provide an excellent case study for observing the Denial and Deception framework used by Germany in preparing for the offensive. The context of this paper examines the planning problems and flaws in Nazi military management that led to unsatisfactory outcomes for the invader. The main purpose is to critically evaluate the approaches to the preparation and course of the operation based on a multifactor analysis of the processes that took place. The main idea is the assertion that counting on the rapid completion of the operation was the main mistake in the implementation of the plan of Operation Barbarossa, with the preparation fully complying with the format of Denial and Deception.
Major Players
Many countries were directly involved in World War II throughout its duration. According to official information, more than sixty nations with a total population of about two billion were involved in one way or another in this protracted conflict (Ellman 2019). However, by focusing specifically on Operation Barbarossa, this study evaluates the balance of power between the Soviet Union and Germany with its allies (Ellman 2019). It is thus possible to distinguish the direct participants at the outbreak of the Second World War and allocate the largest parties more concretely.
On the side of the USSR, as the initial defending party, it is necessary to distinguish between the land and sea forces. Although most of the events took place on land, the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets were involved in fighting and supporting the troops (Matlack 2021). On the other hand, land force groups are commonly divided by their geographic location, with five main directions or fronts: North, Northwest, West, Southwest, and South. The armies on these fronts included troops from various countries that were part of the Soviet Union and had their respective locations: the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova.
On the attacking side, the military forces could be similarly divided according to the consideration of the front lines as well as their reserves. The three leading Army Groups, North, Center, and South, consisting of German troops, and the German-Finnish Army Group, with its Finnish allies, were the main active forces in the respective directions (Roediger et al. 2019). The Army General Command reserves of a brigade and several divisions were planned to be dispersed eastward following the operation to support the army groups and provide security. Thus, Operation Barbarossa involved minimal participation of Allied forces and was fundamentally a confrontation between two states that, until that time in history, had good relations with economic and military cooperation.
In the context of disinformation processes, the leading players must be identified as the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of both sides. In addition, Hitler personally, Propaganda Minister Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, representatives of the military and intelligence wings Kanaris, Schellenberg, Guilder, and others were involved in the planning of such activities on the German side (Matlack 2021). On the Soviet side, the Main Intelligence Directorate, senior army officials, and Stalin personally acted as leading process participants.
However, one should not also rule out similar war preparation activities on the part of the USSR. The fact that they were counting on a later conflict does not deny active reconnaissance activities and a similar German increase in the production of weapons and military equipment. Despite the signed pacts, the Soviet leadership did not forget the desire to attack their country, expressed by Hitler in his book. Significant investments were made in resources for mass production, and the operational doctrine of the Red Army was being developed (Ellman 2019; Gross and Sampat 2020). Defense expenditures were raised as a percentage of the gross national product, and training of the population through propaganda was ready to begin. Thus, more active denial and deception work from Soviet specialists could have been possible if Hitler had not started the war earlier. It can likewise be assumed that, in that case, the USSR itself would have started the war later.
Another negative contributions to the preparations was that the process of purging the ranks by Stalin continued at the time of the invasion. Most of the officer corps had been destroyed by the USSR’s dictator, and the efficiency of the intelligence and counterintelligence processes left much to be desired. Accordingly, expecting a military conflict later in the day, the Soviets could not have had time to conduct a full-scale disinformation campaign to cover their readiness for defense or even an attack on their own. The warnings of British Intelligence were ignored by Stalin because of his distrust of the British. He considered it a British ploy to draw the USSR into the war on his side (Abel et al. 2019). The Chinese spy Yan Baoshan, through his government, as well as his Soviet colleague Richard Sorge, warned of an attack on more than one occasion, even to the point of giving a specific date. However, although Stalin did not deny an impending attack, he minimized preparations out of concern for provoking Hitler.
Interests and Objectives
In the context of what happened, it is necessary to emphasize that the attacking side mostly had goals for the upcoming conflict because, due to Germany’s thorough preparations, the invasion was entirely unexpected for the Soviet Union. In addition to the global ideological objectives and plans to seize territory, the division of influence in Europe was not satisfactory to Nazi Germany, and its expansion was one of the reasons for the war (Stone 2019). Each group of Wehrmacht armies had its own direct task on its specific vector of offense (Roediger et al. 2019). The plan was to seize the Baltic and Black Sea ports and key cities – Leningrad, Kronstadt, Tallinn, Minsk, and Murmansk. Moreover, the occupation of territories up to the Dnipro River coast was listed as a goal in the main phase of the operation. Further development of successes was planned for planning based on the actual timing and course of the operation.
