Introduction
One of the most influential philosophers of the modern age, René Descartes, is renowned for his unconventional theories of knowledge and reality and his methodological skepticism. Descartes contends that even if he cannot be confident of the outside world’s existence, he is aware that he is a thinking creature in his well-known article “Meditations on First Philosophy.”
Descartes’ assertion that he is aware that he is a thinking object is an essential step in his philosophical endeavor. Still, it is ultimately erroneous since it is predicated on an unproven premise and fails to take the body’s part in the thinking process into account. By comparing and contrasting Descartes’ view with David Parfit’s and Gilbert Ryle’s objections, the essay will argue that Descartes’ knowledge of being a thinking thing is limited and that his approach to knowledge acquisition is insufficient.
Descartes’ Claim and Its Central Role in Epistemology
Descartes’ claim that he recognizes himself as a thinking being is controversial since it is unclear if this assertion is true. Descartes contends that even if everything he sees is a dream or an illusion, he can only be positive because he exists as a thinking object (Cottingham 20). This important assertion lays the theoretical groundwork for all subsequent beliefs. If Descartes is correct, then his existence as a thinking creature may serve as the cornerstone upon which all knowledge can be constructed. If he is incorrect, his whole philosophical claim collapses.
Objections
Gilbert Ryle’s “Descartes’ Myth” offers one perspective that disputes Descartes’ assertion. Ryle claims that Descartes commits a category error by separating the mind and the body. Ryle defines reason as a collection of dispositions and actions rather than a single thing that thinks (Ryle). Descartes creates a false duality between mind and body when he claims to be a thinking entity. Descartes’ assertion that he is optimistic about his existence as a thinking being is challenged by Ryle’s argument, which rejects the reality of such a thing.
Consequently, Derek Parfit’s “Personal Identification” provides another perspective undermining Descartes’ thesis. According to Parfit, personal identity is an issue of causal continuity rather than psychological continuity, as Descartes implies (Parfit 3). Parfit uses the example of a brain transplant to argue that psychological continuity is not enough to develop a personal identity.
According to Parfit, if two persons exchanged brains, the one possessing Descartes’ memories would not be Descartes since there would be a break in causal continuity (Parfit 12). Ryle and Parfit vehemently disagree with Descartes’ assertion that he is confident of his existence as a thinking entity. Whereas Parfit’s argument questions the standards for determining the individual identity that Descartes presupposes, Ryle’s objection disputes the reality of the item Descartes claims to be certain. He must respond to these criticisms to save Descartes’ assertion.
Possible Cartesian Responses
In response to Ryle’s point, Descartes may respond that he is not constructing a false dichotomy between thought and body but rather striving to uncover what is definite about his existence. Even if the mind is not distinct, Descartes may be positive that he exists as something that thinks (Ryle). Descartes may respond to Parfit’s point by claiming that psychological continuity is vital for personal identity since it defines who we are. Descartes may argue that even if two persons had the same experiences, they would not be the same since their dispositions and acts would be different.
Deeper Criticisms
However, these responses must fully address the objections raised by Ryle and Parfit. Descartes assumes he can separate the mind from the body and still exist as a thinking thing, but Ryle’s objection denies the possibility (Descartes 6). Descartes assumes that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity, but Parfit’s objection challenges this assumption.
One criticism of Descartes’ reasoning is that it assumes the presence of an “I” or self that thinks, which is contrary to Plato’s meno about knowledge (Plato et al. 38). The argument is based on the premise that a subject is thinking and that this subject is the same as the “I” who doubts in the first meditation (Gettier 120). Therefore, it is unclear if we can deduce the presence of an “I” from the fact that we are thinking. Descartes may respond that the notion of self is not something he is attempting to prove but rather something he accepts as a necessary condition for thinking. He may argue that even if the self is not self-evident or intrinsic, we must assume it to make sense of our experiences.
Another criticism leveled against Descartes’ reasoning is that it is circular. The theory seems to be founded on the premise that the only certainty we have is that we are thinking things, yet this assumption is already dependent on the presence of an “I” or self that is thinking (Cottingham 16). Based on Haslanger (95), Descartes might respond by claiming that the circularity issue misses the meaning of his argument. He may reply that his argument is designed to demonstrate that the self is separate from the body rather than to establish the existence of the self.
Conclusion
Descartes’ claim that he knows he is a thinking thing, even if he cannot be certain of the external world’s existence, is a crucial step in his philosophical project. Still, it ultimately fails to account for the role of the body in the thinking process. Gilbert Ryle’s objection challenges Descartes’ dichotomy between mind and body, while Derek Parfit’s objection challenges the criteria for establishing personal identity. These objections to Descartes’ argument suggest that it presupposes the existence of an “I” or self that thinks and that it is circular. Therefore, Descartes’ approach to knowledge acquisition needs to be revised, and his claim to know that he is a thinking thing is limited.
Works Cited
Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy in Which the Existence of God and the Real Distinction of Mind and Body Are Demonstrated. Watchmaker Publishing, 2007.
Cottingham, John. René Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies. Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Gettier, Edmund L. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis, vol. 23, no. 6, Oxford UP, 1963, p. 121. Web.
Haslanger, Sally. “Ontology and Social Construction.” Philosophical topics 23.2 1995: 95–125. Web.
Parfit, Derek. “Personal Identity.” The Philosophical Review, vol. 80, no. 1, Duke UP, 1971, p. 3. Web.
Plato, George Maximilian Anthony Grube, and J. Cooper. Five Dialogues. Hackett Publishing Company, 1981.
Ryle, G. 2002. Descartes’ Myth. Web.