The USSR was likewise exceptionally interested in further expansion and growth of its influence in Europe. Stalin’s government had not anticipated such a rapid and large-scale conflict, so the state was not prepared for war, which provoked the initial German successes on the front (Michaels 2020, 536). Most of the armies were formed in a hurry and moved to the front at an accelerated pace, in which the supply and readiness of the soldiers suffered greatly. In addition, partial mobilizations of the population were carried out in the disguise of reserve training camps, during which people, often without military experience, were sent into combat zones. Propaganda focused on the fight against Nazism and the invaders, and the social discourse, because of the quality work of the state media and censorship, quickly changed the public’s view of Germany.
Reasons for Denial and Deception
According to the theoretical basis of the concept of Denial and Deception, secrecy and deceit are considered the main methods of military intelligence and counterintelligence. The reason for the relevance of assessing Germany’s preparations for Operation Barbarossa from the perspective of this framework was the use of techniques to conceal information and deceive the enemy before its implementation. As it is known, deception and denial of information or secretiveness are different, though complementary, efforts (Barnea and Meshulach 2021). Deception often refers to providing false information to the adversary, false news to form the wrong impression. Securing and classifying actual documentation, photos, and videos related to military or diplomatic activities complements the framework, being the quintessence of the concept of denial and concealment of information.
In addition, the dissemination of disinformation by the military intelligence of both countries took place not only during the preparation for the operation but also during its execution. Hiding the number of troops and information about their movements, including geographic locations and dates, and finding out the same information from the enemy was also the reason for using this framework (Barnea and Meshulach 2021). In conflicts between the intelligence agencies of warring states, the goal to mislead the enemy by falsifying information is a standard method of action to this day.
Objectives and Mechanics of the Effort
Undoubtedly, the main objectives of the German disinformation efforts were to mislead the Soviet leadership about the probability and timing of a potential German invasion. Another extremely important German goal was to control the lack of a bloc of anti-fascist states in Europe. The aggressive plans were covered by diplomatic measures to convince the future enemy of the successful development of peaceful German-Soviet relations (Michaels 2020). The transfer of military troops and military equipment to the eastern direction was carried out gradually. The increase in the military-industrial complex was explained for the USSR by the need for military action against Great Britain. Hitler’s personal involvement in the planning was particularly noted by his associates as having an effective result (Michaels 2020). The large-scale approach to the active use of Denial and Deception and its effectiveness, mainly due to the low level of technological development in 1941, should be further emphasized.
The Soviet Union carried out the reconnaissance activities with the aim of further expansion after the successful division of the territory of Poland according to the agreement concluded by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Molotov and Ribbentrop. Attempts at disinformation from Germany were periodically uncovered, and some of the reports reached Stalin (Michaels 2020). For some reason of his own, however, Stalin was confident that there was no near-term threat from the West, despite the confirmed accumulation of troops on the borders. Accurate information on that fact is not available today. However, it can be assumed that he had a high level of personal confidence in Hitler, who had a relatively similar ideology at the time. Based on Stalin’s known paranoid tendencies and mental instability, he might as well not have trusted his own country’s intelligence service and its reports, thereby increasing the effectiveness of Germany’s efforts to deceive.
The dissemination of false information directly involved senior officials of the German leadership, ranging from diplomats and ambassadors to military attachés. The influence was exercised through the dissemination of information in the Soviet Union during trade and economic or governmental visits by members of delegations and through the voicing of similar theses in third countries. Ostensible adherence to the Non-Aggression Pact was supposed to guarantee the enemy’s confidence that Germany had no economic or territorial claims.
In particular, one of the first points in the implementation of the Denial and Deception technique was Hitler’s official message to the USSR. The reason for this message was to lull the enemy’s vigilance by means of the upcoming signing of a pact with Japan. This arrangement was followed by an offer to the Soviet government to send Foreign Minister Molotov to Berlin to discuss participation in the occupation of the British Empire’s inheritance, including India and Iran (Li 2022). Accordingly, this helped increase the Soviet leadership’s confidence that Germany did not pose a danger until after the war with Britain. This conflict had been positioned by all means as Hitler’s leading and only military operation of interest. The demonstration of mutual trust and understanding caused by the previous treaties signed and their observance should have further reassured the Soviet government, and this goal was achieved.
Effects on the Situation
The primary and most significant effect was to carry forward most Soviet analysts’ predictions of deteriorating relations with Germany for several years because of the certainty that the conflict with Britain would continue further. This presumption achieved Hitler’s main goal, and Operation Barbarossa was launched as planned. The disbelief and uncertainty of the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war caused a large number of destructions and human and territorial losses (Laakkonen 2019). Despite the eventual failure of the operation, the initial German advance was showing success.
Another indirect effect was the decentralization of power due to Stalin’s temporary disappearance. The organization of the Communist Party of the USSR was an example of authoritarian rule. Germany’s successes were mainly due to the lack of coordination between civilian and military USSR leaders due to the absence of a ruler (Michaels 2020). The deaths of many officers and the capture of large numbers of Soviet soldiers during this period greatly affected the quality of the Soviet army and its losses in the further escalation of the conflict.
Effects on the Overall Situation
In a general format, the successful actions of Denial and Deception practically contributed to Germany’s considerable success at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. However, this could not affect the final result (Ellman 2019; Gross and Sampat 2020). Due to the insufficient level of strategic planning for the operation itself, a rapid end to the conflict by making the enemy capitulate was not possible, and an adequate plan for a protracted conflict was not in place with the current disposition of the forces.
Analysis of the Effort
It is necessary to compare the purpose of the Denial and Deception technique and its use by Germany with the actual purpose of the war to proceed with the analysis further. Although the deception and surprise attack succeeded, the level of disinformation in the hostile Soviet government was not high enough. The shortage of German agents in the USSR was one of the factors why not all possible options were worked out. In addition, when planning the whole operation with the expectation of a Blitzkrieg and a rapid surrender of the USSR, Nazi Germany underestimated the powerful gravitational pull of an authoritarian government. With a similar governing structure and Hitler’s excessive personal ambitions, the Communist Party’s reluctance to lose power was not factored into the planning process.
An even more critical point is the underestimation of the power and abilities of propaganda. While holding his own propaganda ministry and mastering the technique of subjugating the minds of the masses perfectly, Hitler underestimated a similar structure in the USSR. Evidently, in spite of the difference in mentality, the successful and rapid subjugation of territories and populations was assumed. However, apart from cultural differences in a state that was several times the size of Germany in terms of population, there could be no shortage of men capable of carrying arms (Abel et al. 2019). Motivation for the rank and file was provided by propaganda, while the highest leaders of the USSR were not actually under any threat, even in the most difficult later years of the war.
When trying to install counter-propaganda, impose its own ideology, or lure Soviet citizens to its side, Germany encountered incomprehension and rejection. This fact leads to the most logical critical judgment of the deception technique: in this regard, the aggressor was totally unprepared. The methods of disinformation, denial, and informational suppression in effect for Soviet citizens had not been performed and planned. Apparently, despite the universality of his approach, Hitler did not suspect a significant difference in the psyche (Abel et al. 2019). Thus, the brilliantly demonstrated framework of Denial and Deception in preparation for war was completely unadapted to its protraction, as was the military plan for Operation Barbarossa.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be formulated that an unequivocal confirmation of the thesis of the critical paper is achieved. Denial and deception were not fully implemented in support of not only the initiation of Operation Barbarossa but likewise its continuation to completion, which was one of the primary reasons for the failure of the operation along with poor strategic planning. The false confidence in a quick surrender of the USSR caused by the ease of deception in the preparation of the operation further influenced the lack of long-term military plans for the development of the offensive. Further opposition to enemy propaganda was unsuccessful due to a scarcity of preparation. Thus, the first significant and large-scale German operation was doomed to failure, significantly affecting the final outcomes of World War II.
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